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Abstract
This thesis is a collection of independent empirical essays on gender and political economy.
The first chapter investigates the effect of a pro-Islamist local government on female employ-
ment, using a unique dataset of civil servants in Turkish municipalities. Exploiting quasi-
random variation in contested local elections and the time variation in the repeal of the headscarf
ban, I establish two results. First, an Islamist mayor employs a lower share of females when
religious women are denied jobs. Second, an Islamist mayor does not recruit females differently
than a secular mayor, when institutions allow religious females to work. The proposed mech-
anism is the Islamist mayors’ preference for religious female employees, rather than intrinsic
gender bias.
The second chapter, co-authored with Marco Francesconi and Astrid Kunze, investigates labor
demand effects of the extension of parental leave duration in Norway. We focus on whether
and how firms adjust the gender composition of their workforce when the opportunity costs
of certain types of workers rise. Using rich employer-employee data, we uncover that firms
substitute potential mothers and fathers with older workers. Our results demonstrate potentially
undesirable consequences of parental leave for women, even when some leave is provided for
men.
In the third chapter, co-authored with Fatih Serkant Adıgu¨zel and Aslı Cansunar, we consider
the extent to which the geography of healthcare provision is effective in buying electoral votes.
We construct a unique database of free primary healthcare clinics in Istanbul, Turkey. We esti-
1
mate that a ten-minute decrease in walking time to the nearest clinic increases support for the
incumbent party by 6 percentage points in local elections. While low-educated voters only care
about visibility, highly-educated voters only value quality of healthcare. We argue that the spa-
tial distribution of public service provision captures the information available to voters, which
in turn, influences political outcomes.
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Chapter 1
Headscarves and Female Employment
1.1 Introduction
Religious conservatism, especially in Islam, is associated with patriarchal values. An often-
voiced concern is therefore whether pro-Islamist institutions undermine women’s emancipa-
tion.1 Indeed, findings from the World Values Survey demonstrate that religious people have
less progressive attitudes towards women’s rights, and are less favorable for working women.
The relationship is stronger for Muslims (Guiso et al. [2003]). Moreover, Muslim-majority
countries have low female labor force participation compared to their counterparts with simi-
lar levels of development. However, economists have paid scant attention to the link between
pro-Islamist institutions and female employment. This paper documents the first piece of causal
evidence on the consequences of Islamist political rule on female employment outcomes.
In fact, consequences of Islamist political rule for females are ambiguous ex-ante. Islamist
governments can expand opportunities for women by removing some participation constraints
(for example by alleviating the ban on headscarves in schools and workplaces) while reinforc-
ing traditional gender roles in the society.2 In recent years, many Western democracies have
endorsed bans that limit the use of the Islamic veil on the grounds that Islam is incompati-
1Fish [2002] shows that the status of women is significantly worse in societies with religious traditions. Donno
and Russett [2004] find that Islamist governments tend to support both autocratic government and repression of
women’s rights.
2Arat [2010] refers to this trade-off between the expansion of religious freedoms and threats to gender equality
as “Turkey’s democratic paradox”.
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ble with values of their societies,3 while Turkey’s pro-Islamist Justice and Development Party
(AKP, hereafter) has gradually lifted a longstanding restriction on headscarves.4 Under the rule
of a democratically elected pro-Islamist party, Turkey provides an ideal setting to investigate
the effects of Islamist political control on female employment outcomes.
This paper focuses on the impact of Islamist political rule on female employment in Turkish
municipalities, and whether lifting the headscarf ban for public employees changes this rela-
tionship. When women are deterred from covering their heads in state offices, the pro-Islamist
mayor reduces the female share of municipal employees. However, after the repeal of the head-
scarf ban, an Islamist mayor does not recruit females differently than a secular mayor who
marginally won the election. Together, these findings suggest that Islamist political rule is com-
patible with female empowerment only when there are no secular restrictions in labor market
institutions.
Turkish municipalities offer a unique setting where religious preferences of the authority
determining female employment can be proxied with his party affiliation.5 However, Islamic
parties are supported in constituencies with religiously conservative preferences, where women
have a lower status and fewer rights. To isolate the causal impact of Islamist political rule, I
implement a Regression Discontinuity (RD) design. Using a unique administrative dataset of
municipal employees, I compare the female share of employees within municipal governments
in municipalities with marginally elected Islamist and secular mayors, before and after the in-
troduction of headscarves. I condition on having a secular incumbent to isolate the effect of
religious party takeover. Municipalities, where the secular mayor won by a small margin, are ar-
guably appropriate counterfactuals for municipalities where the Islamist mayor won marginally.
I implement a difference-in-discontinuities design in the spirit of Grembi et al. [2016], to
identify the differential effect of AKP victory in local elections when headscarves are allowed
or not. This method allows me to exploit two sources of variation simultaneously: exogenous
3For a timeline of the recent legislation in the West concerning the Muslim veil, see: https://
www.theguardian.com/world/2017/mar/14/headscarves-and-Muslim-veil-ban-debate-timeline
4Until 2013, women with veils remained proscribed in state institutions. Wearing visible symbols at work was
prohibited for civil servants, as they had to be impartial and neutral by law.
5The mayor’s type is Islamist or secular, defined by the mayor’s political party affiliation. I consider a mayor
to be pro-Islamist if he is from the pro-Islamist party AKP, and secular if he is from any other political party.
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timing of the nationwide headscarf legislation, and quasi-random variation in mayor type in
contested local elections.
Despite the negative raw correlations between electing an Islamist mayor and female em-
ployment both before and after the repeal of the headscarf ban, the RD results reveal that the
Islamist mayors do not recruit females differently than a secular mayor, when there are no sec-
ular restrictions. Confirming conventional wisdom, Islamist mayors employ females less when
they replace a secular mayor. However, the difference-in-discontinuities analysis shows that the
repeal of the headscarf ban changes the effect of the Islamist mayor on female employment.
Two potential mechanisms explain my results: intrinsic bias of the AKP mayors against fe-
male employees, or preference for religious co-workers. Using data on educational attainment
by gender, I test these mechanisms and find compelling evidence ruling out the former mecha-
nism.
The paper is outlined as follows: Section 1.2 surveys the literature, section 1.3 outlines the
institutional framework, section 1.4 describes the empirical strategy, section 1.5 documents the
findings, and section 1.6 concludes.
1.2 Related Literature
In addition to the broader literature on Islam and development Kuran [2017], there is an emerg-
ing literature on the effects of Islamist political parties. Several recent studies have shown that
society’s and women’s welfare seem to have improved in several dimensions under Islamist po-
litical rule. Blaydes [2014] finds that women living in a neighborhood in Cairo ruled by radical
Islamists had better reproductive health outcomes than women in a comparable neighborhood
dominated by non-Islamist local leaders. Bhalotra et al. [2014] show that Muslim political
representation improves health and education outcomes in India in the district from which the
legislator is elected. Henderson and Kuncoro [2011] detect lower corruption in districts where
Muslim parties had a higher representation in the assemblies in Indonesia.
Generally, this paper contains some interesting results that contribute to the literature on
religion and female empowerment by using original data on employment. Closely linked stud-
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ies that use data from Turkey, include Gulesci and Meyersson [2012] and Meyersson [2014].
Gulesci and Meyersson [2012] show that a compulsory schooling reform in Turkey has effec-
tively improved women’s empowerment outcomes and lowered self-reported religiosity. Mey-
ersson [2014] demonstrates that religiously conservative political leaders can have socially pro-
gressive effects. In municipalities where the pro-Islamist party marginally won the 1994 local
elections in Turkey, females were more likely to complete high school, and marry at a later age.
These results are explained by the success of the pro-Islamist party on effectively removing
barriers to education for the poor and pious: by increasing the number of school buildings, and
alleviating the enforcement of headscarf ban.6 Estimated effects are more pronounced in poorer
and religiously more conservative communities.
Although Meyersson [2014] constitutes an important benchmark for this study, it is impor-
tant to outline the differences between his paper and mine. Unlike the current paper, Meyersson
[2014] does not study the effects of Islamist party rule on women’s labor market outcomes. In
addition, the current paper focuses on the impact of the repeal of the headscarf ban, whereas
Meyersson [2014] only considers the effects of Islamist political rule at the local level. The
contribution of this paper relative to Meyersson is to look at the interaction of Islamic munici-
pal government with the repeal of the headscarf ban. It is the causal effect of the repeal of the
headscarf ban that is crucial for this paper’s contribution.
Second, this study estimates a direct effect of the local politician. Municipal personnel is
appointed by local authorities, which allows me to isolate the effect of the local politician from
any spillover effects. The outcome of interest, the gender composition of employees within the
municipal government, is one which the mayor can influence directly. Third, my study encom-
passes a more recent time frame (15 years later), when Turkish politics have been relatively
stable. The Islamist party which is the subject of my paper, the AKP, has been continuously
in power (both at the local and national level) since 2002. The Islamist party considered in
Meyersson [2014], Welfare Party (Refah Partisi), was shut down by the constitutional court in
1998; and the study considers a period with transitory and volatile political dynamics. Never-
6The Turkish mixed-gender education curriculum did not allow students to wear religious symbols at school,
including the headscarf for women. This ban was recently lifted in high school in 2014, raising a lot of controver-
sies.
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theless, the results in my paper resonate with Meyersson [2014]: pro-Islamist institutions can
implement policies that empower the pious women.
Surprisingly few studies have addressed the relationship between Islam and female employ-
ment. Hayo and Caris [2013] tests the role of Islam and cultural tradition on females’ labor
market participation decisions, showing that traditional values deter women from participating
in the labor market. In this respect, the current paper is a major contribution by causally linking
Islamist political rule and female employment. Another under-studied component of Islam, is
veiling. Perhaps due to unavailability of data, policy impact evaluations have not devoted at-
tention to veiling regulations. On this issue, Carvalho [2012] and Patel [2012] offer theoretical
predictions to the impact of veiling regulations. Carvalho [2012] predicts that veiling bans can
inhibit social integration and increase religiosity. This result is consistent with evidence from
the current study: veiling bans keep women with headscarves away from the labor market, rein-
forcing traditional values and potentially increasing religiosity among this group of women. In
another interesting study, Patel [2012] finds that freedom of clothing surprisingly benefits pious
women as it enables them to signal their types using more conservative clothing styles credi-
bly. When Islamist governments enforce conservative clothing, this prevents religious Muslim
women from revealing their types. This suggested mechanism can be applied in the context
of the current study: Islamic dress has an informational role, signaling the employee’s piety
(which is otherwise unobservable to the employer), and can be rewarding when the employer
prefers religious employees.
1.3 Political and Institutional Framework
1.3.1 Religion and Politics in Turkey
Religion and politics have long been intertwined in Turkish politics. Since transitioning to
multi-party politics in 1946, Turkey’s political history has been dominated by the conflict be-
tween the secular military and religiously rooted parties. Turkey has experienced three military
14
coups d’e´tat and several Islamist political parties have been closed by the military because they
undermined the secularist principles of the constitution.
The pro-Islamist Justice and Development Party (officially abbreviated AKP) has won plu-
ralities in all legislative elections since 2002. AKP is the biggest pro-Islamist party currently in
the political arena.7 In 2008, the Public Prosecutor took AKP to court seeking to close the party
due to its anti-secular activities, but the Constitutional Court decided in the party’s favor.
In the recent years, the AKP has been pushing for an increasingly religious agenda. Politi-
cians from the AKP have been emphasizing the cohesion and integrity of the family over indi-
vidual empowerment of women, and reinforcing traditional gender roles in media appearances.
Some examples include: “Mothers’ only career should be motherhood”, “You cannot make
women and men equal; this is against nature”.8. This has raised some eyebrows in the interna-
tional media as well (see New York Times [2012] and The Atlantic [2011].)
Headscarf rights have always been a salient and controversial issue in Turkish politics. The
1982 Turkish constitution, legislated with the principle of official secularism following the mil-
itary coup, regulates clothing standards of civil servants, requiring that female civil servants’
heads must be uncovered. An interpretation of this law in 1997 extended the ban on head-
scarves to all universities in Turkey. In recent years, Turkey’s Islamist-rooted government led
by AKP, has gradually abandoned the official ban on Muslim headscarves. In 2010, the ban
was annulled in university campuses, 2013 for state institutions, 2014 for high schools, 2016
for policewomen, and latest in 2017 for female army officers. 9
1.3.2 Local Governance
This subsection provides a brief overview of the structure and hiring roles of local government
in Turkey, to provide better insight into the context. Municipalities are the main local authorities
in Turkey, and provide public services (health, social assistance, education, and transportation)
7There are two other small pro-Islamist parties: the Welfare Party and the Great Union Party. They are not
included in the main analysis, as will be explained later in the text.
8Hurriyet Daily News [2015], Newsweek [2014]
9Appendix A.1.7 shows that the headscarf reforms in educational institutions are not correlated with the treat-
ment of AKP mayor in contested municipalities, and hence does not confound the results.
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within their borders.10 Municipalities function under the direct influence of a mayor, elected by
plurality in local elections for a five-year term. The influence of mayors has increased gradually
as pressures from the central government eased in the post-1980 period.11
The law of municipalities explicitly states that mayors oversee municipal recruitment (cre-
ation, termination and change of positions). Municipal personnel comprise 5% of total public
personnel, and is employed in secretariat, fiscal services, technical services, municipal police
and other units that are established with respect to specific demands of the municipalities (State
Personnel Department [2015]).12 Public services in municipalities are carried out by four types
of staff: civil servants, permanent workers, contracted workers and temporary workers. The
focus of this study is civil servants, who constitute the largest group of municipal personnel,
and 4% of total public labor force. The analysis is restricted to civil servants as regular and
reliable social security data was available only for this group of employees. Civil servants carry
comparative administrative tasks. While it would be interesting to also compare the effects on
gendersegregated tasks, there is no data on these other types of positions, and hence the effects
on them can not be studied.
Civil servants are higher-status staff and are assigned to administrative positions. All civil
servant positions are tenured. Civil servants need a high school or university diploma (depend-
ing on the job opening) to take the centralized Public Personnel Selection Exam, or a special
exam for specific higher-status positions. Municipal personnel appointed in civil servant posi-
tions (subject to Social Security Law 657) earn the highest salary among municipal employees.
The after-tax salaries of civil servants working in municipal governments vary between 2,582-
3,067 TRY as of January 2018, equivalent to e544-622, which is almost twice the minimum
wage.13
Municipalities have become an important ground for politicians to implement their preferred
10Municipal revenues constitute a non-negligible portion of the national budget: The revenues of local govern-
ments constitute 3.9 % of GDP, and expenses of local governments constitute 4.1% of GDP (2013 figures from
Ministry of Development [2015]).
11Bayraktar [2007] provides a historical perspective on the evolution of Turkish municipal framework. Bayraktar
[2007] and Bayraktar and Massicard [2012] discuss the personal empowerment of the mayors.
12Expert and technical staff such as lawyers, architects, engineers, computer analysts, physicians, nurses,
chemists and technicians may be employed on a contractual basis in the municipality based on the needs.
13Source: http://www.memurilanlari.org/belediye-memur-maaslari-ne-kadar/687/. After-tax minimum wage is
determined to be 1,603 TRY for 2018, amounting to e325. Source: http://www.muhasebetr.com/asgari-ucret/
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policies.14 To prevent partisan and patronage policies in municipal recruitment, the principle of
standards for permanent staff was established in 2007 (Resmi Gazete [2007]). Accordingly, the
Ministry of the Interior determines the number, titles and qualifications of the staff that local
authorities can hire.15 Within certain limits determined by the center, municipalities can freely
appoint and reappoint staff.16
Hiring and firing practices are similar and quite inflexible for permanent staff. Municipal-
ities announce vacancies to hire employees with respect to their needs, indicating the number
and qualifications for the available posts to the Ministry of Interior for hiring civil servants.
Municipal authorities then choose from the pool of applicants (sent by these institutions) after a
written or oral exam. A change in the Municipal Decree in 2007 abolished central placement of
municipal personnel after the public personnel exam. This change undermined the objectivity
of the central civil servant appointment system and created room for preferential recruitment.
Therefore, Turkish municipalities provide an interesting testing ground to study if Islamist
and secular mayors hire females differently. In fact, the results of the paper can be viewed more
generally, if one draws an analogy between municipalities-mayors, and firms-CEO’s, where the
religious preferences of the CEO’s can be measured.
1.4 Difference-in-Discontinuities Design
To identify the effect of an Islamist mayor on female employment, I exploit the timing of the
local elections and of the repeal of the headscarf ban. The timeline below demonstrates the
two treatments and the two periods in the analysis. The first treatment is the mayor treatment,
indicating whether the AKP mayor won or lost the local elections in 2009 and 2014, condi-
tioning on a secular incumbent. The second treatment is the introduction of headscarves to all
state institutions at the end of the year 2013. I refer to the period before the introduction of
14See Bayraktar and Massicard [2012]. Newspapers frequently report that civil service positions are steadily
being filled with AKP partisans.
15The main criterion in determining the permanent staff is the population of the locality. In addition, the type of
the municipality, its touristic and industrial values are also considered.
16There are two strict conditions: 1. the permanent staff cannot exceed the numbers determined by the central
government (but it can be less). 2. spending on personnel cannot exceed 30 % of the municipal budget.
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headscarves as t = 09, marked by the mayor elected in 2009 local elections; and the period after
the introduction of headscarves as t = 14, marked by the mayor elected in 2014 local elections.
This timeline allows me to compare two Regression Discontinuities (RD) in a Difference-in-
Discontinuities (diff-in-disc) design introduced by Grembi et al. [2016]. One crucial difference
with respect to Grembi et al. [2016] is that the headscarf treatment is independent of the running
variable, as the law applies to all municipalities at the national level.
2009 2014
AKP mayor AKP mayor
Headscarves
t=09 t=14
1.4.1 Empirical Setup
Mit denotes the mayor treatment for municipality i at time t ∈ {09,14}, conditional on having
a secular incumbent. Mit is equal to one if AKP mayor takes over, and equal to zero otherwise.
xit denotes the running variable, defined as the AKP win margin and constructed as the vote
share difference between AKP and the largest secular party (vote share of the secular party
with the most votes among secular parties). xit ranges between -1 and 1, and determines sharp
assignment to the mayor treatment, with the cutoff being equal to 0. The assignment to AKP
mayor follows a deterministic rule: Mit = 1(xit ≥ 0), where 1 is the indicator function.
xit =

xi,09, t = 09
xi,14, t = 14
Hit denotes the introduction of headscarves: whether headscarves were allowed or banned
at the time of election. The headscarf treatment is equal to 0 in t = 09, when headscarves are
banned; and equal to 1 in t = 14, when the ban has been lifted.
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1.4.2 Identification
Let Y = (Y 1t ,Y
0
t ) denote potential outcomes, and Yt = Y
0
t + τtMit be the observed outcome.
Following the notation in Hahn et al. [2001], let Y+t and Y
−
t denote the observed mean outcomes
marginally above and below the 0 cutoff of AKP win margin. x¯ denotes the discontinuity point,
and is equal to 0.
Y+t ≡ lim
xt→x¯+
E{Yit |xit = x¯}= E{Yt |x¯+}
Y−t ≡ lim
xt→x¯−
E{Yit |xit = x¯}= E{Yt |x¯−}
Under the standard continuity and local randomization assumptions, the sharp RD estimator
identifies the causal effect of AKP mayor at time t, and can be expressed as:
τ09 = Y09+−Y09−
τ14 = Y14+−Y14−
Finally, the diff-in-disc estimator is defined as the difference between the two RD estimators:
δ ≡ τ14− τ09 (1.1)
Identification in this setting requires additional assumptions to the standard continuity as-
sumptions of RD, which are listed below and discussed extensively in the following sections.
1. Continuity: All potential outcomes are continuous in x at 0.
E{Y 0t |x¯+}= E{Y 0t |x¯−} ∀t ∈ {09,14}
E{Y 1t |x¯+}= E{Y 1t |x¯−} ∀t ∈ {09,14}
2. Local Parallel Trends: The effect of AKP mayor at x = 0 is constant over time in the
case of no change in headscarf law. This assumption requires observations just below and
above the 0 threshold to be on a local parallel trend, in the absence of policy change in H.
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The parallel trend assumption of difference-in-differences (DID, in what follows) must
be met only in a neighborhood of the win margin threshold. In the absence of a change in
headscarf law, this implies:
τ14 = Y 114−Y 014 = Y 109−Y 009 = τ09
Not the same municipalities staying above and below the win threshold! In fact they do
not! Note that: Different municipalities have close elections in different years.
3. Homogeneity: Probability of receiving the headscarf treatment does not depend on mayor
type.
Under assumptions 1 and 2, δ is the average treatment effect (ATE) of how relaxing the head-
scarf ban changes the effect of AKP mayor on female share of employees in municipalities.
1.5 Islamist Political Rule and Female Employment
1.5.1 Data Description
I combine data from different sources to construct a panel of 1,258 Turkish municipalities for
a period of 10 years covering 2 local elections. Data for 2009 and 2014 local elections come
from the Turkish Statistical Institute (TurkSTAT).17 Electoral returns data include vote counts
for all parties, the number of actual and registered voters, and total vote counts for each mu-
nicipality.18 In the analysis that follows, the pro-Islamist mayor is defined as a mayor from the
Islamic-rooted party AKP. Two other parties can be classified as pro-Islamist: the Welfare Party
(SP), and the Great Union Party (BBP). In the main analysis, I exclude municipalities where
AKP won or lost to one of the other pro-Islamist parties.19 Figure 1.1 provides an overview of
the regional variation in contested elections, using data on the 2009 local elections.
17I also use data on 2004 Local Elections from the same source to control for incumbency in 2009.
18Votes for independent candidates are pooled, and therefore not considered here.
19Dropping these observations do not affect the results, as this constitutes a very small number of municipalities.
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Figure 1.1: Map of contested elections. Data from the 2009 local elections. The markers indicate the geographical
location of the municipalities that had contested elections.
The main outcome variable is the share of female employees within the municipal gov-
ernments. I use unique administrative data based on social security records on civil servants
working in municipal governments, which covers the entire population of municipalities. It
is a challenging task to obtain administrative data on the Turkish labor market.20 Data is not
available prior to 2008. This restricts my analysis to the 2008-2017 period. This data reports
end of the year stocks of personnel in each municipality by gender, from 2008 to 2017.21 An
important limitation of the data is that there is no information on hires, fires, and quits; which
makes it impossible to pin down supply and demand effects.22
I use additional characteristics of municipalities to test the validity of the design. Data on all
covariates are at municipality level, and come from different datasets: the Address-Based Pop-
ulation Register, and National Education Statistics Database of the Turkish Statistical Institute
(TurkSTAT).23 Demographic characteristics include municipality-level averages of population
and distribution of age groups, education statistics (literacy rate and completed schooling) by
gender, and the proportion of never-married females between ages 15-30. Data on general labor
20Personnel data has been prepared specifically for this study by the Social Security Institution of Turkey.
Municipality-level personnel data has been aggregated from individual social security records, by extracting the
municipality names from workplaces.
21I use data from June for 2017, since the end of the year data was not yet available as this paper was written.
22Data on characteristics of employees (including age, education, tenure, wages) was not provided due to confi-
dentiality purposes.
23All data have been prepared by the TurkSTAT at municipality level upon request.
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market characteristics are not available.
Table 1.1 summarizes the characteristics of municipalities for t = 09 (measured in the year
2008), and Table 1.2 for t = 14 (measured in the year 2013), by mayor type.
Table 1.1: Descriptive Statistics for t = 09
t = 09
Secular Mayor AKP Mayor
AKP vote share (2009) 0.315 0.463
(0.107) (0.095)
Voter Turnout (2009) 0.873 0.870
(0.064) (0.074)
Number of parties receiving votes (2009) 6.052 5.979
(1.997) (2.221)
Literacy Rate 0.888 0.889
(0.081) (0.074)
Secondary Educ. Completion 0.256 0.241
(0.110) (0.095)
Secondary Educ. Completion-females 0.212 0.194
(0.120) (0.101)
Observations 3,324 3,450
Election data comes from the local elections in 2009, other characteristics belong
to the pre-election year 2008. Sample means and standard deviations are reported.
average values in the pre past reform period. literacy and secondaet educ rates are
from years 2008 and 2011.
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Table 1.2: Descriptive Statistics for t = 14
t = 14
Secular Mayor AKP Mayor
AKP vote share (2014) 0.323 0.497
(0.113) (0.095)
Voter Turnout (2014) 0.894 0.897
(0.053) (0.057)
Number of parties receiving votes (2014) 6.565 6.437
(2.675) (2.361)
Literacy Rate 0.935 0.938
(0.046) (0.038)
Secondary Educ. Completion 0.286 0.273
(0.135) (0.105)
Secondary Educ. Completion-females 0.223 0.204
(0.135) (0.099)
Observations 1,828 2,688
Election data comes from the local elections in 2014, other characteristics be-
long to the pre-election year 2013. Sample means and standard deviations are re-
ported.average values in the pre past reform period. literacy and secondaet educ rates
are from years 2013-2016.
Due to the nature of the Regression Discontinuity, which exploits the discontinuity in mayor
type at the win margin, I only keep municipalities where the AKP was ranked first or second
in the local elections of 2009 and 2014. Unfortunately, personnel information is missing for a
subsample of the municipalities due to administrative errors.24 I keep municipalities for which
there is employment data for each year between 2008 and 2017. I further restrict the sample to
municipalities with a secular incumbent. The true effect of Islamist political rule is revealed in
municipalities where the AKP takes over.
24The share of municipalities for which personnel information is missing varies between 10-12% across the
years. Winner of the local elections (AKP or secular party) is balanced across municipalities that have missing
data, and the probability of the match is not correlated with the mayor type or the AKP win margin.
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This results in a final sample of 1,258 municipalities, and a total number of 12,580 obser-
vations from 2008-2017.25 Among the municipalities, 672 are treated with an AKP mayor, and
586 are in the control group.
To measure female employment, the outcome of interest, I compute the female share of
civil servants in municipalities. I define the outcome for t = 09 as the female share of municipal
employees in years 2009-2013, and the outcome for t = 14 as the female share of municipal
employees in years 2014-2017.26 Table 1.3 presents summary statistics for the outcome vari-
able, in t = 09 and t = 14, by mayor type. The next subsection documents the findings.
Table 1.3: %Females Employed in Municipalities
Secular Mayor AKP Mayor
Y09 0.106 0.084
(0.128) (0.112)
Y14 0.123 0.10
(0.135) (0.115)
The sample is split by period and by
mayor type. Mean outcome and standard
deviations are reported.
1.5.2 Main Results
Restricting the sample to municipalities with contested elections, I estimate the following model
for each observed outcome of municipality i at time t.
Yit = α0+α1xit +θ0Mit +θ1Mitxit +Hit [γ0+ γ1xit + β0︸︷︷︸
δ
Mit +β1Mitxit ]+ εit (1.2)
25Moreover, there is no data across all years for some of the municipalities, due to municipal mergers legislated
in 2012. Implications of the municipal mergers for the empirical analysis is discussed in detail in the appendix
26The results are robust to excluding the year 2014. Since the type of municipal personnel considered need to
have qualified in a state personnel exam, it will require some time for women with headscarves to enter the public
labor force, i.e., for the supply of religious women qualified for civil servant posts to adjust.
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To better characterize the diff-in-disc estimation, I formulate the equations for the two peri-
ods separately.
Yi,09 =α0+α1xi,09+ θ0︸︷︷︸
τ09
Mi,09+θ1Mi,09xi,09+ εi,09
Yi,14 =(α0+ γ0)+(α1+ γ1)xi,14+(θ0+β0)︸ ︷︷ ︸
τ14
Mi,14+(θ1+β1)Mi,14xi,14+ εi,14
The diff-in-disc estimator, β0, is defined as the difference between the two RD estimators,
and identifies how relaxing the headscarf ban changes the effect of the AKP mayor on the fe-
male share of municipal employees. θ0 provides the causal effect of the AKP mayor, in the
presence of a headscarf ban (t = 09) with headscarves, and θ0 +β0 identifies the causal effect
of the AKP mayor when women are allowed to wear headscarf at work.
Table 1.4 reports the three coefficients described above. The outcome is the female share of
civil servants in municipalities.27 I present the baseline local linear regression estimates from
equation 1.2, with two different types of data-driven optimally computed bandwidths using the
algorithm of Calonico et al. [2014]. The table reports robust standard errors, clustered at the
municipality level.28 Column 1 presents Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) results. Columns 2
and 3 report results with the mean squared error (MSE) optimal bandwidth; and the coverage
error rate (CER) optimal bandwidth respectively. Columns 4 and 5 show results with half of
each bandwidth to test robustness to smaller bandwidths. Following Grembi et al. [2016], the
optimal bandwidth for diff-in-disc estimation is computed as the mean of the two optimal band-
widths in RD estimations for t = 09 and t = 14.
27Results using the change in female share as the outcome are statistically similar and are available upon request.
28See Abadie et al. [2017] for state-of-the-art discussion on clustering.
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Table 1.4: Main results
Outcome: Female share of employees
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
OLS MSE CER MSE/2 CER/2
AKP14-AKP09 0.003 0.099** 0.116** 0.130** 0.158**
(0.024) (0.045) (0.054) (0.060) (0.069)
Bandwidth 1.000 0.088 0.065 0.044 0.032
Obs. 3,858 1,697 1,323 993 730
Clusters 687 335 274 211 158
AKP09 -0.035* -0.099** -0.091** -0.010 -0.039
(0.018) (0.044) (0.046) (0.059) (0.060)
Bandwidth 1.000 0.073 0.054 0.036 0.027
Obs. 1,950 765 600 390 305
AKP14 -0.032** 0.050 0.051 0.099 0.073
(0.016) (0.022) (0.040) (0.067) (0.079)
Bandwidth 1.000 0.102 0.075 0.051 0.038
Obs. 1,908 916 704 548 436
Outcome Mean 0.103 0.109 0.112 0.108 0.117
Estimation method is local linear regression with two optimal bandwidths estimated fol-
lowing MSE-optimal and CER-optimal procedures described in Calonico et al. [2014].
Robust standard errors are clustered at the municipality level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *
p<0.1.
The first parameter of interest is the effect of the introduction of headscarves on the dif-
ference between the AKP mayor effect in t = 14 and t = 09 on the female share of municipal
employees. The difference is positive and significant both statistically and economically. The
difference in the AKP mayor effect between the two periods is between 10-16 percentage points,
depending on bandwidth choice. The repeal of the headscarf ban has changed the effect of AKP
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mayor on female share in the positive direction. Notably, OLS coefficient in the first column is
not statistically significant, because when we include the infra-marginal municipalities (band-
width=1), the impact of lifting the headscarf ban is confounded by sorting of municipalities to
AKP and secular mayors, as municipalities where religious women are more prevalent are more
likely to be AKP supporters.
In t = 09, a marginally elected AKP mayor reduces the female share of employees in mu-
nicipal governments. When religious females are denied employment opportunities, an AKP
mayor reduces the female share of municipal employees by about 9 percentage points. This
corresponds to a relative decrease of 85%, significant both statistically and economically.29
Columns 4 and 5 show that the pre-treatment RD estimate is not robust to smaller bandwidths,
most likely due to low statistical power.
In t = 14, female share employed does not differ between AKP and secular mayors. The
sign of the coefficient τ14 is positive for all specifications but not statistically significant. The
negative effect of the AKP mayor on the female share of municipal employees observed in
t = 09, disappears in t = 14, when headscarves are allowed for public employees. The intro-
duction of headscarves facilitates female employment for AKP.
Figure 1.2 visualizes the evidence in the table above, within the optimal bandwidths. The
top panel of Figure 1.2 shows the effect of AKP mayor on the female share of employees in
t = 09, when headscarves are banned in public offices. The bottom panel of Figure 1.2 shows
the effect of the AKP mayor on the female share of employees in t = 14, when headscarves
are allowed in state institutions. As evident from the figure, an AKP mayor reduces the female
share of employees when religious females are denied jobs due to secular restrictions. The
difference between an AKP mayor and a secular mayor disappears when religious women can
be employed. Although the cross-sectional discontinuities are not robustly significant by them-
selves, the main result of the paper is the significant difference in discontinuities.
29Unfortunately, there are no published statistics on typical personnel turnover ratios in municipalities in Turkey
for this period. Gu¨nay [2011] provides some evidence that similarly high staff turnover ratios are observed follow-
ing the local elections in 2004.
27
0
.0
5
.1
.1
5
.2
%
Fe
m
ale
s E
m
plo
ye
d 
(Y
09
)
-.075 -.05 -.025 0 .025 .05 .075
AKP win margin (x09)
0
.0
5
.1
.1
5
.2
%
Fe
m
ale
s E
m
plo
ye
d 
(Y
14
)
-.1 -.075 -.05 -.025 0 .025 .05 .075 .1
AKP win margin (x14)
Figure 1.2: Vertical axis shows the mean outcome value, averaged over bins of 2% of AKP win margin. The
horizontal axis represents the AKP win margin. The central line fits a local linear polynomial; and the lateral lines
represent the 95 percent confidence intervals.
Figure 1.3 visualizes the difference in the AKP mayor effect, before and after the introduc-
tion of headscarves. To the right of the threshold, are municipalities where an AKP mayor took
over. To the left of the threshold are municipalities where the secular mayor remained. The
vertical axis plots the average differences between each t = 14 outcome and t = 09 outcome
value, in bins of 2% AKP win margin. In other words, Figure 1.3 plots the effect of AKP vic-
tory post-repeal on the pre-post change in female employment shares.30
30Note that this estimate is related to but not distinct from the difference-in-discontinuities estimates, since
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The estimation results in Table 1.4 are consistent with the descriptive graph shown in Figure
1.3, where I draw scatters and polynomial fits of the differences between each post-repeal out-
come and each pre-repeal value. This graph allows us to see whether these differences exhibit a
discontinuity at the win margin threshold. We see that our measure of female employment ex-
hibits a sharp jump when moving from the left to the right of the threshold in the whole sample.
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Figure 1.3: Vertical axis shows the difference of each outcome value for t = 14 and t = 09. Horizontal axis
represents the AKP win margin. The central line fits a local linear polynomial; and the lateral lines represent the
95 percent confidence intervals. Bins are averaged over 2 % of vote share difference.
The change in the female share of municipal employees exhibits a sharp jump when moving
from left to right of the threshold in the whole sample. With the relaxation of the headscarf ban,
the female share of employees increased significantly more in municipalities where AKP won
the elections by a slim vote margin. Near the threshold, however, the female share remained
almost constant for secular municipalities.
municipalities having close elections in pre and post-repeal elections are not the same ones.
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Figure 1.4 sheds light on the timing of the headscarf law by showing that AKP mayors and
secular mayors who marginally won the local elections in municipalities with a secular incum-
bent were on parallel trends before 2014.This figure plots cross-sectional discontinuities over
time, from 2009 to 2017, and marks a significant departure from the trend in the year of the
repeal. This is a key figure and deserves some emphasis. The pre-existing discontinuities reveal
the negative AKP mayor effect before 2014. The sign of the coefficient reverses in 2014, after
the introduction of headscarves to public employment. This figure confirms that even though
the cross-sectional discontinuities are not significant, the change in discontinuities can be ex-
plained with the timing of the repeal of the headscarf ban.
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Figure 1.4: Yearly RD coefficients. Vertical axis contains point estimates of local linear RD regressions with
optimal bandwidth computed following Calonico et al. [2014]. Horizontal axis plots the years. The central line is
the point estimate; the lateral lines represent the 95 percent confidence intervals.
This figure also serves as a robustness check ensuring that the change in headscarf law was
not anticipated in the previous years, especially considering the difference between 2013 and
30
2014. The accompanying RD graphs estimated for each year are displayed in Figure 1.5.
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Figure 1.5: Yearly RD coefficients. Vertical axis contains point estimates of local linear RD regressions with
optimal bandwidth computed following Calonico et al. [2014]. Horizontal axis plots the AKP victory margin in
the relevant election.
1.5.3 Mechanism
To consolidate the findings, I offer two possible explanations, and provide empirical evidence
with the available data to rule out one of the channels. The obvious candidate is the gender bias
hypothesis, which would lead AKP mayors to discriminate against female employees when re-
cruiting. This would explain the results in the pre-repeal period, and confirm the conventional
wisdom that Islamist party rule goes against female empowerment.
Alternatively, think of a simple interpretation that the pro-Islamist governments’ main goal
is to increase the share of religious employees. Under this scenario, without the ban on head-
scarves, female/male ratio in their recruitment would be the same as for non-Islamist govern-
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ments. However under the ban, hiring religious employees entails a bias against women. With
this interpretation, lower female shares for pro-Islamist mayors would reflect the bias against
women by the preference for religious workers. Ideally, one would need data on new hires (and
head-covering of employees) to test this hypothesis. Given the absence of such data, I use ex-
isting data to rule out the former scenario and make the evidence more compelling.
To test whether the gender bias channel is at play, we use data on average educational attain-
ment within municipalities, by gender. This test relies on the key assumption that any potential
bias of the Islamist mayors against females in the workplace would also prevail in education
outcomes. I conduct an empirical test identical to the main approach, but using as the outcome
variable the female to male ratios in municipality averages of literacy rate, high school com-
pletion, secondary school completion, and university completion.31 The results are provided
in Table 1.5. t = 09 outcomes measured in 2011 and 2013, and t = 14 outcomes measured in
2015 and 2016. The robust RD coefficients are reported, and none of the coefficients have a
statistically significant effect. Thus, the results show that the marginally elected AKP mayor
does not have an impact on the relative educational outcomes of males and females. This is an
interesting result in itself, because it is widely presumed that religiosity oftentimes goes against
female empowerment. Moreover, we perceive it as suggestive evidence that the gender bias
channel is unlikely to hold in employment.
31This analysis is almost an extension of Meyersson [2014] to 2009 and 2014.
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Table 1.5: Effect of Islamist Political Rule on Education Outcomes
Education outcomes: female/male ratios
Literacy High school Secondary University
AKP09 0.003 0.247 0.336 -0.056
(0.035) (0.413) (0.523) (0.146)
Bandwidth 0.156 0.213 0.218 0.101
Obs. 547 649 663 382
AKP14 -0.011 0.066 0.058 0.053
(0.022) (0.041) (0.037) (0.041)
Bandwidth 0.140 0.107 0.111 0.136
Obs. 644 506 528 638
Estimation method is local linear regression with two optimal bandwidths estimated following MSE-optimal and
CER-optimal procedures described in Calonico et al. [2014]. Robust standard errors are clustered at the munici-
pality level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Overall, the results highlight the role of labor market institutions: When institutions do not
allow religious females to work, Islamist party takeover decreases the female share employed in
municipalities, but when religious females can work, both Islamist and secular mayors recruit
more women, and not differently. The results are suggestive of the Islamist mayor’s preference
for recruiting religious women. There is an implicit assumption on the first-stage: that the repeal
of the headscarf ban led to an inflow of female workers in municipalities. Although there is no
data on the religiosity of female employees in municipalities, evidence from a nationally rep-
resentative survey confirms that lifting the headscarf restriction increased public sector female
employment among women wearing headscarves, demonstrated in appendix A.1.7.
1.5.4 Robustness Checks
Figure 1.6 plots robustness of diff-in-disc estimates to different windows around the AKP win
margin threshold. I plot the diff-in-disc coefficient for an array of bandwidths, including the
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optimal bandwidths employed in the main analysis, marked by the two vertical lines. The mag-
nitude of the effect is mostly robust to bandwidth choice. Given the trade-off between bias
and precision, smaller bandwidths yield larger confidence intervals in the expected direction of
the bias. For bandwidths too large to be considered competitive elections, both the magnitude
and statistical significance of the effect decline. Statistical significance disappears for a band-
width of about 9% vote share difference, which is considerably large in the multi-party Turkish
context. Estimates approach zero and lose statistical significance as one extrapolates to larger
bandwidths. Note that the diff-in-disc estimates converge to the diff-in-diff estimates as the
bandwidth approaches 1.32
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Figure 1.6: Vertical axis plots the diff-in-disc coefficients. Horizontal axis plots the different bandwidths used
to estimate the reported diff-in-disc coefficients. Vertical lines mark the optimal bandwidths computed using the
MSE and CER-optimal procedures following Calonico et al. [2014].
Next, I demonstrate the robustness of diff-in-disc estimates to the inclusion of time-invariant
32Results from a standard diff-in-diff analysis are presented in appendix A.1.5.
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covariates, year fixed effects, and higher order control functions. Table 1.6 presents the base-
line diff-in-disc estimations with year fixed effects and time-invariant municipality character-
istics included as covariates. As a time-invariant characteristic, I use a dummy for the region
in which the municipality is located. Point estimates remain largely unchanged, with increased
precision, as expected.
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Table 1.6: Robustness to covariates and year fixed effects
Outcome: Female share of employees
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
AKP14-AKP09 0.009 0.106* 0.123** 0.141** 0.161**
(0.022) (0.041) (0.050) (0.057) (0.069)
Bandwidth 1.000 0.081 0.060 0.041 0.033
Observations 3,858 1,588 1,267 920 692
Clusters 687 319 263 195 150
AKP09 -0.030*
-
0.099***
-0.088** -0.010 0.005
(0.016) (0.035) (0.036) (0.054) (0.057)
Bandwidth 1.000 0.067 0.05 0.033 0.025
Observations 1,950 705 585 365 285
AKP14 -0.023 0.053 0.051 0.092 0.072
(0.014) (0.036) (0.040) (0.067) (0.077)
Bandwidth 1.000 0.095 0.070 0.048 0.033
Observations 1,908 864 664 524 424
Covariates 1 1 1 1 1
Fixed Effects 1 1 1 1 1
Covariates include dummies for the seven geographical regions of Turkey. Estimation
method is local linear regression with two optimal bandwidths estimated either following
MSE-optimal or CER-optimal procedures described in Calonico et al. [2014]. Robust
standard errors are clustered at the municipality level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Table 1.7 replicates the main analysis using higher order control functions of AKP win mar-
gin. Columns 1 and 2 report results from using quadratic control functions, and columns 3 and
4 contain results from control polynomials of the third degree. The bandwidth used is MSE
optimal following Calonico et al. [2014]. Columns 2 and 4 estimate the effect for half of the
optimal bandwidth. The diff-in-disc estimates are robust to the inclusion of higher-order control
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functions of the running variable. The computed optimal bandwidths and the point estimates
are slightly larger in magnitude.
Table 1.7: Robustness to higher-order control functions
Outcome: Female share of employees
(1) (2) (3) (4)
AKP14-AKP09 0.133** 0.167*** 0.163*** 0.171**
(0.051) (0.061) (0.058) (0.070)
Bandwidth 0.146 0.103 0.203 0.0145
Observations 2,435 1,901 2,967 2,414
Clusters 463 367 547 460
AKP09 -0.112** -0.094* -0.115** -0.078
(0.047) (0.050) (0.053) (0.056)
Bandwidth 0.127 0.090 0.168 0.121
Observations 1,120 900 1,380 1,070
AKP14 0.059 0.058 0.065 0.064
(0.042) (0.046) (0.045) (0.049)
Bandwidth 0.164 0.115 0.238 0.169
Observations 1,304 1,020 1,536 1,320
Control function 2 2 3 3
Estimation method is local polynomial regression including control func-
tions of degree 2 (columns 1 and 2), or of degree 3 (columns 3 and 4) of the
AKP win margin, within the MSE-optimal bandwidth computed following
Calonico et al. [2014], and half of the optimal bandwidth. Robust standard
errors are clustered at the municipality level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *
p<0.1.
I also investigate whether total municipal employment differs for Islamist and secular may-
ors, and before and after the introduction of headscarves. I do not detect a statistically significant
effect of an AKP mayor on the size of the local government, measured by the total number of
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municipal employees adjusted by population, with or without a headscarf ban in place.33 Hence,
the estimated effects on the female share of employees result from changes in female recruit-
ment. A reduction in the share of females implies that female employees are being replaced by
male correspondents. These set of results confirm that the absolute numbers of men and women
are not changing, and the only changes occur with the relative shares.
1.5.5 Validation of the Design
In this section I provide indirect tests of Assumptions 1 and 2. As discussed earlier, the estima-
tion results rest on Assumptions 1 and 2 for the identification of the average treatment effect in
the neighborhood of the AKP win margin threshold. Assumption 3 holds trivially since all mu-
nicipalities comply with the nationally-implemented legislation of the headscarf ban, ensuring
that compliance is not confounded by mayor type.
To test Assumption 1, I demonstrate that there is no manipulative sorting around the thresh-
old, or differential manipulative sorting to Islamist and secular mayors in the two periods. Fig-
ure 1.7 displays results from the McCrary [2008] Density Test of a jump in the density of the
running variable at the discontinuity point, for 2009 and 2014 local elections, respectively. This
figure reveals no obvious sorting at the discontinuity for both elections as the estimates from
the McCrary [2008] test are statistically insignificant.
Figure 1.8 tests the null hypothesis of continuity in the difference in the densities of AKP
win margin for t = 09 and t = 14 at the discontinuity point, in municipalities with a secular
incumbent, between the 2009 and 2014 elections. If election results were manipulated in favor
of the AKP mayor in municipalities where there are more women with headscarves, my esti-
mates would suffer from selection bias. Figures 1.7 and 1.8 are reassuring about the absence of
manipulation, as there is no jump in either the separate densities, nor the difference between the
two densities.
33The diff-in-disc point estimate is 0.0007 (0.0006).
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Figure 1.7: McCrary [2008] test of a jump at the discontinuity point. Density of the AKP win margin in t = 09 and
t = 14, conditioning on secular incumbent.
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Figure 1.8: Test of the continuity of the difference between densities of the AKP win margin in 2014 and 2009
local elections, at the threshold. Bins represent averages over 2% Islamist win margin. A third-order polynomial
is fitted. 95% confidence intervals are displayed.
To further verify the continuity assumption, I demonstrate the continuity of pre-determined
covariates at the discontinuity, and check for the balancing of time-invariant characteristics of
municipalities. Figure 1.9 shows the balancing of covariates for the two RD’s, confirming that
the comparison groups with Islamist and secular mayors are statistically similar.
Figure 1.9 inspects the continuity of available covariates determined prior to the election
outcomes in 2009. The set of covariates include: voter turnout in 2009 elections, number of
political parties with votes, metropolitan dummy, logarithm of population, never-married ratio
of females to males in 15-30 cohort, literacy rate, high school completion rate, ratio of high
school completion among females to males, and pre-treatment outcome, from the year 2008.
The graphs depict unconditional local means of each covariate, along with the AKP victory
margin. The vertical line indicates the treatment cutoff, and a flexible local polynomial is fitted.
Upon inspection of the figures, all of the covariates and the pre-treatment outcome appear con-
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tinuous over the cutoff point.34
I conduct identical validation tests for the analysis with the 2014 local elections, using pre-
determined covariates from the year 2013. The set of covariates include: voter turnout, number
of political parties with votes, metropolitan dummy, the logarithm of the population, gender
ratio, never-married ratio of females to males for 15-30 cohort, high school completion rate, the
ratio of high school completion among females to males, literacy rate, and pre-treatment out-
come. Figure 1.9 displays continuity of binned variable means within the optimal bandwidth.35
The placebo tests for the covariates and the pre-treatment outcome are satisfied.
34The corresponding regressions are available upon request.
35The corresponding regressions are available upon request.
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Figure 1.9: Test for continuity of covariates for AKP mayor treatment in 2014. Dots represent unconditional local
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Table 1.8 presents diff-in-disc results from a falsification test, using time-invariant charac-
teristics -geographical regions where the elections are held- as outcome variables.36 Turkey
is composed of seven geographical regions, which are constant over time. If identification is
valid, the mayor elected in contested elections should not affect the proportion of cities in a
given geographical region, before and after the introduction of headscarves. In other words,
36An identical validity test is carried out in Grembi et al. [2016].
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the fixed characteristics of municipalities should not vary discontinuously just above and below
the AKP win margin threshold. Geographic regions are an appealing dimension to test because
both voting patterns and religious conservatism change greatly across regions. The results are
robust, except for Region 1.37
Table 1.8: Balance tests of time-invariant characteristics
Region R1 R2 R3 R4 R5 R6 R7
AKP14-AKP09 -0.341* -0.054 -0.004 0.055 -0.041 0.025 0.253
(0.189) (0.147) (0.200) (0.119) (0.159) (0.190) (0.180)
Observations 1,001 1,023 737 958 1,023 808 760
Bandwidth 0.0502 0.0527 0.0376 0.0477 0.0532 0.0408 0.0393
Dependent variables is the proportion of municipalities in a given geographical region. Estima-
tion method is local linear regression with MSE-optimal bandwidth computed following Calonico
et al. [2014]. Robust standard errors are clustered at the municipality level. *** p<0.01, **
p<0.05, * p<0.1.
To test Assumption 2, I show that municipalities where the AKP mayor barely won or lost
the election were on parallel trends before the introduction of headscarves. Figure 2 in the previ-
ous subsection displays the local parallel trends assumption visually in a diff-in-diff framework.
Lastly, I conduct falsification tests using placebo years for the introduction of headscarves.
The results are displayed in Table 1.9. First, I use 2009 as false treatment year for headscarves,
since there was a change in mayor type but no change in headscarf law. I use data from the year
2008 for pre-headscarf and 2009-2013 for post-headscarf outcomes. The results are displayed
in column 1. Columns 2-4 display results from placebo diff-in-disc regressions for the years
2010, 2011 and 2012. I abstain from using 2013 as false treatment year. Since the law was
changed in 2013, this year does not constitute a placebo check. The false diff-in-disc estimates
are in magnitude close to zero, and lack statistical significance. This result further reassures
37The statistical significance of this estimate disappears when 13 municipalities in Region 1, subject to mergers
are dropped from the sample.
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about the validity of the design.
Table 1.9: Diff-in-disc estimates for placebo years
Dependent variable: % Females employed
False Treatment Year 2009 2010 2011 2012
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Diff. in AKP effect -0.053 -0.042 -0.033 -0.037
(0.049) (0.025) (0.021) (0.024)
Observations 725 881 900 768
Bandwidth 0.0556 0.0731 0.0758 0.0607
Mean 0.0943 0.0941 0.0933 0.0948
Estimation method is local linear regression with optimal bandwidths
estimated following MSE-optimal procedures described in Calonico
et al. [2014]. Robust standard errors are clustered at the municipality
level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Another possible placebo test for the headscarf-repeal, is by changing the definition of treat-
ment. Since only the AKP mayors are expected to be interested in female employees with head-
scarves, we should observe a null effect on female employment in municipalities that switch to
secular mayor rule. In order to test, I repeat the analysis conditioning on AKP incumbent, where
treatment is switching to a secular mayor. Table 1.10 presents the regression results, and Figure
1.10 displays the RDD figures from both periods.38 Switching to a secular mayor does not have
a causal effect on the female share employed as civil servants within municipal governments,
and the repeal of the headscarf ban has no statistically significant effect. These results weakly
support the hypothesis that the repeal of the headscarf ban helps the Islamist mayors recruit
more women who are of the same type. In the second period, secular mayors do not recruit
more females even though the supply of females in the public workforce have increased.
38Validity exercises including density and covariate tests are available upon request.
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Table 1.10: Switching to a Secular Mayor
Outcome: Female share of employees
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
OLS MSE CER MSE/2 CER/2
Secular14- Secular09 -0.023 -0.006 0.025 0.047 0.033
(0.019) (0.035) (0.039) (0.044) (0.048)
Bandwidth 1.000 0.097 0.071 0.049 0.035
Observations 4,910 2,456 1,878 1,295 947
Clusters 748 472 371 265 196
Secular09 0.006 -0.019 -0.020 -0.014 0.015
(0.014) (0.022) (0.023) (0.035) (0.041)
Bandwidth 1.000 0.094 0.069 0.047 0.034
Observations 2,850 1,525 1,170 820 600
Secular14 -0.018 0.003 0.012 0.029 0.066
(0.014) (0.035) (0.036) (0.053) (0.060)
Bandwidth 1.000 0.100 0.073 0.050 0.036
Observations 2,060 912 708 476 344
Outcome Mean 0.103 0.085 0.085 0.081 0.083
Estimation method is local linear regression with two optimal bandwidths estimated follow-
ing MSE-optimal and CER-optimal procedures described in Calonico et al. [2014]. Robust
standard errors are clustered at the municipality level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Figure 1.10: Vertical axis shows the mean outcome value, averaged over bins of 2% of secular win margin. Hori-
zontal axis represents the secular win margin. The central line fits a local linear polynomial; and the lateral lines
represent the 95 percent confidence intervals.
As expected, the change in the headscarf regulation does not affect female recruitment of
secular mayors, but only the AKP mayors. I argue that the asymmetry result presented serves
as a placebo test for the headscarf reform, validating the identification strategy.
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1.6 Conclusion
Whether religious symbols should be banned in public is a politically charged issue. Many
Western countries have recently regulated Muslim headwear in public or in certain institutions.
However, these legislations have a dual nature. On the one hand, they are perceived as a threat
to women’s empowerment and to secularism. On the other hand, freedom of religious dress
promotes equality, an essential component of democracy. In this paper, I consider the interac-
tion between (the repeal of) veiling bans, Islamist political governance, and the ramifications
on female employment outcomes.
The main result of this paper relies on the interaction between the repeal of the headscarf
ban and the causal effect of the mayor in power. The results are explained with the Islamist
mayors’ preferences for religious women, rather than intrinsic bias against women in the work-
place.
Unfortunately, there are no measures of the extent to which the headscarf ban was imple-
mented across municipalities, pre-repeal. (anecdotal evidence, cite) Perhaps in some, the ban
was formally in place but unenforced! Yet, this should matter at the minimum for the municipal-
ities with competitive elections. It is perhaps more relevant for AKP stronghold municipalities
that the ban was not strictly enforced.
Although the results of this paper are limited to a specific institutional setting, they have
broader implications regarding the role of religious identity. In the framework of Akerlof and
Kranton [2000], ability to signal piety improves employment outcomes for pious women, under
the rule of a policymaker of the same (religious) type.
To conclude, the results of this paper imply that Islamist political rule is compatible with
female empowerment only when labor market institutions do not pose entry restrictions for
religious women. This is a paradox as the same set of values that motivate women to wear
headscarves and propagate patriarchal values that keep women away from the labor and edu-
cation markets, may also expand labor market opportunities for women wearing headscarves.
Hence, one cannot separate the effect of Islamist political control from the institutions in place.
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Chapter 2
Parental Leave from the Firm’s
Perspective
2.1 Introduction
Can generous job-protected parental leave level the playing field in the labor market for men
and women? It is well-established that women experience substantial earnings penalties due to
motherhood (Waldfogel [1997], Bertrand et al. [2010], Adda et al. [2017]), even in the most
gender-equal Scandinavian countries (Angelov et al. [2016], Kleven et al. [2018], Ejrnæs and
Kunze [2013]). Having children and the challenges to achieve work-family balance are iden-
tified as important drivers of gender gaps in earnings and employment. Despite remarkable
progress, gender equality in the labor market remains to be a challenge (Goldin [2014]). With
the aim of reducing the career costs of children and gender inequality in the labor market, many
advanced countries have implemented reforms that offer generous paid maternity leave entitle-
ments (Olivetti and Petrongolo [2017]).
While there is a large literature investigating the impact of maternity leave on children’s
outcomes and the careers of women, less is known about the consequences of generous parental
leave policies for firms. However, job-protected leave affects both employees and employers,
and therefore understanding the firms’ response is essential for a comprehensive evaluation of
parental leave policies. In this paper, we analyze the effect of parental leave policies on labor
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demand, from the viewpoint of the firms.
So far, firms’ perspective in parental leave policies has largely been neglected in the liter-
ature. This is primarily because such analysis requires demanding data which contains infor-
mation on the universe of firms and workers that can be linked to individual-level outcomes on
fertility and parental leave usage. In this respect, Norway provides an ideal testing ground with
several parental leave reforms to analyze, and the availability of rich administrative data on the
labor market. We analyze the effects of the 1993 reform in Norway and extend our results to
the 2005 reform. The 1993 reform extended parental leave to 42 weeks (52 weeks at 80% wage
coverage), and introduced a 4-week paternity quota.1 The 2005 reform, on the other hand, has
only extended the duration of paternity leave. We inspect whether firms make labor supply and
wage adjustments in response to the extension of parental leave duration.
The mechanism we propose is an exogenous variation in costs accrued to the firms via the
reform. From the firms’ perspective, the costs of parental leave are multifold. Although wages
are compensated by the government in Norway as in many high-income countries, firms have
to bear the costs of replacing and re-absorbing the employee on leave and training the surro-
gate.2 To understand the mechanism, consider a simple labor model with two inputs: labor and
capital, and a tax on labor. Introduction of a labor tax will make one of the inputs relatively
more expensive; as a result, the standard labor theory predicts that firms will move away from
the costlier input in favor of the other.
We distinguish between three types of inputs for the firm that are potentially affected by
eligibility to parental leave to varying degrees: male employees at risk, female employees at
risk, and employees (both male and female) not at risk, concerning age and parental status.3
Employee groups “at risk” refer to potential mothers and fathers in the eye of the firm. We are
interested in how the extension of parental leave alters the quantities and prices of these inputs
for the firms, as measured by the marginal hires and gender wage gap, respectively.
There is an endogeneity problem with estimating recruits in firms using the employment
1This is the first time that a father-specific parental leave quota was introduced.
2These costs are discussed in detail in Appelbaum and Milkman [2011], who survey about 500 companies in
the U.S. on the issue.
3In the Robustness section we present a more disaggregated analysis, using more detailed worker groups: young
and old women without children, women with pre-school or older kids.
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stocks, as employment stocks indicate family-friendliness of firms and will surely be correlated
with new hires after the reform. In an environment where the reform affects all firms, and there
is no natural control group; we exploit heterogeneity in exposure to the reform with respect to
pre-reform workforce composition of the firms. Our identification relies on the assumption that
firms with very low proportions of potential mothers and fathers will have different costs than
those firms with very high proportions of these two types of inputs.
In line with our hypothesis, we observe a relative movement away from the risky assets. Our
results show that firms respond to the extension of parental leave by moving away precisely from
the type of workers that are expected to be benefiting from the parental leave reform: potential
mothers and fathers. Besides, we also consider the implications for the gender wage gap within
firms, firm size, the flexibility of working arrangements, and measures of firm performance.
Our main focus is on the effect of the absence of female employees who take parental leave.
Even though the marginal increase in the duration of paternity leave was higher (from 0-4 weeks
for men and 35-38 weeks or 44 to 48 weeks for women), the total leave period available to the
mothers is considerably larger, and arguably more costly for the firm. Thus, we estimate a
joint response of the firms to the mothers and fathers, but the main focus is on the effect on
the former. We address the complication by the simultaneous effects of males and females in
two ways. First, we distinguish between short and long-run effects and argue that the short-run
effects can be attributed to the extension of maternity leave as leave take-up of men had a lagged
response to the reform. Second, we repeat the analysis for the period 2000-2014, exploiting the
2005 reform which only extended the duration of paternity leave.
Overall, our results emphasize the importance of labor demand, an aspect of the labor mar-
ket which has been neglected so far by studies on the impact of parental leave reforms. The
results certainly have implications for parental leave policies worldwide. Parental leave was
introduced in the first place as a response to the biological need of women. However, it might
be a disservice to the women, instead of a service. Therefore, policymakers have to think of
potentially undesirable consequences for women. This is what our results confirm, even when
some leave is introduced for men.
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The next section overviews the literature on parental leave; section 3 describes the institu-
tional setting, section 4 introduces the empirical framework and describes the data, section 5
documents our findings, and section 6 concludes.
2.2 Related Literature
A large and growing empirical literature analyzes the effects of parental leave on individual
(worker) outcomes such as maternal employment, return to work decision, wage dynamics
around birth, and various outcomes related to the children. Most estimates range from neg-
ligible to small positive impacts. These studies conclude that the extension of parental leave
duration has led to a decline in the return to full-time work, and significant wage drops have
been found for many countries, even after controlling for heterogeneity and non-random selec-
tion back to work after childbirth (Lalive and Zweimu¨ller [2009] and Scho¨nberg and Ludsteck
[2014]). Exploiting the maternity leave expansions in Norway between 1988-1992, Dahl et al.
[2016] shows that increased maternity leave has little effect on children’s schooling, parental
earnings and labor force participation, completed fertility, or marriage and divorce outcomes.
Overall, the evidence tends to suggest relatively short-term negative employment and wage ef-
fects on females and negligible effects in the longer run.
In recent years, many advanced countries have introduced paternity leave, with the hope
of undoing the inequalities in the labor market as well as changing gender norms. There is a
burgeoning literature on the impacts of these policies. Dahl et al. [2014] emphasizes the impor-
tance of peer effects to increase fathers’ leave take up. Ekberg et al. [2013] finds no behavioral
effects in the household and no substantial effects on mothers’ and fathers’ employment and
wages. Kotsadam and Finseraas [2011] finds ambiguous results regarding gender norms, mea-
sured by the division of tasks within the household. Rege and Solli [2013] shows that four
weeks of paternity leave decreases fathers’ future earnings, which persists in the long-run but
has not contributed to the improvement of maternal labor market outcomes. Another study by
Cools et al. [2015] shows that while the introduction of paternity leave has not affected fathers’
earnings and work hours, it hurt the mothers’ labor market outcomes.
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“In a nutshell, there is little compelling evidence that extended parental leave rights have
an overall positive effect on female outcomes.” (Olivetti and Petrongolo [2017]). Olivetti and
Petrongolo [2017] provides an excellent discussion and overview of studies analyzing parental
leave. In light of previous studies, one can argue that we still do not understand fully how
parental leave policy operates in labor markets and why governments insist on extending the
leave durations. Despite these generous parental leave policies, labor markets are still very
much gender-segregated, even in the most female-friendly Scandinavian context ( Mandel and
Semyonov [2006]).
While much attention has been devoted to the labor supply effects of parental leave; firm
side effects have largely been neglected in previous studies. Nonetheless, employers are af-
fected by parental leave policies and actual take up. Even when firms do not pay for the actual
leave (as in Norway), firms have to face other costs, including the recruitment and training of
new staff and re-absorbing the parent coming back from leave. Hence, hidden costs on the firm
side may exist that explain why at the aggregate level we still observe large and quite persistent
gender gaps despite generous parental leave policies. Appelbaum and Milkman [2011] provide
some evidence on the costs of employee absence for firms, with a particular focus on employees
taking parental leave.
The role of firms in the divergence between male and female wages at the onset of parent-
hood has been emphasized even in earlier studies of the labor market, including Becker [1971]
and Neumark et al. [1996], Mincer and Polachek [1974]). More recent studies by Goldin and
co-authors (Bertrand et al. [2010], Goldin and Katz [2011]) have focused on the role of “work-
place flexibility” or the “family-friendliness” of the workplace, in exacerbating the gender wage
gap. Characterizing firms with respect to a family-friendliness index, Hotz et al. [2017] high-
light the role of firms in facilitating the balance between work and family life. Pertold-Gebicka
et al. [2016] considers employment mobility of mothers and finds that women switch to more
family-friendly working arrangements around childbirth, accompanied by a drop in their wages.
This strand of the literature suggests that new mothers who are trying to combine family respon-
sibilities with market work face additional constraints than those addressed by family policies.
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Although it has been extensively documented that firms play a part in amplifying the gender seg-
regation in the labor market, the impacts on firms are not considered when analyzing parental
leave policies. In line with these results, we argue that, for a comprehensive assessment of these
policies, one needs to take into account the firm’s response.
Few studies link firm characteristics to parental leave take-up rates.Dahl et al. [2014] on fa-
thers’ leave take-up and Bygren and Duvander [2006] analyzes how workplace characteristics
affect parental leave usage and document similar characteristics as family-friendliness and job
flexibility. However, the literature investigating the firm side impacts of parental leave reforms
is scant. The only two studies that we know of are working papers by Gallen [2016] and Brenoe
et al. [2018]. Both of these studies find minimal impacts of parental leave extensions on firms’
performance and work trajectories and earnings of co-workers. They also do not observe a de-
tectable effect on firm output and firm closures.
Compared to these studies, the novelty in our approach is to assume the firm’s point of view.
In this study, we examine the impact of extended parental leave duration on within-firm dy-
namics. High-quality administrative data allows us to link characteristics of employees to their
workplaces. We expect that firms with a higher share of potential mothers and fathers that are
more exposed to the reform will have different costs of adjustment than those firms who have a
different labor composition. Thus, we expect to see these firms substitute away from employing
potential mothers and fathers, and adjust relative wages. We can identify the job to job mobility
in the data so we can measure flows of workers, as well as other firm-level outcomes such as
the gender wage gap and several measures of firm performance. We compare the results for
two reforms from Norway, in 1993 and in 2005 which extended the parental leave duration for
mothers and fathers, and only fathers, respectively. Next section provides a detailed overview
of the reform and our data.
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2.3 Institutional Background
2.3.1 Parental Leave in Norway
Norway has a longstanding tradition of family policies aimed at enhancing work-family balance
for women. Generous parental leave schemes are one of the major policy tools. Starting in the
1970’s job-protected parental leave has been made available to working Norwegian parents, and
extensions have followed. Table 2.1 provides a detailed timeline of the parental leave reforms
in Norway between 1977 and 2014.
In Norway, parental leave is job-protected, which prohibits the employers from laying off
their workers who are on leave. Moreover, employees have the right to return to the same po-
sition before leaving, and a comparable job after an extended period. The wages during leave
period are compensated by the government, and since 1989, the parents can choose between
100 or 80 % earnings replacement for extra weeks of parental leave. Unpaid leave is also an op-
tion to extend the duration of the paid leave. There is a generous earnings threshold for income
replacement, which is topped up by most employers so that full wage replacement is provided.
The earnings threshold is not binding for most of the mothers.4
Expansions in paid leave durations are determined with respect to the birth date of the child.
To be eligible for paid parental leave benefits, mothers should work at least 6 out of the 10
months preceding birth. Moreover, earnings in the ten months before birth should exceed the
“substantial gainful activity” threshold.5
The Norwegian parental leave system is universal, and individuals are well-informed of the
benefits and eligibility conditions. To apply for parental leave benefits, parents must inform
their employers and submit a joint application to a Social Security Administration field office
at least six weeks before the pregnancy due date.
4Dahl et al. [2016] report that in 2010, only 7% of mothers earned more than this threshold.
5The threshold was approximately $12,500 in the year 2010.
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Table 2.1: Parental leave reforms, 1977-2010 in Norway
Year Parental Leave Father Quota
100 % coverage 80 % coverage
Since Number of weeks
1.7.1977 18 0 0
1.5.1987 20 0 0
1.7.1988 22 0 0
1.4.1989 24 30 0
1.5.1990 28 35 0
1.7.1991 32 40 0
1.4.1992 35 44 + 2 days 0
1.4.1993 42 52 4
1994 42 52 4
2000 42 52 4
1.7.2005 43 53 5
1.7.2006 44 54 6
2007 46 56 6
2008 46 56 6
1.7.2009 46 56 10
1.7.2011 47 57 12
1.7.2013 49 59 14
1.7.2014 49 59 10
Note: *3 weeks before birth and 6 weeks after birth must be taken by the mother
** The father quota is a period of the total parental leave reserved to the father.
Among the total parental leave available, three weeks before birth and six weeks after birth
are reserved exclusively for the mothers. Apart from these 9 weeks, the rest of the parental leave
period can be freely shared between the mother and the father. However, evidence shows that
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in most cases, mothers used the entire amount of parental leave available, until a specific quota
for fathers was introduced in 1993. Subsequent reforms have increased father quotas, mostly
by increasing the total amount of existing parental leave. With the introduction of the paternity
quota, parents can now divide the leave period remaining after allocating the paternity quota to
the fathers.
In this study, we will particularly focus on the 1993 and 2005 reforms. Our focus is on the
change of the duration of the leave and how the extension impacts the firms. Although Nor-
wegian firms do not incur a direct wage cost for employees who are on leave (as the wage is
compensated by the government), they still have to cover up for other costs of absence such
as replacement costs, training cost for the new employees, and the costs of re-absorbing the
employee who returns from leave. Our research design, which is presented in the next section,
exploits sharp variation in the costs incurred by the firms as a result of parental leave extension,
as the main treatment.
We argue that the 1993 Reform increases the opportunity costs of employing potential moth-
ers and fathers, by extending the duration of the parental leave. We hypothesize that as a result,
the firms will adjust by re-allocating their labor input resources, and the gender wage gap. We
test whether the extension of the reform has an impact on the marginal hiring of men and women
‘at risk’, who are expected to have a child and take parental leave shortly. Finally, there is little
evidence that the expansions to parental leave affected completed fertility, marriage, or divorce
(Dahl et al. [2016]).
2.3.2 The 1993 Parental Leave Reform
The 1993 reform of parental leave in Norway was a major reform for two reasons. First, for
the first time parental leave was extended to a full year (52 weeks) at 80 % wage replacement
(or 42 weeks at 100 % wage replacement). There is empirical evidence showing that parental
leaves longer than one year have negative effects on job continuity for women (Rossin-Slater
[2017]). Combined with the fact that public childcare in Norway is available from the age of 1,
this policy was a breakthrough as it enabled parents to combine work and family.
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Second, for the first time in the world, paternity leave and a paternity quota of 4 weeks were
introduced. This law reserves 4 weeks out of the total paid leave (42 or 52 weeks) for the fa-
thers, and the parents forgo the benefits if these 4 weeks are not used by the father. This policy
aimed to improve job continuity of women as well as increasing the involvement of fathers with
housework and childcare. Importantly, the father’s eligibility for the paternal quota was condi-
tional on the mother working.6 As a result, the reform increased the total duration of parental
leave available by seven weeks: 4 weeks for the fathers and 3 weeks for the mothers.
Analyzing the 1993 reform poses two empirical challenges. First, along with extending
the duration of maternity leave, a paternity leave quota was introduced. With respect to our
proposed mechanism, while extending the duration of maternity leave raises the relative oppor-
tunity costs of potential mothers for the firm; analogously extending the duration of paternity
leave (from 0 to 4 weeks) increases the relative opportunity costs of potential fathers, which
operates at exactly the opposite direction as the first effect. We consider as separate outcomes
the marginal hires of potential mothers and fathers. We address this issue in two means. Al-
though parental leave was available for both mothers and fathers, traditionally it was taken only
by the mothers until 1993, and take-up by the fathers gained momentum only after 1997 (See
Dahl et al. [2014]). This allows us to use short and long-run effects of the reform to disentangle
the effects implied by more mothers and fathers taking leave. Moreover, the 2005 reform only
changed the duration of paternity quota. We extend our analysis by presenting the results from
this subsequent reform and comparing the estimates.
The second challenge of identifying the impact of the 1993 reform, is the presence of re-
forms in the years leading up to the 1993 reform. Since the year 1987, the Norwegian govern-
ment has incrementally increased the duration of parental leave, every year. The problem is also
evident in Dahl et al. [2016]’s study of the 1992 reform. In this, we follow Dahl et al. [2016]’s
approach and claim that we estimate a cumulative effect of these seven reforms. In total, these
7 reforms have expanded the duration of paid maternity leave by 17 weeks.7 Compared to the
1977 reform which introduced maternity leave and provided 18 weeks, this is a considerable
6This condition was relaxed in 1994.
7Here we use maternity leave, and parental leave interchangeably since before 1993, even though parental leave
could be shared between couples, de facto only mothers took the parental leave available.
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increase. Since all these reforms have extended parental leave duration in the same direction,
we assume that our proposed cost channel would have operated the same way in all these re-
forms. We circumvent the confounding from previous reforms by arguing that our estimators
provide a lower bound at best if firms have already adjusted after these previous expansions of
parental leave. In addition, our data allows us to conduct robustness checks excluding several
expansions before the 1993 reform.
2.3.3 The 2005 Parental Leave Reform
The 2005 reform simply increased the father’s quota for a week. The total paid parental leave
amounted to 53 weeks, of which 9 weeks were reserved for the mother, 5 for the father and
39 weeks to be shared, paid at 80%; or 43 weeks paid at 100%. We exploit this reform to test
whether increased costs of employing potential fathers lead firms to hire less of these types of
men. The fraction of eligible fathers taking leave in Norway has increased steadily over time
and reached above 80% in 2005 (Cools et al. [2015]). This provides a reasonable context to
isolate the adjustment costs arising from males taking leave, and repeat the symmetric analysis
using marginal hires of potential fathers as the main outcome.
2.4 Empirical Framework
2.4.1 Data Description
Our study context offers two key advantages to measure the impacts of parental leave policies
on firms. First is the availability of data on the population of employers and employees, for a
long enough period around the parental leave reforms. Norwegian administrative data is con-
sidered to be of extremely high quality and reliability, as also documented in Atkinson et al.
[1995]. Second, is the changes in the duration of parental leave policies.
Our data is based on administrative registers that cover the entire population of employers
and employees in Norway. All of these registers can be linked through unique identifiers of
individuals and firms. We merge several registers to generate an employer-employee dataset.
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This allows us to construct a rich establishment-year panel and generate firm-level characteris-
tics which contain information on parental leave and other demographic characteristics.
Our main dataset comes from employment histories based on employer-employee registers
that contain complete employment records of all firms and individuals in the labor market from
1988 to 2014. We extract information on earnings, gender, year of birth, number and year of
birth of children, and parental leave take-up from different individual registers.8 To construct a
firm panel, we merge establishment id, person id and sector information with individual regis-
ters. Finally, we collapse the data at the establishment-year level around the period of the 1993
reform (1993-2003) and the 2005 reform (2000-2014).
A major challenge was that no unique establishment, firm or organization id exists in the
delivered Norwegian registers. We define a unique establishment identifier across the entire
period 1988-2014 by the use of worker flows (Hethey-Maier and Schmieder [2013]). Although
some observations are dropped due to missing information problems such as missing sector and
individuals with multiple jobs, these are not unusually many.
From the employer-employee matched panel, we generate establishment-level characteris-
tics by year, including the number of employees, gender composition, the flexibility of working
hours, the number of parental leave takers among employees, percentage of take-up by gender,
new childbirths within firm, average wage, and the fraction of full and part-time workers. In
order to generate this rich dataset, we need the population of employees in an establishment, a
certain cell size and data available in the period around the reform. This is the key advantage of
our data which renders the firm-level analysis of parental leave possible.
Our main analysis sample consists of 16-59 years old individuals, who are not self-employed.9
We further restrict the sample to employees whose annual earnings exceed the substantial gain-
ful activity level.10 This threshold is crucial for eligibility to take parental leave. Moreover,
we only consider firms that existed in the pre-reform year 1992 (for the 1993 reform).11 This
condition is necessary for our empirical strategy which exploits variation in pre-reform work-
8List the names of these registers.
9We refrain from including the self-employed due to several issues related to data.
10Note on the basic income threshold.
11We condition on observability in the year 2003 for the 2005 reform. The 2005 reform was announced in the
year 2004, hence we drop this year from the analysis sample for the 2005 reform.
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force composition. We further refine our sample to firms with three or more employees, in order
to allow for the possibility of gender mix within the firms. Due to the nature of our outcome
variable, the fraction of potential mothers within the firm, it is a necessary condition.
We define three groups of workers, which constitute different types of labor inputs within
the firms. We consider potential parents to be women and men below 40 years old without kids,
and parents of pre-school children (youngest kid being younger than 6 years old). We argue
that these two groups of employees are more likely to become parents (and take leave) in the
near future, from the viewpoint of the firm, and call them the groups ‘at risk’. The third group
comprises of women and men older than 40 years old without kids, and women and men whose
youngest kid is older than 6 years old. We expect that it is less likely for these women and men
to have a child and are less likely to be on leave in the near future. We call them the groups
‘not at risk’.12 We assume that the reform changes the marginal costs of hiring the risky and
non-risky types of assets for the firm.
By using data on actual take-up of parental leave, we are able to measure the ex-post expo-
sure of the firms to the parental leave reform in terms of the relative proportions of employees
at risk and not at risk. Parental leave conditional on giving birth in the same year for mothers,
and birth in the same or the previous year for the fathers. We then compute the proportion of
different types of employees who are absent.
Throughout the analysis, all our outcomes are at the firm level. Our main outcome is the new
recruits within the firm by employee type. Using information on job transitions, we compute
the fraction of employees at risk by gender, and employees not at risk, among the new hires
within each firm. Using information on flows circumvents the mechanical aging effect of the
stock of employees.
Our treatment variable is the pre-reform composition of employees at risk and not at risk,
within the firm. For our treatment variable, we re-define the three categories of employees in the
following way. We adopt a more general definition and only distinguish among females below
40 years old, males below 40 years old, and male and female employees above 40 years old.
This variable is computed as the average proportion of the three groups (females at risk, males
12Note that the groups do not overlap, so that an individual is either ‘at risk’ or ‘not at risk’.
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at risk, and employees not at risk) in the three years preceding the reform, for both reforms.
Table presents the pre-reform composition of firms in the data. Another advantage of our rich
establishment year panel is that it renders firm-level analysis possible, which provides insights
on within-firm adjustments.
2.4.2 Empirical Setup
Identification of the effect of the 1993 parental leave reform on firm outcomes is challenged by
the fact that all firms in Norway experienced the enactment of the policy change contempora-
neously. Therefore, there is no natural control group.13 We address this challenge by taking
advantage of the sharp variation in the costs faced by firms as a result of the parental leave
extensions. In particular, we investigate whether firms with a higher concentration of workers
who are at greater risks of taking up parental leave in the pre-reform period experience larger
changes in their labor input allocations after the reform implementation.
Traditionally, women are the primary takers of parental leave in Norway (references). This
holds even after the introduction of a paternity quota in 1993 reform. Women’s parental leave
take-up is close to 100%, with considerably higher duration than men. Therefore, firms that
primarily employ men will incur different costs -measured in terms of employee absence- due
to the extended leave duration, relative to firms that employ higher proportions of women who
are potential takers of the extended parental leave duration. We assume that the costs to the firm
are increasing in the intensity of potential leave-takers. We admit that this is not an entirely
naive assumption, and delay the discussion of this assumption to the Robustness section.
Obviously, the proportion of females (and potential mothers) within the firm reveals many
of the firms’ characteristics and is highly correlated with our outcomes of interest such as labor
and wage adjustments. Thus, we exploit the pre-reform intensity of potential mothers within
the firm’s workforce, which is a predetermined characteristic. In our empirical setting, the pre-
13Moreover, differently from when we consider individual workers, we cannot estimate the effects of interest
with a regression discontinuity design approach distinguishing firms whose employees had children just before
April 1, 1993 from firms whose employees had children on April 1, 1993 or soon after. In any given firm, in fact,
some workers may have children before the cutoff date and others may have children after. This distinction is
likely to be meaningful only in very small firms, where births among few employees are rare events and can occur
either before or after the reform. This clearly raises issues of external validity.
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reform intensity of potential mothers captures the variation in costs incurred by the firms due to
the expansion.
We estimate the mean effect that is continuous in the proportion of employees in three sub-
groups describing the worker composition within a firm. Let employment of firm i in sector j at
time t be denoted Ei jt , and Ei jt be defined by the sum of all male and female workers employed
in i at time t. The data allows us to distinguish between younger and older workers, as well
as between workers who already have children and those who do not. For our main analysis,
we define three subgroups of workers with respect to the probability of taking parental leave,
from the point of view of the firm: potential mothers, potential fathers, and workers not at risk.
We argue that the most observable characteristic by the firm is the employee’s age, and firms
are likely to use age as an indicator to form beliefs about the employee’s probability of having
children and taking parental leave. Firms may not have information on whether or not their
employees have children, especially in larger firms. Hence, we define potential mothers and
mothers as women and men younger than 40 years old.14 In the robustness checks, we offer
alternative and more detailed definitions of the treatment.
A more complete representation of firm-level employment that adheres to our problem then
will be as follows (we drop all the subscripts for convenience):
E ≡ AtRisk f +AtRiskm+NoRisk,
where AtRisk refers to workers younger than 40, the superscripts f and m indicate female and
male workers, and NoRisk corresponds to workers not at risk of taking parental leave. We
do not distinguish between the men and women not at risk, as we expect the firm to treat the
two groups equally in terms of employment. We compute the employment shares of potential
mothers, potential fathers, and workers not at risk. Table 3.1 provides information on the char-
acteristics of employees within the different groups classified with respect to hazard of taking
parental leave, from the point of view of the firm. The descriptives are from the pre-reform year
1440 is a commonly used as a threshold for women’s fertility cycle. We prefer to use asymmetric definition for
men.
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1992.
Our identification focuses on the contrast among these groups in parental leave take-up and
duration.15 Clearly, potential mothers are the subgroup of the worker population that are most
affected by the reform. In line with our assumption that firms with higher intensity of potential
mothers have higher exposure to the reform, these figures constitute a first-stage showing that
potential mothers are the primary users of parental leave, and the variation among the three
groups allows us to define treatment and control firms. Potential mothers further diverge from
the other two groups in terms of hours worked and wages: Even though they seem to have
obtained higher education, they are more likely to work part-time and receive lower average
wages.16
Potential Mothers Potential Fathers Not at Risk
Age 29.754 29.909 47.501
Low educ. 0.222 0.237 0.224
Medium educ. 0.422 0.462 0.479
High educ. 0.356 0.302 0.297
Part-time 0.145 0.04 0.084
Parental leave take-up 0.054 0.001 0.001
Parental leave duration 14.793 0.086 0.176
Yearly earnings 168,401 243,557 254,164
Observations 403,354 458,748 580,768
Table 2.2: Characteristics of employees grouped by probability of taking parental leave. Mean and standard
deviations are reported. Year: 1992.
Figure 3.1 provides an overview of the proportion of employees affected differently by the
reform, and how much of the labor force they constitute. As for the firms, it provides infor-
15These are mean take-up and durations.
16Annual wages include the combined average of part and full-time wages. Potential mothers receive lower
average annual earnings given that they are more likely to be working part-time.
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mation about firms’ direct exposure to the expansion of parental leave over time. With our
definition of treatment, the proportion of potential mothers (and fathers for the 2005 reform)
measures the intensity of exposure of firms to the parental leave extension each year. This
figure exhibits a noticeable expansion in the proportion of employees not at risk. While the pro-
portion of potential mothers stays constant, the proportion of potential father declines slightly
over time. However, this figure only shows raw trends comparing the evolution of employment
by worker groups and does not distinguish between treated and control firms.
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Figure 2.1: Workforce composition within firms over time. Vertical axis shows the mean proportions of potential
mothers, fathers and workers not at risk, out of total employment. Panel: 1983-2014.
Throughout the analysis, our outcomes of interest are measured at the firm level and refer
to processes that might differ by employees’ age and sex, such as the gender and age com-
position of the workforce or the gender pay gap. We exploit the pre-reform composition of
the potential mothers within the firms to capture variation in firms’ exposure to the parental
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leave extension, and estimate its interacted effect with the pre and post-reform time dummies.
Our main empirical specification follows a Difference-in-Differences (DID hereafter) approach
with a continuous treatment variable, as in Machin et al. [2003] and Galassi [2018]. We follow
closely the empirical approach in these two papers, which consider changes in minimum wage
and labor tax laws, respectively, where the reform affects heavily certain sectors and firms due
to their workforce composition.17 Bleakley [2007] Acemoglu and Johnson [2007] have a sim-
ilar empirical setup where they instead employ an Instrumental Variables approach. Our main
specification follows:
yit = αi+βShortRun ∗AtRisk fi ∗Shortt +βLongRun ∗AtRisk fi ∗Longt +δt + εit (2.1)
where yit is the outcome of firm i in period t. AtRisk
f
i measures the pre-reform intensity of
potential mothers, and is constructed as the fraction of potential mothers (for 1993 reform) (or
fathers 2005 reform) employed within the firm averaged over 3 years pre-reform, 1988-1992
or 2000-2003.18 βShortRun and βLongRun are the coefficients of interest, reported for post-reform
years in the short-run (1993-1996) and the long-run (1997-2003). In the robustness checks, we
also report βt for yearly treatment effects, and βpost for the average treatment effect in years
post-reform. αi are the firm fixed effects that capture time-invariant heterogeneity across firms,
such as productivity. Finally, δt are year fixed effects to absorb common trends and macroe-
conomic shocks. Given that Norway experienced a large financial crisis between 1988-1992,
controlling for the macroeconomic trend is crucial.
The treatment intensity is measured by the variable AtRisk fi , which proxies the cost incurred
to the firms by the reform, as measured by the proportion of absent female employees. We chose
to compute this variable as the average of three years preceding the reform (instead of the pre-
reform year level), as the proportion of women who give birth in a firm may not be consistent,
particularly in subsequent years. In the robustness checks, we demonstrate that our results are
valid when we use a binary treatment which takes on the value 0 for below median and 1 for
17Similar approaches have been used in the labor literature.
18We exclude the year 2004 from the analysis of the 2005 reform as the reform was already announced in 2004.
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above median intensity of potential mothers.
The coefficient of interest is β and is interacted with a period dummy to estimate the dif-
ferential treatment effects for the short and long-run post-reform. β estimates the differences
in labor demand of firms with different pre-reform intensities of potential mothers. Our main
identification assumption is that in the absence of the reform, the outcomes would have fol-
lowed parallel trends across firms with different pre-reform intensities. In the Appendix, we
also report βt , where the estimates of βt for the pre-reform years correspond to placebo effects
and hence provide a means to test the parallel trends assumption. We show that the parallel
trends assumption is not violated as the estimates interacted with pre-reform years are small
and statistically insignificant.
Our identification strategy relies on the assumption that establishments with higher inten-
sity of potential mothers are more exposed to the reform as we expect a higher proportion of
employees to be absent, and for a longer duration. With this motivation, we assume that higher
intensity firms have higher adjustment costs related to the reform. As these costs are not direct
costs but rather hidden costs of replacing absent workers, we do not have a variable that can di-
rectly measure the costs incurred by the firms. Hence, we plan to build a conceptual framework
which elucidates this mechanism.
Another challenge of estimating the effects of the 1993 reform, is the introduction of the
paternity quota contemporaneous to the extension in parental leave duration which effects the
mothers. Given our assumption, if the extension of maternity leave duration raises the opportu-
nity costs of employing potential mothers, relative to the other groups; extending the paternity
leave duration should similarly raise the opportunity costs of employing potential fathers for the
firms.
We address this challenge in two ways. First, we compare the worker flows in firms with
different pre-reform intensities of potential fathers. Second, we repeat the analysis for the 2005
reform, which has only increased the parental leave duration for fathers and therefore allows us
to isolate the effects of increasing the opportunity costs of potential fathers, from that of moth-
ers. As shown in 2.2, both reforms (1993 and 2005) have increased parental leave take-up and
66
duration of mothers and fathers, respectively. While parental leave take-up is not relevant for
the mothers, as de facto all mothers take leave, we observe that the mothers immediately adapt
to the maximum parental leave duration available. For the fathers, take-up has increased grad-
ually since the introduction of paternity quota in 1993. In contrast to the mothers, the fathers
rarely take leaves longer than the paternity quota.
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Figure 2.2: Parental leave take-up (proportion of employees) and mean duration within firms, by aggregate indus-
tries. Shown separately for male and female employees. Upper row: Panel: 1991-2003 for the upper row and
2000-2014 for the bottom row.
As discussed above, our estimation strategy does not have treatment and control groups in
the strict sense, as all firms are affected by the reform. This causes a violation of the stable
unit treatment value (SUTVA) assumption. We relax the SUTVA assumption by showing that
establishments with higher proportions of potential mothers have higher exposure to the reform,
visualized in Figure 3.4. This figure provides a ‘first-stage’ for our analysis, as it demonstrates
that firms with a higher pre-reform intensity of potential mothers and fathers were more badly
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affected by the reform, measured in terms of parental leave take-up rates.19
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Figure 2.3: Parental leave take-up (proportion of employees) and mean duration within firms, by the pre-reform
intensity of mothers (upper panel) and fathers (lower panel). Shown separately for male and female employees.
Upper row: Panel: 1991-2003 for the upper row and 2000-2014 for the bottom row.
With respect to standard labor demand theory, we expect firms that have a higher intensity of
potential mothers to have more incentives for substituting these workers with other types, when
the opportunity costs of employing them increases. Differences in firms’ hiring by worker type
convey information about whether potential mothers, who are supposed to benefit from the ex-
pansion of parental leave policies, are de facto being substituted by other types of employees.
We also present evidence on how the workforce composition within the firms are affected with
respect to additional margins including education and hours worked.
Our final sample consists of 81,316 establishments from Norway matched to 3,349,059
19Note that the duration of leave is similar among high and low-intensity firms. Conditional on taking leave,
females traditionally use the entire number of days available, while fathers rarely consume above the paternity
quota.
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workers for the observation window of 1983-2003. For our empirical strategy to be valid, we
need variation in the treatment (intensity of potential mothers pre-reform) across firms. Figure
3.4 shows the distribution of firms according to pre-reform proportions of potential mothers and
fathers. While there are a non-negligible fraction of firms with no potential mothers or fathers
(about 10-15% of the sample), rest of the firms very highly in terms of their treatment intensity.
0
5
10
15
Pr
op
or
tio
n 
of
 F
irm
s
0 .2 .4 .6 .8 1
Potential Mothers/Total Employment
0
5
10
15
Pr
op
or
tio
n 
of
 F
irm
s
0 .2 .4 .6 .8 1
Potential Fathers/Total Employment
Figure 2.4: Distribution of firms according to pre-reform proportions of potential mothers (1988-1992), and po-
tential fathers (2000-2003).
In Figure 3.6, we document the proportion of establishments with above and median pre-
reform intensities of potential mothers, and fathers, by sectors defined by single-digit NACE
codes.20 Therefore, this figure explores the sectoral variation in our treatment. The proportion
of potential mothers higher in sectors such as education and health, and less in traditionally
male-dominated sectors like construction and repair. The lower panel shows that treatment
20We have 1,022 different sector classifications, and we observe high sectoral variation in the proportion of
potential mothers employed.
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intensity varies across sectors, symmetrically for potential fathers, in the 2000-2014 panel. Tra-
ditionally female-dominated sectors (such as education and health, as opposed to construction
and repair) are more heavily exposed to the 1993 reform. Later, we explore heterogeneity of the
effects in male and female-dominated sectors and show the robustness of our results to sector
fixed effects. Together, these pieces of evidence suggest that the estimates are not driven by
sector level variation.
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Figure 2.5: Proportion of establishments by the pre-reform intensity of potential mothers and fathers (above/below
median), by aggregate industry definitions. Years: 1992 (Panel A) and 2003 (Panel B).
Tables 3.2 and 3.3 report our investigations on the characteristics of the firms that are af-
fected by the reform to varying degrees. We present descriptive statistics by groups of firms
according to quartiles of the treatment: the pre-reform proportion of potential mothers in Table
3.2 and potential fathers in Table 3.3. Summary statistics according to quartiles in terms of the
proportion of potential mothers are calculated for the year before reform, for both tables. It is
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worth pointing out that firms with different pre-reform intensities of potential mothers differ
along several dimensions such as hours worked, employee turnover, and wages. Comparing the
bottom and top quartiles of the high-intensity establishments; we observe that potential moth-
ers are employed heavily in firms with more part-time employment, lower median wages, and
higher employee turnover. By contrast, the characteristics of firms with high intensity of po-
tential fathers, are exactly the opposite. These characteristics are related to substitution effects,
which we discuss in the next section.
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4
%Potential Mothers 0.039 0.213 0.361 0.652
%Potential Fathers 0.511 0.329 0.233 0.108
No Employees 14.173 19.406 19.175 14.564
Full-time Employees 13.733 18.097 16.851 12.305
%Part-time Employees 0.047 0.083 0.116 0.139
%Low-educ Employees 0.279 0.231 0.233 0.243
%Medium-educ Employees 0.535 0.471 0.467 0.478
%High-educ Employees 0.186 0.298 0.3 0.279
Median Wage (yearly) 226,014 217,856 191,764 157,757
Gender Wage Gap 0.391 0.372 0.363 0.326
Median Wage (full-time) 229,468 224,530 200,360 165,737
%New Hires 0.159 0.171 0.184 0.219
%Separations 0.098 0.114 0.129 0.153
Observations 31018 14815 16409 19074
Table 2.3: Establishment characteristics by the pre-reform proportion of potential mothers within the firm. The
sample is split by quantiles of the pre-reform proportion of potential mothers. Year: 1992.
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Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4
%Potential Mothers 0.305 0.281 0.206 0.138
%Potential Fathers 0.052 0.197 0.368 0.597
No Employees 24.548 27.201 25.839 20.326
Full-time Employees 20.742 24.763 24.245 19.142
%Part-time Employees 0.142 0.117 0.094 0.078
%Low-educ Employees 0.194 0.223 0.261 0.265
%Medium-educ Employees 0.433 0.441 0.478 0.512
%High-educ Employees 0.373 0.336 0.261 0.223
Median Wage (yearly) 250,740 260,699 271,289 276,711
Gender Wage Gap 0.319 0.278 0.272 0.273
Median Wage (full-time) 263,754 271,802 280,713 283,452
%New Hires 0.177 0.177 0.18 0.209
%Separations 0.14 0.15 0.144 0.147
Observations 21,654 17,811 16,343 11,432
Table 2.4: Establishment characteristics by the pre-reform proportion of potential fathers within firm. The sample
is split by quantiles of pre-reform proportion of potential fathers. Year: 2003.
2.5 Empirical Results
In this section, we present the estimated effects of the 1993 reform on a variety of firm-level
outcomes. We distinguish between the short-run (1993-1996) and long-run (1997-2003) effects
of the reform and report both coefficients. The treatment is continuous (between 0 and 1) and
measured as the intensity of potential mothers (women below 40 years old) within the firm pre-
reform years (averaged over 1988-1992). In the figures, we graphically compare the outcomes
for high and low-intensity establishments, defined with respect to above or below median pre-
reform intensity of potential mothers. Complications arising from the introduction of Paternity
Quota are discussed later, and similar analyses for the effects of paternity leave expansion are
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included in the robustness checks for 1993 and 2005 reforms. Further robustness checks include
alternative definitions of ‘intensity’. Yearly treatment effects for the main outcomes of interest
are documented in the Appendix, and visually presented in the figures included in this section.
2.5.1 Labor Demand Adjustments
We concentrate first on firms’ labor demand adjustments. In particular, we are interested in
knowing whether the relative fraction of potential mothers and fathers affects firms’ hiring of
new women, given that the reform has increased the opportunity cost of employing potential
mothers. The outcomes we use are hires of potential mothers, potential fathers and workers not
at risk (measured as the fraction of new hires), the growth rate of employment for these groups
(measured as the difference between the proportion of these groups at time t and in t-1), and the
growth rate of total employment. The short and long-run impacts of the reform on hiring are
reported in Table 2.5, and Figure 2.6 represents the yearly treatment effects.21
In Table 4, columns 1-3 use as the outcome the fraction of specific types of employees
among all new hires, and columns 4-6 use a dummy variable indicating whether employees in
a specific group are hired, which corresponds to the marginal probability of hiring. All speci-
fications include firm fixed effects and year dummies. Standard errors are clustered at the firm
level to account for autocorrelation.
Notably, firms with a higher fraction of potential mothers pre-reform, hire relatively less
potential mothers after the reform (statistically significant effects with point estimates 21 pp in
the short-run and 22 pp in the long-run). Columns 2 and 3 show that these firms hire relatively
more potential fathers and workers not at risk, suggesting that they are substituting away from
potential mothers in favor of the other labor input resources which they perceive to be less risky
assets. Potential mothers are substituted mostly with potential fathers (point estimate of 14 pp
in the short-run and 16 pp in the long-run), but also with workers not at risk (point estimate of
7 pp in the short and long-run),. Columns 4-6 compare the probabilities of hiring the marginal
potential mother (or father, or worker not at risk) for firms with high and low pre-reform intensi-
21The corresponding regression results are documented in the Appendix.
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ties of potential mothers. Although all estimates are negatively significant, suggesting that firms
with high intensity have a lower probability of hiring from any of these groups, the difference is
more pronounced for potential mothers. These set of results are consistent with the established
results in the first three columns.
Outcome: Hirings
Proportions Dummy (0,1)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Potential Mothers Potential Fathers Not At Risk Potential Mothers Potential Fathers Not At Risk
βShortRun -0.209*** 0.135*** 0.074*** -0.596*** -0.012** -0.193***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
βLongRun -0.223*** 0.156*** 0.067*** -0.570*** -0.113*** -0.237***
(0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.009) (0.009) (0.008)
Obs. 569,612 569,612 569,612 940,397 940,397 940,397
R2 0.007 0.004 0.006 0.049 0.029 0.031
No. Firms 81,107 81,107 81,107 81,316 81,316 81,316
Year Dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES
Firm FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
Table 2.5: Estimates from Equation 3.1. Each column corresponds to a different outcome. Standard errors clustered
at the firm level are reported in parenthesis. ∗p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗p < 0.001. Outcomes refer to the hiring
of the three worker groups considered. Hirings of potential mothers, potential fathers and workers not at risk are
estimated on the subsample of establishments with high and low intensities of potential mothers. Reform year:
1993, Panel: 1983-2003.
Figure 2.6 shows that these firms with different pre-reform intensities exhibited similar hir-
ing practices before the reform. In 2.6, we report βt also for pre-reform years, to confirm that the
parallel trends assumption holds. This coefficient plot that starts from pre-reform years to visu-
alize the parallel trends and the post-reform effects. Figure 2.6 shows the evolution of different
types of hirings across establishments with different pre-reform intensities of potential mothers
within their workforce. In firms with a higher proportion of potential mothers pre-reform, the
reform has altered hiring of different types of workers. Importantly, we observe differences in
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the outcome even before the reform, starting in 1988. This does not invalidate our identification
but rather suggests that firms have already started making adjustments in the reforms preceding
the 1993 reform. Hence, we estimate a cumulative effect of the reforms that have extended
maternity leave duration between 1987-1993, in a similar manner to Dahl et al. [2016].
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Figure 2.6: Confidence intervals correspond to 95 % level. Panel: 1983-2003.
Figure 2.7 provides an overview of the evolution of total employment, and the employment
of our three worker types, over time, by the intensity of treatment (above or below median).
This figure provides an overall picture of the growth of employment with the firms. In firms
with a higher pre-reform intensity of potential mothers, the time trend in employment seems
to change with the reform. There is a reversal in the pattern: Firms with a high intensity of
potential mothers start shrinking in terms of employment of potential mothers while growing
in terms of employment of workers not at risk. The reverse pattern is observed in low-intensity
establishments. Total employment follows a similar time trend for both groups. There is a
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slump around the year 1991, which can be explained with the economic downturn in Norway.
Moreover, the first two graphs rule out that the increase in total employment is driven by the
substitution of full-time by part-time positions. In the next set of results, we further demonstrate
that high-intensity establishments shrink in terms of part-time employment.
15
20
25
30
35
To
ta
l E
m
pl
oy
m
en
t
1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
Year
15
20
25
30
Fu
ll-
tim
e 
Em
pl
oy
m
en
t
1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
Year
0
.
1
.
2
.
3
.
4
Po
te
nt
ia
l M
ot
he
rs
 E
m
p.
1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
Year
.
1
.
2
.
3
.
4
.
5
Po
te
nt
ia
l F
at
he
rs
 E
m
p.
1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
Year
.
4
.
45
.
5
.
55
.
6
N
ot
 A
t R
is
k 
Em
p.
1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
Year
Non-Intense Intense
Average
Figure 2.7: High and low-intensity refer to establishments with above and below median proportions of pre-reform
potential mothers. The vertical line indicates the reform year 1993. Confidence intervals correspond to 95 % level.
Panel: 1983-2003.
2.5.2 Wage Adjustments
The first set of results suggest that labor demand falls for a particular type of employees. Stan-
dard labor demand theory then predicts that, even if there is an increase in the labor supply of
potential mothers due to the reform, the wages of potential mothers should fall following the
1993 reform. To test this simple prediction in our setting, we compare the median wages in
firms with different pre-reform intensities. We consider as our outcome the median wages of
76
full-time male and female employees, and the gender wage differential in full-time employ-
ment.22
Our evidence aligns with the theoretical prediction, as shown in Table 3.5. Full-time me-
dian wages for females exhibit a relative decline in firms more strongly affected by the reform.
This effect is only present in the short-run and smaller in magnitude compared to the effect
on male wages. Interestingly, the gender wage gap also declines, due to a relative decline in
male wages as well. Perhaps, one needs to differentiate between the median wages for separate
worker groups (potential mothers, potential fathers, and workers not at risk), to get a complete
picture. Figure 2.8 illustrates these results, comparing the median full-time wages on average
and by gender, with respect to the pre-reform intensity of treatment. While the median wages
are relatively lower in high-intensity establishments after the reform, median female wages are
relatively increasing, and median male wages are relatively declining. We observe that the esti-
mated βShortRun coefficient on median female wages is driven by a large difference in the year
1995. Except for this year, median female wages are higher for high-intensity establishments
after the reform. This is a counterintuitive result as we would expect median female wages to
fall with the estimated decline in labor demand. In the next section, we try to explain these
results with shifts in other employee characteristics.
22Earnings are reported as gross yearly earnings, in NOK. Our sample excludes from the workforce employees
who earn less than the basic income threshold in each year since they are not eligible for parental leave.
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Outcome: Growth in Full-time Wages
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Median Wage Female Wage Male Wage Gender Wage Gap
βShortRun -0.029*** -0.014*** -0.037*** -0.026***
(0.002) (0.003) (0.004) (0.005)
βLongRun -0.029*** 0.000 -0.030*** -0.043***
(0.002) (0.003) (0.004) (0.006)
Obs. 857,540 699,082 751,375 593,066
R2 0.007 0.006 0.005 0.001
No. Firms 80,662 71,514 72,803 63,601
Year Dummies YES YES YES YES
Firm FE YES YES YES YES
Table 2.6: Effect of the reform on wage growth. Outcomes considered are the growth of median wages, median
female wages, median male wages, and the gender wage gap differential, for full-time employees. Each column
corresponds to a different outcome. Standard errors clustered at the firm level are reported in parenthesis. ∗p <
0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗p < 0.001. Reform year: 1993, Panel: 1983-2003.
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Figure 2.8: Effect of the reform on the growth of median yearly wages of full-time employees. The first panel
displays the average median full-time wage, middle panel for females, and the bottom panel for males. Confidence
intervals correspond to 95 % level. Panel: 1985-2003.
2.5.3 Characterization of the Workforce
The observed relative decline in median wages within high-intensity establishments may be
driven by two channels: a change in the education of the workforce, or a decrease in hours-
worked (part-time employment relative to full-time). This subsection presents evidence sug-
gesting that both channels are effective.
Changes in hiring behavior will eventually change the characteristics of the firms’ work-
force. To get more insight into the mechanisms of these employment flows, we consider the
change in the worker composition of the firm with respect to different employee characteristics.
For this purpose, we use growth in employment levels of workers who work part-time, workers
with low and high education. This analysis permits us to infer the characteristics of employees
who are substituting the potential mothers.
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Table 3.5 reports our investigations. Each column corresponds to a different outcome, com-
puted as the growth of employment in terms of specific types of employees. The coefficients
compare the employment growth in different characteristics of firms with high and low pre-
reform intensities. Establishments more heavily affected by the reform shrink in terms of part-
time and high-skilled employees, while growing in low-skilled employment. Some features of
the sample are described in Table 3.1, and it’s important to highlight that workers not at risk,
who constituted the subsample of older workers, are less likely to be high-educated relative to
potential mothers and fathers. Hence, the established result that potential mothers are being
substituted by workers, not at risk, is consistent with the shrinking share of high-educated em-
ployees in high-intensity establishments.
Interestingly, total part-time employment declines and this result continues to hold when we
exclusively consider part-time female employment.23 The decline in part-time female employ-
ment explains why we do not observe lower female wages in high-intensity firms, despite the
substitution effect. This result further suggests that high-intensity firms substitute away only
from part-time female workers, who are likely to be potential mothers. Unfortunately, we do
not have data at the moment to confirm whether these effects can be attributed to temporary
or permanent employees. However, the effects are persistent over time, suggesting a long-term
change in firms’ workforce compositions.
23Results are available upon request.
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Outcome: Growth in Employment
(1) (2) (3)
Part-time Workers Low-educated Workers High-educated Workers
βShortRun -0.027*** 0.003*** -0.003***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
βLongRun -0.015*** 0.005*** -0.005***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Obs. 859,081 859,081 859,081
R2 0.003 0.001 0.000
No. Firms 80,749 80,749 80,749
Year Dummies YES YES YES
Firm FE YES YES YES
Table 2.7: Effect on growth in employment by part-time status, and by education level. Each column corresponds to
a different outcome. Standard errors clustered at the firm level are reported in parenthesis. ∗p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01,
∗∗∗p < 0.001. Reform year: 1993, Panel: 1983-2003.
2.5.4 Heterogenous Effects
We explore heterogeneity of our estimated effects with respect to two dimensions: establish-
ment size in the year before reform, and the proportion of females within the sector in the year
pre-reform. To investigate whether the treatment effects vary across some key establishment
characteristics, we estimate the following regression equation for establishment i belonging to
the group g:
yit = αi+∑
g
βg ∗AtRisk fi ∗Postt ∗Hetig+∑
g
δgHetig+∑
p
λpSectori+θPostt + εit (2.2)
where Postt is a dummy variable equal to 1 for years after the reform, β g estimates the average
treatment effect post-reform for firms in group g, Hetig are dummy variables equal to 1 if the
firm belongs to group g. ∑pλpSectori controls for a first-order polynomial on the sector level
(1022 categories). For firm size categories, baseline group is small firms (with less than 10 em-
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ployees), and for the proportion of females within the sector, baseline group is male-dominated
firms (female proportion <20%). The results are displayed in Table 3.7.
Among the firms with a higher pre-reform intensity of potential mothers, smaller firms are
expected to face larger costs of adjustments.Bygren and Duvander [2006] argue that fathers’
parental leave usage is lower in smaller workplaces, as it is harder to replace absent employees.
Mothers are also more reluctant to use longer leaves in smaller businesses. The figure demon-
strates similar descriptive evidence on PL take-up and duration for females with respect to firm
size categories and gender composition of the sectors. A smaller fraction of female employees
takes parental leave in small firms (as it is less likely to have a new birth when the number of
females is lower), though we discern no differences among firms in male and female-dominated
sectors.
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Figure 2.9: Parental leave take-up (proportion of employees) and the mean duration of females within firms, by
firm size categories (upper panel) and gender composition in the sector (lower panel). Firms with only male or
only female employees are excluded. Panel: 1991-2003.
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In Table 3.7, we examine the heterogeneity of labor demand. Panel A compares high and
low-intensity firms with respect to firm size categories. Following the reform, small firms hire
a relatively lower fraction of potential mothers, relatively more potential fathers, and workers
not at risk. The evidence is suggestive that there is more substitution within smaller firms.
Panel B distinguishes between male and female-dominated sectors. Norway has a heav-
ily gender-segregated labor market, as pointed out in Mandel and Semyonov [2006], where
female-dominated sectors tend to show more flexibility for females. We would expect firms
within female-dominated sectors to adjust their expectations and have lower costs of adjust-
ments in response to the reform as they possibly face these costs more often than firms in male-
dominated sectors. In other words, if these firms have already figured out how to deal with
the costs of parental leave, we would see fewer employment adjustments within these types of
firms.
To our surprise, differences across male and female-dominated sectors are not statistically
significant in terms of the hiring of potential mothers. In female-dominated firms, potential
fathers compose a lower fraction of new hires, while workers not at risk are hired more inten-
sively post-reform, in treated firms. In Panel C, we exclude firms with only male or only female
employees, as they might not have margins to adjust the gender composition of their workforce.
The results are similar to the previous regression.
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Outcome: Hirings
Proportions
(1) (2) (3)
Potential Mothers Potential Fathers Not At Risk
Panel A
βPost*Medium Firm 0.100*** -0.024*** -0.076***
(0.010) (0.009) (0.010)
βPost*Large Firm 0.114*** 0.020 -0.134***
(0.016) (0.019) (0.020)
Obs. 587,470 587,470 587,470
No. Firms 81,107 81,107 81,107
Panel B
βPost*Female-Dominated -0.002 -0.277*** 0.278***
(0.028) (0.026) (0.028)
Obs. 160,540 160,540 160,540
No. Firms 20,797 20,797 20,797
Panel C
βPost*Female-Dominated 0.010 -0.117*** 0.108***
(0.038) (0.037) (0.039)
Obs. 114,285 114,285 114,285
No. Firms 16,046 16,046 16,046
Year Dummies YES YES YES
Firm FE YES YES YES
Sector Dummies YES YES YES
Table 2.8: Estimates from Equation 2.2. Each column corresponds to a different outcome. Standard errors clustered
at the firm level are reported in parenthesis. ∗p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗p < 0.001. Outcomes refer to the hiring
of the three worker groups considered. Hirings of potential mothers, potential fathers and workers not at risk are
estimated on the subsample of establishments with high and low intensities of potential mothers. Panel A reports
results by firm size categories, baseline category being small firms. Panels B and C report results for male and
female-dominated sectors, where the baseline category is male-dominated sectors. Panel C further excludes firms
with only male or female employees from the sample. Reform year: 1993, Panel: 1983-2003.
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2.5.5 Robustness Exercises
In this section, we discuss the robustness and validity of our empirical results. First, we propose
alternative measures of intensity. Next, we discuss potential threats to our identification strategy.
Definition of Treatment
One could argue that the number and age of children are also an important criterion for
being perceived as a potential mother from the viewpoint of the firm, and therefore should we
included in the definition. Exploiting the richness of our data in employee characteristics, we
use finer definitions of potential mothers, separately considering women with pre-school kids
and young women (below 40) with no kids. As before, we measure the intensity of treatment
by the proportion of women in these groups within the firm in the pre-reform years (average
between 1988-1992). The results are reported in Table 3.8. The direction of the effects are
similar for these alternative specifications, and the effect of young women with no kids seem to
be a relatively stronger predictor of hires.
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Outcome: Hirings
Proportions
(1) (2) (3)
Potential Mothers Potential Fathers Not At Risk
Panel A
βShortRun (Pre-school Kids) -0.302*** 0.124*** 0.178***
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
βLongRun (Pre-school Kids) -0.349*** 0.154*** 0.195***
(0.007) (0.007) (0.008)
R2 0.010 0.004 0.003
Panel B
βShortRun (Young, No Kids) -0.442*** 0.192*** 0.251***
(0.022) (0.020) (0.021)
βLongRun (Young, No Kids) -0.449*** 0.191*** 0.257***
(0.025) (0.021) (0.025)
R2 0.002 0.008 0.006
Obs. 569,612 569,612 569,612
No. Firms 81,107 81,107 81,107
Year Dummies YES YES YES
Firm FE YES YES YES
Table 2.9: Estimates from Equation 3.1. Each column corresponds to a different outcome. Standard errors clustered
at the firm level are reported in parenthesis. ∗p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗p < 0.001. Outcomes refer to the hiring
of the three worker groups considered. Hirings of potential mothers, potential fathers and workers not at risk are
estimated on the subsample of establishments with high and low intensities of potential mothers. Panels A uses
pre-reform intensity of women with pre-school kids, and Panel B uses the pre-reform intensity of young women
with no kids, as treatment. Reform year: 1993, Panel: 1983-2003.
Next, we define our intensity of treatment as a binary variable, which takes on the value 1 if
the pre-reform proportion of potential mothers (defined as women below 40 years old) is above
the median, and 0 otherwise. This is a useful exercise to rule out that the results are being driven
by outliers in the data. Results are reported in Table 3.9, where the baseline comparison group
is firms with low intensity of pre-reform potential mothers. Hence, the reported coefficients
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compare the outcomes in high-intensity firms relative to low-intensity firms. This specification
corresponds to a standard DID with a binary treatment variable. Although the estimated co-
efficients are smaller in magnitude, the direction and statistical significance of our established
results on firms’ hiring are preserved when we have a binary treatment. This implies that some
of the effects are driven by outliers (firms with exceptionally high or low proportion of women
below 40 years old). Nevertheless, the effect is observed even when we estimate a common
treatment effect with respect to the median value which does not consider the outliers.
Outcome: Hirings
Proportions
(1) (2) (3)
Potential Mothers Potential Fathers Not At Risk
βShortRun -0.072*** 0.056*** 0.016***
(0.002) (0.003) (0.003)
βLongRun -0.077*** 0.060*** 0.016***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Obs. 569,612 569,612 569,612
R2 0.005 0.003 0.006
No. Firms 81,107 81,107 81,107
Year Dummies YES YES YES
Firm FE YES YES YES
Table 2.10: Estimates from Equation 3.1. Each column corresponds to a different outcome. Standard errors
clustered at the firm level are reported in parenthesis. ∗p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ p < 0.01, ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.001. Outcomes refer
to the hiring of the three worker groups considered. Hirings of potential mothers, potential fathers and workers
not at risk are estimated on the subsample of establishments with high and low intensities of potential mothers.
Treatment is a dummy indicator of whether the firm’s pre-reform intensity of potential mothers is above or below
the median value. Reform year: 1993, Panel: 1983-2003.
Finally, to ensure that the effect is driven by the potential mothers, we use as a placebo
treatment, the proportion of employees not at risk, composed of all males and females above
40 years old. Results are provided in Table 3.10. Placebo treatment should not give the same
results, which is what we observe.
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Outcome: Hirings
Proportions
(1) (2) (3)
Potential Mothers Potential Fathers Not At Risk
βShortRun (Not At Risk) 0.190*** 0.163*** -0.353***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.006)
βLongRun (Not At Risk) 0.206*** 0.176*** -0.382***
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Obs. 569,612 569,612 569,612
R2 0.006 0.004 0.018
No. Firms 81,107 81,107 81,107
Year Dummies YES YES YES
Firm FE YES YES YES
Table 2.11: Estimates from Equation 3.1. Each column corresponds to a different outcome. Standard errors
clustered at the firm level are reported in parenthesis. ∗p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗p < 0.001. Outcomes refer to
the hiring of the three worker groups considered. Hirings of potential mothers, potential fathers and workers not
at risk are estimated on the subsample of establishments with high and low intensities of employees, not at risk.
Reform year: 1993, Panel: 1983-2003.
We use alternative measures of the impact of the parental leave expansion. In fact, firms’
direct exposure to the parental leave reforms are reflected in the number of employees that take
parental leave. We use the proportion of pre-reform females taking parental leave, as the inten-
sity of treatment. Since parental leave data is not available before 1991, we use the pre-reform
year level in 1992 as our intensity measure. Results are reported in Table 3.11. The results also
elaborate on the mechanism. Firms with higher intensity of parental leave take-up by females,
hire relatively less potential mothers and instead hire more workers who are not at risk of taking
parental leave. Effects are virtually same to the benchmark specification, except for the result
on the hirings of potential fathers which is not significantly different anymore. In the next set of
results, we explain these results with the contemporaneous introduction of the paternity quota,
and clearly establish parental leave take-up as the main channel through which the reform op-
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erates on labor demand.
Outcome: Hirings
Proportions
(1) (2) (3)
Potential Mothers Potential Fathers Not At Risk
βShortRun -0.182*** 0.015 0.167***
(0.016) (0.017) (0.014)
βLongRun -0.233*** 0.028 0.205***
(0.017) (0.018) (0.017)
Obs. 569,612 569,612 569,612
R2 0.003 0.002 0.006
No. Firms 81,107 81,107 81,107
Year Dummies YES YES YES
Firm FE YES YES YES
Table 2.12: Estimates from Equation 3.1. Each column corresponds to a different outcome. Standard errors
clustered at the firm level are reported in parenthesis. ∗p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗p < 0.001. Outcomes refer to
hiring of the three worker groups considered. Hirings of potential mothers, potential fathers and workers not at
risk are estimated on the subsample of establishments with high and low intensities of proportion of females taking
parental leave in 1992. Reform year: 1993, Panel: 1983-2003.
Paternity Leave
With the introduction of the paternity quota, firms could have an incentive to decrease the
employment of both potential mothers and fathers. To test if our proposed mechanism sym-
metrically holds also for the male employees, we exploit the 2005 reform. As stated before,
the 2005 reform extended the paternity quota without changing the duration of maternity leave.
This allows us to isolate the effect of extension of paternity leave duration. The coefficient of
interest captures the differences among firms with different pre-reform intensities of potential
fathers in hiring of potential mothers, fathers and employees not at risk, in the short and long-
run. Short-run treatment effect is defined as the average treatment effect in years 2005-2009,
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while the long-run treatment effect refers to the average treatment effect between 2010-2014.
Table 2.13 presents the estimated coefficients. Panel B of Table 2.13 uses the proportion of
male employees taking parental leave in the pre-reform year 2004, as our measure of intensity.
Outcome: Hirings
Proportions
(1) (2) (3)
Potential Mothers Potential Fathers Not At Risk
Panel A
βShortRun 0.079*** -0.188*** 0.109***
(0.003) (0.004) (0.004)
βLongRun 0.069*** -0.241*** 0.172***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
R2 0.001 0.008 0.003
Panel B
βShortRun (PL Take-up) 0.017 -0.126*** 0.109***
(0.019) (0.017) (0.018)
βLongRun (PL Take-up) 0.008 -0.134*** 0.126***
(0.020) (0.019) (0.020)
R2 0.000 0.001 0.001
Obs. 662,880 662,880 662,880
No. Firms 100,230 100,230 100,230
Year Dummies YES YES YES
Firm FE YES YES YES
Table 2.13: Estimates from Equation 3.1. Each column corresponds to a different outcome. Standard errors
clustered at the firm level are reported in parenthesis. ∗p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗p < 0.001. Outcomes refer to
hiring of the three worker groups considered. Hirings of potential mothers, potential fathers, and workers not at risk
are estimated on the subsample of establishments with high and low intensities of potential fathers in Panel A. The
treatment variable is the fraction of fathers taking parental leave in 2003. Reform year: 2005, Panel: 2000-2014.
Our findings in Table 2.13 suggest that firms treat male employees symmetrically when the
duration of paternity leave is extended. This further implies that our previous results on poten-
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tial mothers provide a conservative estimation of the effect of the reform on the demand for total
female employment. Assuming that the effect of the introduction of paternity leave would be
in the same direction, this will confound the estimated effect of the extension of parental leave
duration for mothers. We test this by comparing the hiring outcomes of firms with high and low
pre-reform intensity of potential fathers (and pre-reform parental leave take-up by men) before
and after the 1993 reform, which introduced the paternity quota. Panel B of Table 2.14 reveals
that the 1993 reform had no bite for firms with high pre-reform intensity of potential fathers, or
fathers taking parental leave. This reassures that our estimates in Table 2.5 are not confounded
by the introduction of the paternity quota.
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Outcome: Hirings
Proportions
(1) (2) (3)
Potential Mothers Potential Fathers Not At Risk
Panel A
βShortRun 0.021*** -0.228*** 0.207***
(0.004) (0.005) (0.005)
βLongRun 0.008* -0.247*** 0.239***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
R2 0.002 0.008 0.010
Panel B
βShortRun (Parental Leave) -0.047 -0.058 0.105
(0.070) (0.060) (0.065)
βLongRun (Parental Leave) -0.084 0.007 0.077
(0.075) (0.063) (0.064)
R2 0.002 0.002 0.006
Obs. 569,612 569,612 569,612
No. Firms 81,107 81,107 81,107
Year Dummies YES YES YES
Firm FE YES YES YES
Table 2.14: Estimates from Equation 3.1. Each column corresponds to a different outcome. Standard errors
clustered at the firm level are reported in parenthesis. ∗p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗p < 0.001. Outcomes refer to
hiring of the three worker groups considered. Hirings of potential mothers, potential fathers, and workers not at risk
are estimated on the subsample of establishments with high and low intensities of potential fathers in Panel A. The
treatment variable is the fraction of fathers taking parental leave in 1992. Reform year: 1993, Panel: 1983-2003.
Previous Parental Leave Extensions
In order to deal with the series of reforms before 1993 which have gradually extended the
duration of parental leave, we exclude the years 1987-1992 from the sample. We use the years
1983-1986 to construct the pre-reform intensity of potential mothers. Table 2.15 contains the
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results from these estimations.
Outcome: Hirings
Proportions
(1) (2) (3)
Potential Mothers Potential Fathers Not At Risk
βShortRun -0.271*** 0.251*** 0.021**
(0.009) (0.009) (0.010)
βLongRun -0.274*** 0.267*** 0.008
(0.010) (0.009) (0.011)
Obs. 341,074 341,074 341,074
R2 0.005 0.005 0.002
No. Firms 69,448 69,448 69,448
Year Dummies YES YES YES
Firm FE YES YES YES
Table 2.15: Estimates from Equation 3.1. Each column corresponds to a different outcome. Standard errors
clustered at the firm level are reported in parenthesis. ∗p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗p < 0.001. Outcomes refer to
hiring of the three worker groups considered. Hirings of potential mothers, potential fathers and workers not at risk
are estimated on the subsample of establishments with high and low intensities of potential mothers. Pre-reform
year: 1983-1986. Reform year: 1993, Panel: 1983-2003, excluding 1987-1992.
The results provide some insights into whether firms have made previous adjustments in
response to the parental leave extensions before 1993. Compared to the coefficients reported in
Table 2.5, the estimated effects are higher in magnitude, with the exception of hires of employ-
ees not at risk. Only the short-run effect is statistically significant in for this group of employees.
The differences could perhaps be attributed to the novelty in the 1993 reform, which is the intro-
duction of paternity leave. Together with the cumulative response to previous reforms and the
introduction of paternity leave, our estimates in Table 2.5 constitute a lower bound to the effect
of the 1993 reform. In that respect, this robustness exercise provides us an upper bound for the
estimates. Hence, this exercise provides us with an upper and a lower bound within which the
true Average Treatment Effect must lie. As also shown in the Appendix figure, our results in
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Table 2.5 estimate a cumulative effect of the parental leave extensions between 1987-1993.
2.6 Conclusion
Paid and job-protected maternity and recently paternity leave have become common practices
in the developed economies. While parental leave policies become more and more generous,
the benefits on the labor supply of women are still ambiguous, and there is scant evidence on
how these policies affect labor demand. In this paper, we consider the labor demand effects of
this labor supply policy, which aims to minimize the career costs of having children for women.
Using employer-employee matched administrative data from Norway, we analyze the exten-
sion of parental leave duration in 1993, and observe the post-reform employment flows, gender
wage gap, hours and skill distribution within the firms. Although the reform is legally binding
for all firms, the treatment affects everybody but certain firms are more affected. Our identifi-
cation strategy relies on an assumption on the cost structure of the firm.
Among the three factors of production comprised of potential mothers, potential fathers,
and employees not at risk, we hypothesize that firms will substitute away from the one whose
opportunity cost relatively increases, in this case, potential mothers. We distinguish between
firms that have high intensity of potential mothers, fathers and employees not at risk.
Indeed, we find that the pre-existing relative fraction (intensity) of potential mothers affects
firms’ hiring of new women. Firms that are highly populated with potential mothers prior to
the reform, move away from hiring women below 40 years old, in favor of hiring men below 40
years old, and older employees of both genders, after the reform. These firms shift employment
towards full-time employment which is less suitable for potential mothers. Moreover, firms
with a high intensity of potential mothers pre-reform grow in low-skilled workforce (and shrink
in high-skilled workforce).
Our results emphasize the importance of labor demand, an aspect of the labor market which
has been neglected so far by studies on the impact of parental leave reforms. Overall, our find-
ings also suggest that generous parental leave policies may not be able to achieve their target of
balancing career and family responsibilities for women. Policymakers need to take into account
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the response of the labor demand side. The way firms and jobs are structured play a central role
in facilitating this balance. Nevertheless, while Norway provides an ideal setting with rich data
availability and policy changes, it is a very particular context in terms of gender perceptions,
and the policy implications from this study can at best be generalized to Scandinavian countries.
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Chapter 3
Out of Sight, Out of Mind? Proximity to
Health Care and Electoral Outcomes
3.1 Introduction
How does the allocation of public goods across geographical units within a polity affect electoral
support? In line with Harold Lasswell’s eminent definition of politics as a process of determin-
ing “who gets what, when, and how?” (Laswell [1936]), most work in political economy views
the ability of the incumbent to allocate public resources as a powerful tool to enhance their prob-
ability of reelection (Dixit and Londregan [1996], Cox and McCubbins [1986], Dahlberg and
Johansson [2002]). Although the positive association between the targeting of public spend-
ing to certain groups and an increase in their support for the incumbent in the next election is
widely accepted, there is not much micro-level evidence that shows this is indeed the case. Do
voters reward incumbents who target public goods to their locality? Are all voters susceptible
to increased public goods spending? What kind of investments appeal to voters with different
socio-economic characteristics?
In this article, we present a novel argument that voters reward incumbents when there is pub-
lic spending that is in their local proximity. We argue the rewarding mechanism works through
two distinct channels. The first channel has to do with how distance to a public good affects its
accessibility. Most models of public goods provision rest on the assumption that public goods
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can effectively be enjoyed by an infinitely large number of individuals with no additional costs
other than the tax contributions. However, the variation in proximity to a public good generates
change in the additional costs of using that service. Thus, individuals should value a new facil-
ity providing a public service their neighborhood much more than a similar facility that is 30
miles away.
The second channel involves the visibility of the public service. A critical insight emerg-
ing from the behavioral political economy is that voters do not have perfect information on
policies. Empirical evidence shows that there is a lot of variation in estimates of welfare spend-
ing between citizens (Kuklinski et al. [2000], Caplan [2011], Gimpelson and Treisman [2018],
Gingrich [2014]). We argue that in the absence of perfect information on how much the govern-
ment spends on specific policies, “visibility” of a new investment becomes an important factor
in shaping voters’ information level on government’s efforts to serve its citizens. In this arti-
cle, we show that geographical proximity to public services makes them more “visible”, thus
informing voters who live close to the government’s work. We assert that the increase in infor-
mation through visibility helps the incumbent get electoral rewards.
Our findings indicate a non-negligible impact of the change in proximity on votes: ten-
minute decrease in walking time to the nearest clinic increases the vote share of the Justice and
Development Party in Turkey (AKP) by about six percentage points in that polling unit. When
we consider the quality of healthcare provision, we do not find the same effect. Increasing the
number of family physicians in the clinics has no significant impact on electoral outcomes over-
all. However, when treatment impacts are allowed to vary by the education level of voters, we
document that visibility is determinant only for voters in low-educated areas. Voters living in
areas with a higher education level, on the other hand, value the quality of public service pro-
vision. This result further corroborates our argument that visibility enhances the information
available, particularly for the uninformed voters. This result is also consistent with theories of
rational but poorly informed voters.
Besides quantifying the effect of a universally accessible visible public good on voting out-
comes, we also contribute empirically to the literature on public goods provision by devising a
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new method to measure the visibility of public goods. Existing measures in the literature are at
more macro levels, such as the change in health-care spending as a percentage of the GDP. In
this paper, we introduce the most disaggregated measure of public goods provision to-date.
This paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we overview the related literature. In section
3 we describe the institutional background and our data. In section 4 we present and discuss the
empirical results. Section 5 contains conclusions.
3.2 Related Literature
We draw on two different themes of the political economy literature: pre-electoral manipula-
tion, and the role of information in voting. Empirical research on pre-electoral manipulation
finds evidence of partisan and opportunistic cycles in fiscal policy choices, where political par-
ties target public goods to specific groups as an electoral strategy to maximize votes (Dixit and
Londregan [1996]). Often termed ‘pork-barrel spending’, parties change the level and compo-
sition of government spending in pre-election years. As for the electoral returns, these studies
conclude that election year deficits lower the probability of re-election, but voters do respond to
re-allocated spending. Hence, this literature concludes that the optimal strategy for an incum-
bent is targeted increases in spending financed by cuts on other types of spending (see Drazen
and Eslava [2010], Drazen and Eslava [2006], Veiga and Veiga [2011], and Vergne [2009]).
Brender and Drazen [2005] shows that the political deficit cycle phenomenon is more prevalent
in young democracies. Brender and Drazen [2008] tests whether deficit spending in the pre-
election year influences the election outcome, and find no evidence in a wide array of countries
of different development levels and democracy.
A key question that remains underexplained by this strand of the literature is: “Why would
rational, forward-looking voters who are targeted by the incumbent before the election find it
optimal to vote for him?”(Drazen and Eslava [2006]) While a substantial literature is devoted
to understanding pork-barrel spending, there is a relative paucity of evidence on the effects of
public goods provision on voting outcomes. Closely linked, is work on state spending in au-
thoritarian regimes (Voigtla¨nder and Voth [2014], Cinnirella and Schueler [2018], Adena et al.
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[2015]). Also known as winning the ‘hearts and minds’ of the electorate, these studies show
that spending on infrastructure and education, respectively, have effectively raised support for
the government. In general, however, the literature on the effects of infrastructure spending on
support for the government is inconclusive.While some studies find that spending programs and
income transfers can effectively boost support for the government (Levitt and Snyder Jr [1997],
Manacorda et al. [2011]); others have failed to detect any significant impact (Stein and Bickers
[1994], Feldman and Jondrow [1984]).
As Stein and Bickers [1994] argues, “Previous research may have failed to detect a rela-
tionship due to misconceptualization, misspecified empirical tests, or both.” In this respect, we
make a number of contributions to the existing literature. Existing research on electoral returns
to state spending has mostly relied on data on state spending. However, federal spending out-
side of a district is unlikely to be correlated with the electoral outcomes if this information is
not available to the voters, or the voters do not receive direct benefits. Furthermore, the extent
to which voters are influenced by these investments depends on a variety of factors. To address
this issue, we focus on the spatial distribution of public goods provision instead of spending and
construct a micro-level measure.
In this respect, the most closely linked study to ours, is Voigtla¨nder and Voth [2014], which
finds that distance to a newly constructed highway in Nazi Germany has increased the power
of the authoritarian regime. Our contribution with regards to this paper is two-fold. First, our
analysis is at a more disaggregated level, and we bring in the channel of visibility to provide
insights into the mechanisms at play. Second, thanks to the national reform implemented with
respect to population thresholds, we can isolate the causal effect of healthcare provision on sup-
port for the government, from pork-barrel motivations.
Existing literature assessing the electoral returns to public goods investment has largely ne-
glected one essential characteristic: visibility. Why does visibility matter? As Gingrich [2014]
shows, visibility decreases the informational burden of welfare policies on voters. In this sense,
visibility of public services constitutes an aimportant factor in shaping voters’ perceptions of
welfare provision. In this paper, we assert that for individuals who live closer to the public
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services, visibility of the government’s welfare policies increases. We confirm this hypothesis
by demonstrating that these individuals are more likely to vote for the incumbent party.
Evidence regarding the visibility of public services is scant in the literature, and this is
partly due to challenges in measuring visibility from the viewpoint of voters. To address this
challenge, Kneebone and McKenzie [2001] distinguish visible expenditures, measured by in-
vestment expenses such as the construction of roads and structures in Canadian provinces. They
find no evidence of political budget cycles in overall spending, but electoral increases in spend-
ing in highly visible areas (schools, roads, hockey rinks). In Kneebone and McKenzie [2001],
visibility changes with respect to the type of investment. In our paper, visibility changes with
proximity, and there is a single type of investment. Our data allows us to construct a more
refined measure of visible public good investment.
Information is crucial in determining political outcomes, given that voters do not have per-
fect information on policies. Baron [1994] shows that the equilibrium policy choice is shaped
by the proportion of informed voters. There is rich political science literature on voter misper-
ceptions and the fiscal illusion. Rogoff [1990] and Shi and Svensson [2006] highlight voters’
inability to observe the overall level of spending or deficit. Consistent with these theoretical pre-
dictions, Boeri and Tabellini [2010] show, using data from a field experiment, that information
increases support for pension reforms. Banerjee et al. [2011] provides experimental evidence
from India to show that informed voters judge politicians more accurately, based on knowledge
of public good spending. Our study contributes to this strand of the literature by providing new
micro-level empirical evidence and adding geographic proximity as a dimension to correct for
voters’ bias in assessing public investment by political parties.
Lastly, our results contribute to the literature on the role of education in political outcomes.
Many studies document that voters with high and low education levels behave differently. For
example, Dee [2004] finds significant effects of educational attainment on voter turnout and free
speech. The proposed mechanism is similar to ours: educated voters are also more informed,
as measured by the frequency of newspaper readership. Similarly, Milligan et al. [2004] shows
that more educated citizens have more information on political candidates and campaigns.Pande
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[2011] provides supportive experimental evidence from low-income countries. Overall, these
papers highlight that educated voters are more informed and will have fewer misperceptions.
Using visibility and quality of public services, we find evidence corroborating that education
enhances information and changes voters’ response to public service provision.
3.3 Empirical Framework
3.3.1 Institutional Background
Our research design uses the Family Medicine Program reform in Turkey. In 2005, the Turk-
ish government, headed by the Justice and Development Party (AKP hereafter), implemented
a large-scale nationwide healthcare reform, the Family Medicine Program (FMP), which as-
signs each Turkish citizen to a specific family physician. Family physicians work at the Family
Health Centers (FHC) that operate on a walk-in basis and are located within neighborhoods in
close proximity where the patients live. Health services offered at these centers are universal
and free of charge. The first FHC was built in Du¨zce in 2005 as the pilot province and gradually
expanded to all the other provinces across Turkey. In this study, we use data from Turkey’s
largest and most-populated province, I˙stanbul, where FHC’s were built rapidly within the last
three months of the year 2010.
A particularly distinctive feature of the reform for our methodology is that every single
Turkish citizen, regardless of income, was assigned to a family physician in one of these free
walk-in clinics located within the neighborhoods where they reside.1 This allows us to use
polling centers, at which level disaggregated voting outcomes are available, as catchment areas
of the FHC’s.2
In a recently published study, Cesur et al. [2017] examine the effect of the family medicine
program on population health exploiting the differential adoption rates across Turkish provinces.
Cesur et al. [2017] present evidence showing that the implementation of the FMP has decreased
1In order to change the assigned family physician, citizens had to go through a cumbersome procedure which
took at least several months. This practice was recently revised in 2017. Since March 2017, citizens can easily
choose their family physician using an online system.
2In each election, citizens are assigned to a polling unit based on where they reside.
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child mortality rates in Turkey. The mentioned study also includes a very detailed description
of the reform. By contrast, our focus is on the political consequences of the spatial distribution
of these clinics.
The 2010 implementation of the FMP in Istanbul provides an ideal setting to answer our
question, along with the availability of data on geographic locations and electoral outcomes at
a disaggregated level. Following the reform, FHC’s were opened with respect to a population
threshold (one family physician for every 3,500 inhabitants). Every individual is registered to
the nearest FHC, where free universal primary healthcare is provided. This was an improvement
from the older system where individuals could get service at any public hospital after long wait-
ing hours. Hence the main goals of the reform were reducing congestion at hospitals, building
a trust relationship between citizens and family physicians, and bringing health service to the
people’s doorstep. The reform was implemented by the governing party AKP all over Turkey.
Social assistance for primary healthcare existed in Turkey before the FMP. However, the
system was disintegrated and non-universal. Even though a primary healthcare system existed
before the FMP, public hospitals were the main sources of primary care due to inaccessibility
and low quality of services. This overburdened the public hospitals and generated congestion
(Baris et al. [2011], Bank [2008], Tatar et al. [2011]). To prevent this over-crowding, with the
FMP, the government waived co-payments at hospitals if their family physicians referred indi-
viduals. Qualitative evidence confirms that the FMP has effectively reduced waiting times at
public hospitals and improved access to primary healthcare (Akdag et al. [2009], Dagdeviren
and Akturk [2004], Bank [2008] , Vujicic et al. [2009]). Tatar et al. [2011] shows that patient
satisfaction has also increased substantially between 2003 and 2010.
Importantly, primary healthcare centers existed before the 2010 reform. After the reform, a
majority of the existing clinic buildings were still utilized. New clinics were built and staffed
in order to achieve the required number of family physicians per population. There can be one
or more family physicians in a primary healthcare center, depending on the physical capacity
of the building (e.g., the number of rooms and size). We use information on the geographic
locations of the FHC’s and the number of family physicians available in each FHC.
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A potential concern in our setting is whether the reform resulted in the unequal provision
of healthcare services. A relevant question is whether the reform increased or redistributed the
pre-existing resources. If resources are constant, it must be the case that some citizens benefited
and got a better service, at the cost of hurting others. We address this concern by providing
more information on the implementation of the reform. The 2005 FMP was an organizational
reform which improved the quality of primary healthcare services by reshuffling the resources.
Resources, measured in terms of the number of family physicians, were reshuffled in the follow-
ing way. The reform did not increase the total number of available physicians but increased the
number of family physicians among the pool of general practitioners (GP’s hereafter), imple-
mented in several ways. The family physicians are recruited from the existing pool of general
practitioners working as specialists within both the private and public sectors, and recent gradu-
ates from medical schools. The Ministry of Health encouraged these physicians and candidates
to participate in the FMP by taking a leave of absence from their current positions to work as
a family physician if working, and opening family medicine departments in medical schools
which train new graduates specifically for this position. These practitioners were also required
to go through a special training program and a distance-learning program while working. As
a result, approximately 45,000 GPs joined the FMP by going through these training programs
between 2005 and 2011 ( Cesur et al. [2017] , Akdag et al. [2009]).
Furthermore, the reform improved the quality of primary healthcare services via two chan-
nels. First, family physicians were required to meet various performance targets, and failure to
meet these criteria caused a deduction from their salary or even termination of the contract in
severe cases. The Ministry of Health randomly monitored performances of the physicians. Sec-
ond, a capitation plus performance-based payment system was designed where family medicine
physicians could potentially raise their salary by between 150 and 800% (Akdag et al. [2009]).
Overall, this was an organizational reform which contemporaneously increased resources
and improved the quality of service in all FHC’s in a standardized manner. Although the reform
was implemented at a national level, the reform was binding only for FHC’s where the doc-
tor/patient ratio was lower than 1/3500 (in some cases 4000). Regarding our research question,
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it is not a general phenomenon that increased public goods provision buys votes. Notably, the
empirical evidence on political budget cycle is concentrated on developing countries or young
democracies. With respect, we show that even without increasing resources, spending can be
reshuffled, in a way that the public good becomes more visible for specific categories of the
population (those geographically closer), and it is only for those groups that votes are actually
bought. In that respect, we make a similar contribution to Drazen and Eslava [2010], in an
empirical framework that permits causal identification.
The next section describes our data and provides details on the construction of our variables.
3.3.2 Data and Variables
Throughout the analysis, our outcomes of interest are measured at the polling center level. We
use polling centers as catchment areas of primary healthcare centers, to proxy where people
reside. A significant advantage of this approach is the availability of electoral data at the level
of polling centers, which is the most disaggregated measure of public service provision to the
best of our knowledge. We have data from four different elections in 2009, 2011, 2014 and
2015.3 Below, we provide a timeline of the critical events in our analysis.
2009
Local
Elections
2010
Re f orm
2011
General
Elections
2014
Local
Elections
2015
General
Elections
Electoral outcomes data comes from Turkey’s Supreme Election Council aggregated at the
level of polling centers, covering all the polling centers in Istanbul.4 We use two principal mea-
sures of political outcomes: changes in the AKP’s vote share in the elections and voter turnout.
Figure 2.2 demonstrates the distribution of AKP vote share in our data. After the 2009 elec-
tions, the distribution shifts to the right, as the AKP increases its overall vote share. This figure
32009 and 2014 are local elections, while 2011 and 2015 are parliamentary elections
4Data is unique and prepared for the purposes of this study upon official request.
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is also useful to highlight that the AKP’s vote share has evolved similarly similar in local and
general elections.
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Figure 3.1: Support for the AKP, in local and general elections. The figure plots the density of the vote share
received by the AKP in Istanbul.
We obtained the list of primary healthcare clinics in 2009 pre-reform, from the Public Health
Directorate in Istanbul. The list of post-reform primary healthcare clinics and other healthcare
centers are scraped from a government-supported website that includes detailed information on
healthcare institutions in Turkey.5
We have collected data on the names all of the primary healthcare clinics in Istanbul both
before the reform (in 2009), and after the reform (in 2015). To this data, we added information
on the number of family physicians within each polling center, as recorded in 2010 and 2015.
Since the FHC’s are standard in physical characteristics (such as equipment, etc.), data on this
5https://halksagligimerkezi.com/kuruluslar/aile-sagligi-merkezi/istanbul/
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is irrelevant. Finally, we constructed a primary healthcare database which also includes the ad-
dresses and geographic information for these FHC’s.
We have voting data for all of the 1,711 polling stations in Istanbul for all of these elections.
These data are combined with demographic and socioeconomic characteristics of the neighbor-
hoods from 2009. We further merge these datasets with some neighborhood-level population
and education registers provided by the Turkish Statistical Institute. From these registers, we
extract information on the age and education distribution of the people residing within the neigh-
borhoods in which the polling units are located. To this, we add the geographical coordinates
of the polling stations and map to the data on FHC’s.
Construction of Geographic Proximity
To construct our measure of geographic proximity, we have geocoded the locations of all
polling centers and identified the nearest primary healthcare center to each polling center. For
this purpose, we developed an algorithm which computes the distance between each polling
center and FHC, and then uses the ‘Great circle distance’ measure to pick the pair with the
shortest distance.6 Then, using Google Maps, we computed the time to travel between these
two locations for different modes of travel, including walking, driving and public transport.7
Figures 3.2 and 3.3 visualize the spatial distribution of FHC’s by change in AKP support.
We select two representative districts: Fatih, a core AKP district is displayed in the first fig-
ure and Kadıko¨y, a stronghold of the opposition in the second figure. For each polling unit,
the degree of increase in political support is shown for a radius of 65 meters. Our heat map
indicates higher increase support for the AKP from 2009 to 2014 local elections, for yellow
and red colors. At first glance, there is a noticeably higher increase for the AKP where FHC’s
are concentrated in Fath. By contrast, this pattern does not seem to hold in Kadıko¨y. We will
elaborate on the underlying mechanisms in the Results section.
6Greatest circle distance or orthodromic distance computes the shortest distance between two points on a spher-
ical surface, and is a commonly used measure by Geographic Information Systems analysis.
7For driving and public transport travel, we have set departure date and time as 26.09.2018 at 10.00am. The
choice of day and time are based on interviews with doctors at primary healthcare clinics: we chose a weekday
that is not a holiday, and a time in the morning where most of the visits occur.
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Figure 3.2: Spatial distribution of FHC’s and shift in favor of AKP support, 2014-2009. District: Fatih.
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Figure 3.3: Spatial distribution of FHC’s and shift in favor of AKP support, 2014-2009. District: Kadıko¨y.
Sample Restrictions
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We impose several conditions on our sample of analysis, and this section will elaborate on
them. First, we match each polling center to the neighborhood it is stated in.8 From this data,
we drop the district Adalar (Prince’s Islands), because the only means of transportation between
the islands is via sea and driving times are computed erroneously. We further restrict our sample
by dropping the top and bottom percentiles of changes in walking time and driving time, as we
have observed some extreme values. We presume that this could result from possible measure-
ment errors resulting from computing distances in an automated manner. However, potential
measurement errors will not bias our estimates, as they are differenced out by using first differ-
ences. Moreover, they do not invalidate our identification unless the presence of measurement
errors are systematically correlated with AKP votes. We circumvent this issue by controlling
for difference in urban/rural status of the areas.
Our final sample is an unbalanced panel of 1,509 polling centers and consists of 3,958 ob-
servations.9 Out of the 1,509 polling units, 1,397 experienced a change in proximity to health-
care.10 Table 3.1 reports the number of polling units with respect to distance to the nearest FHC,
pre and post-reform. Also, we weight the number of polling units by the number of voters reg-
istered in each unit, to provide more insight into the size of the effect and overall relevance of
the reform. By looking at these numbers, we can infer a crude number of how many individ-
uals would potentially benefit from primary healthcare reform.11 Columns present number for
arbitrarily selected cutoffs of walking time to the nearest FHC. After the implementation of the
reform, more individuals enjoyed nearby primary healthcare services, and fewer individuals had
to walk more than 2 hours to reach the nearest FHC. In other words, the overall distribution of
distance has shifted to the left.12
8Redistricting with the Municipality Law of 2014 has led to changes in the borders and districts of some
neighborhoods. However, this is irrelevant in our data sample, as we have information on both the pre-reform
names and characteristics of the neighborhoods.
9Note that we condition on having data for the pre-reform year 2009.
10Note that in some cases, the FHC’s were closed, and the distance to the nearest FHC increased.
11In the absence of data on the actual population figures residing near the polling units, we argue that the number
of voters registered is a valid proxy.
12Becase as a result of the 2014 re-districting reform villages were included in the boundaries of neighborhoods
and the residents became eligible for voting, the number of voters in rural areas has increased after 2014, which
mechanically increases the numbers of voters in the higher walking time categories.
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Walking Time (minutes)
< 10 10−30 30−60 60−120 > 120
Pre-reform 904 428 66 64 47
Pre-reform, weighted 5,829,534 2,349,092 151,565 35,348 27,816
Post-reform 1,394 103 7 0 2
Post-reform, weighted 6,064,121 2,573,584 156,202 36,983 32,986
Table 3.1: Number of polling centers and voters affected by the reform. This table shows proximity to FHC’s
before and after the reform, by arbitrarily chosen time interval categories. Number of polling units are weighted
by the number of voters registered within the polling units for each category.
Table 3.2 provides some key summary statistics from our data, for the whole sample, and
by change in distance to the nearest FHC.13 Polling units where the travel time was not affected
are in the ‘control’ sample, and polling units which were affected by the reform in terms of
traveling time to the nearest FHC are in the ‘treatment’ sample. The last column of the table
reports the means different from a simple t-test between the two subsamples. We present the
mean and standard deviations for some pre-reform polling center level electoral characteristics,
and neighborhood-level demographic characteristics.
Table 3.2 gives an overview of where the reform had a bite, in terms of pre-reform character-
istics. With respect, we observe that places with lower AKP vote share in 2009, lower number
of voters (possibly implies less populated), longer driving times, with less number of doctors,
and lower high school completion rate in 2009 were affected by the reform. While it might
be a concern that places that were treated, differed in demographic and electoral characteristics
than those who were not affected, one should keep in mind that in some cases, the reform re-
duced proximity due to closures. We offer detailed robustness checks to alleviate concerns of
pre-reform differences systematically affecting treatment status.
13We infer that the old clinic is being used if the time to travel to the nearest polling center did not change and
that a new clinic has been built if there is a change in time to travel.
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Whole Sample Treatment Control Diff.
AKP Vote Share, 2009 43.138 42.774 47.567 -4.793***
(14.106) (14.120) (13.168) (0.845)
AKP Vote Margin, 2009 3.826 3.068 13.043 -9.975***
(32.165) (32.223) (29.995) (1.929)
No. Voters, 2009 5766.357 5719.287 6339.064 -619.777**
(3937.295) (3937.379) (3897.445) (236.696)
Turnout, 2009 82.411 82.449 81.941 0.508
(5.148) (5.114) (5.528) (0.310)
Walking Time (min.), 2009 19.046 19.704 11.048 8.656
(94.335) (97.968) (18.212) (5.674)
Driving Time (min.), 2009 4.136 4.233 2.949 1.285**
(7.013) (7.245) (2.715) (0.421)
Public Transport (0,1) 0.960 0.959 0.967 -0.007
(0.196) (0.198) (0.180) (0.012)
Public Hospital (0,1) 0.132 0.129 0.164 -0.035
(0.338) (0.335) (0.371) (0.020)
No. Doctors, 2009 0.025 0.002 0.304 -0.302***
(0.379) (0.086) (1.312) (0.022)
Literacy Rate, 2009 0.954 0.954 0.956 -0.003
(0.030) (0.031) (0.023) (0.002)
% High School, 2009 0.234 0.233 0.247 -0.014**
(0.078) (0.077) (0.084) (0.005)
% University, 2009 0.110 0.110 0.105 0.006
(0.094) (0.095) (0.079) (0.006)
Observations 3,937 3,638 299 3,937
Table 3.2: Summary statistics. Means and standard deviations are displayed for each variable, for the whole
sample, and by treatment status. Polling centers where time to travel to the nearest clinic changed are treated, and
polling centers where time to travel to the nearest clinic stayed constant are in the control group. The last column
reports the difference in mean and standard deviation. *, ** and *** denote significance at 1,5 and 10 percent
respectively, from a t-test of the mean difference between the two subsamples.
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3.3.3 Empirical Model
The main source of identification is the nationwide primary healthcare reform in Turkey, exe-
cuted in 2010. We focus on the province of I˙stanbul. With this reform, the ruling party AKP
built and staffed FHC’s with respect to a population threshold: The aim was to achieve 3,500
patients per family physician. Moreover, each was assigned to a family physician in the nearest
FHC, based on their place of residence. This assignment rule allows us to construct catchment
areas using the polling centers. We argue that this is a good proxy since individuals are also
assigned to polling centers on the basis of residence.
Our treatment is the change in traveling time to the nearest primary healthcare center, and
our outcome of interest is change in AKP vote share, and we also test the effect on change in
voter turnout. We cannot directly use the distance as our treatment variable. As previously
explained, some FHC’s used existing buildings, and these buildings would confound the rela-
tionship. Moreover, we define our treatment with respect to the change in walking time, as
driving time may be measured with error since travel times are computed in 2018, eight years
after the reform and new roads might have been built. We assume that walking distances and
times have not changed significantly and newly constructed roads would have affected driving
times only.
An attractive feature of the reform is the provision of healthcare with respect to exogenously
determined population thresholds. Ideally, we would have preferred an Instrumental Variables
(IV hereafter) strategy which exploits the exogenous population cutoff in the reform that deter-
mined the provision of primary healthcare. However, since we do not have information on the
size of the existing clinics and the exact boundaries corresponding to the population cutoffs for
family physicians, we cannot compute a measure of ‘need for FHC’s’, and the IV strategy is
infeasible. Moreover, a Difference-in-Differences strategy is not possible either, because we do
not have sufficient pre-reform years in our panel.
To estimate the effect of change in travel time to healthcare on change in AKP votes, we
prefer a First-Differences (FD, hereafter) model, which can be described with the equation be-
low:
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∆Yit = α+βt∆Xit ∗Tt + εit (3.1)
For each polling center i at time t; ∆Yit denotes the change in AKP vote share, ∆Xit denotes
the change in time to travel to the nearest FHC, and are interacting with the year dummies de-
noted by Tt , to estimate the differential effect of treatment for each subsequent election. The
coefficient of interest, βt measures the elasticity of votes to changes in geographic proximity to
healthcare centers in a given election year.
First-differences rids of the unobserved time-invariant components, and as long as cov(∆uit ,∆xit)=
0 holds, βFD will be consistent. The main identification assumption states that there are no sys-
tematic differences between polling units in the treated and control samples that are related to
the outcome of interest. If the treatment and control samples are systematically different in
these characteristics, this would suggest that even if the reform were not in place, we would
expect the voters in these polling units to increase their support for the AKP. To address the
problem of omitted variables, we show the robustness of the results to the inclusion of various
control variables both at the polling center and at the neighborhood level. Another major con-
cern related to endogeneity is the possibility of reverse causality. We refute the reverse causality
argument by showing that the effect of the reform was not concentrated in places in which the
voters systematically voted more or less for the AKP.
Hence, the reform offers a potentially useful setting with which to empirically test our hy-
pothesized relationship between the visibility of public services and electoral returns. Figure
3.4 visually conveys the raw correlations. This figure plots the change in support for AKP,
our outcome of interest, averaged over bins of our treatment variable: change in proximity to
healthcare (as measured by the change from 2009). There is a predicted negative linear rela-
tionship, and the immediate effect appears to be stronger. In the next section, we will estimate
the regression coefficients with the appropriate modeling assumptions.
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Figure 3.4: Binned scatter plots showing the change in AKP vote share, averaged over bins of change in time to
travel to the nearest FHC. Changes are computed with respect to the pre-reform year 2009. We restrict the change
in proximity to the interval [-30, 30] for visualization purposes.
3.4 Empirical Evidence
3.4.1 Does Geographic Distribution of Public Services Affect Votes?
In this section, we demonstrate that support for the AKP is systematically higher where FHC’s
became more accessible in terms of geographic proximity.
Table 3.3, presents our main results. The first column reports the raw correlations between
change in walking time and change in AKP vote shares. This simplest specification without
any controls, predicts a negative and significant coefficient. The rest of the columns present
results from our main specification, a First-Differences model, which partials out the time-
invariant characteristics of polling centers. We cluster standard errors within various levels:
within polling centers, within neighborhoods in which polling centers are located, and within
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clinics located nearby the polling centers. Since multiple polling centers are matched with the
same clinic (polling centers are nested within clinics), there might be common characteristics
of these clinics (such as the quality of doctors, size, staffing, etc.) that affect the response of
voters. Clustering standard errors at the clinic level adjusts for serial correlation across standard
errors of nearby clinics which might have different qualities. The last column includes some
controls at the polling unit and neighborhood level. Across polling units, we control for AKP
vote share, voter turnout and number of voters registered in 2009 elections, walking and driving
time to the nearest FHC in 2009, a dummy for whether public transport is available to reach the
nearest FHC (which we also use to proxy urban/rural status), the pre-reform number of doctors
within the nearest FHC. The number of controls available at the neighborhood level include a
dummy variable for presence of a public or university hospital, literacy rate, high school and
university completion rates in 2009. With the addition of these control variables, the effect we
obtain is less significant (compared to column 2) but still robust and similar in magnitude.
The estimated coefficient is similar in magnitude across the different specifications in columns
2-5, which shows the robustness of our estimates. On average, a ten-minute decrease in walk-
ing time is associated with a 6 percentage point increase in AKP’s vote share in that polling
unit. Results also hold with neighborhood fixed effects, implying that among all polling cen-
ters within that neighborhood, polling units that get a FHC nearby has seen higher increase in
AKP support. Our OLS estimates are biased downward, because they do not take into account
the common macroeconomic trends, serial correlation among error terms, and omits some vari-
ables.
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Effect of Proximity to Healthcare on AKP Votes. Main outcome: Change in AKP Vote Share.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
OLS FD FD FD FD FD
∆ Walking Time -0.162*** 0.019 0.019 0.019 0.019 0.013
(0.023) (0.139) (0.170) (0.170) (0.170) (0.167)
2011*∆ Walking Time -0.085 -0.085 -0.085 -0.085 -0.071
(0.141) (0.173) (0.173) (0.175) (0.169)
2014∆ Walking Time -0.602*** -0.602* -0.602* -0.602* -0.628**
(0.176) (0.310) (0.328) (0.328) (0.297)
Obs. 3,958 3,958 3,958 3,958 3,958 3,937
R2 0.012 0.276 0.276 0.276 0.276 0.347
Covariates NO NO NO NO NO YES
Year FE NO YES YES YES YES YES
Clusters NO NO Polling Center Neighborhood Clinic Polling Center
Table 3.3: OLS and First-Difference regressions of change in AKP vote share on change in walking time to the
nearest FHC. Columns 2-6 include year dummies interacted with the treatment, and standard errors clustered at
the indicated levels. 2015 is the base year. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
The interaction of treatment (change in walking time) with year dummies allows us to dis-
tinguish between the effects in the short-run (one year after the reform) and longer-run (4 and
5 years after the reform). We use 2015 as the base year, in which the treatment effect is not
significant. The difference between the effect in 2011 and 2014 is notable. It implies that prox-
imity to healthcare only influences votes in the medium run and in local elections. The voters
respond to the reform in 2014 because it’s new, and the effect fades out in 2015. Moreover, it
is important to note that the salient issues were different in 2015 elections, as this was a snap
election after a series of terrorist attacks. We argue that voters evaluate local policies in local
elections, and so 2011 and 2015 elections serve as placebos. In fact, they are rewarding the
central AKP government, by electing the same party at the local level. While the distinction
between central and local government is theoretically important, in the Turkish context, parties
dominating the central and local politics are the same, and local elections are a means where
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the voters reward or punish the incumbent for the locally provided services.
In what follows, we try to explain the underlying mechanisms. First, we test whether the
increased support for AKP in treated polling units can be explained by higher voter turnout. We
repeat the analysis using as our outcome the change in voter turnout.
We find that a decrease in walking time to the nearest clinic is associated with an decrease
in voter turnout in the 2014 elections, which is significant econometrically and in magnitude.
The results are robust in all our specifications. This result may seem counterintuitive at first, but
further explorations reveal that the estimated effect comes from non-AKP voters (voters in pre-
viously non-AKP municipalities). This suggests that part of the non-AKP voters who received
nearby healthcare services did not turn out in the elections. The remaining part of the non-AKP
voters swayed their votes to AKP after receiving healthcare services in their proximity. The
first group is core voters while the second group correspond to the swing voters. Hence, we
rule out the hypothesis that increased voter turnout is the channel which increased AKP votes in
places that received healthcare services. The difference between the AKP and non-AKP voters
are examined in the next subsection.
117
Effect of Proximity to Healthcare on AKP Votes. Outcome: Change in Turnout.
(1) (2) (3)
FD FD FD
∆ Walking Time -0.188** -0.188** -0.188**
(0.091) (0.091) (0.091)
2011*∆ Walking Time 0.126 0.126 0.126
(0.094) (0.094) (0.094)
2014*∆ Walking Time 0.376*** 0.376*** 0.376***
(0.143) (0.142) (0.143)
Obs. 3,957 3,957 3,957
R2 0.186 0.186 0.186
Covariates NO NO NO
Year FE YES YES YES
Clusters Polling Center Neighborhood Clinic
Table 3.4: First-Difference regressions of change in voter turnout on change in walking time to the nearest primary
healthcare center. All regressions include year dummies interacted with the treatment. Standard errors are clustered
at the indicated levels. 2015 is the base year.
Our results suggest that the spatial distribution of local healthcare effectively increases sup-
port for the AKP, and one of the channels through which this is realized, is via increased partic-
ipation in local elections.
3.4.2 Heterogeneity of Voter Characteristics
Table 3.2 documented that polling units that were affected by the reform differed from the rest
in several pre-determined characteristics, including AKP’s vote share in 2009, and the average
level of education within the neighborhood. We explore the heterogeneity of the effect in order
to improve our understanding of which voters responded to the reform, and which did not.
To start with, we estimate our model by AKP victory in the local elections of 2009, splitting
our sample into two subsamples. This is a crucial analysis, because municipalities in Turkey are
the administrative units responsible for the provision of local public goods and therefore would
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be directly effective in voters’ support for the incumbent in the subsequent local elections. The
outcome examined is the change in AKP’s vote share as before. The results are documented in
Table 3.5 below. Columns 1-3 report the coefficient for the AKP municipality subsample, and
columns 4-6 for the non-AKP subsample, with respect to AKP victory in 2009 local elections.
Strikingly, we find evidence that only voters where the AKP lost the local elections in 2009
(i.e., voters residing in non-AKP municipalities) respond to healthcare reform in the expected
direction. Put differently, proximity to healthcare increases AKP’s vote share in non-AKP mu-
nicipalities, with no discernible effect on AKP vote share in AKP-municipalities. A possible
implication of this finding is that the voters in non-AKP municipalities have punished their party
by decreasing their support (increasing their support for the AKP) in places where distance to
healthcare has been reduced. The effect is statistically significant both in the short and medium
run.
Effect of Proximity to Healthcare on AKP Votes. Main outcome: Change in AKP Vote Share.
AKP Municipality Non-AKP Municipality
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
∆ Walking Time -0.206 -0.206 -0.206 0.236*** 0.236*** 0.236***
(0.201) (0.201) (0.201) (0.079) (0.079) (0.079)
2011*∆ Walking Time 0.170 0.170 0.170 -0.322*** -0.322*** -0.322***
(0.204) (0.203) (0.204) (0.093) (0.099) (0.093)
2014*∆ Walking Time -0.741 -0.741 -0.741 -0.587** -0.587** -0.587**
(0.507) (0.509) (0.507) (0.272) (0.234) (0.272)
Obs. 2,600 2,600 2,600 1,358 1,358 1,358
R2 0.310 0.310 0.310 0.223 0.223 0.223
Covariates NO NO YES NO NO YES
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
Clusters Polling Center Neighborhood Polling Center Polling Center Neighborhood Polling Center
Table 3.5: First-Difference regressions of change in AKP vote share on change in walking time, by AKP and non-
AKP municipalities, elected in 2009. All regressions include year dummies interacted with the treatment. Standard
errors are clustered at the indicated levels. 2015 is the base year.
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We link our results to the concept of visibility. In line with Gingrich [2014]’s theory that vis-
ibility enhances the information that is available to the voters, we find compelling evidence that
visibility, as measured by geographic proximity, is relatively more important for uninformed
voters, which we define by having lower educational attainment. To test the explained mecha-
nism, we exploit information on the average level of education, available at the neighborhood
level. Neighborhoods are very small units of administration and hence we can safely assume
that the educational attainment in a neighborhood is a good proxy for the educational attainment
of the population residing in the catchment areas of the polling centers.
With respect, we split the sample according to the median value of pre-reform high school
completion rates within the neighborhood.14 The specifications are as before, and 2015 is the
base year. Effects of having healthcare closer on AKP support in 2011 and 2014 are presented
in Table 3.6, and suggest a determinant role for education. Proximity to FHC’s has increased
support for AKP only in neighborhoods with below median high school completion rate. There
is no detectable effect for neighborhoods with above median high school completion. Our re-
sults align with Dee [2004] and Milligan et al. [2004].
14Results do not differ when we instead use university completion rates in 2009 as an indicator, and are available
upon request.
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Effect of Proximity to Healthcare on AKP Votes. Main outcome: Change in AKP Vote Share.
High School Completion
Below Median Above Median
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
∆ Walking Time 0.384*** 0.384*** 0.384*** -0.036 -0.036 -0.036
(0.038) (0.039) (0.038) (0.193) (0.193) (0.193)
2011*∆ Walking Time -0.402*** -0.402*** -0.402*** -0.064 -0.064 -0.064
(0.052) (0.055) (0.052) (0.199) (0.196) (0.199)
2014*∆ Walking Time -2.060*** -2.060*** -2.060*** -0.318 -0.318 -0.318
(0.731) (0.732) (0.731) (0.278) (0.325) (0.278)
Obs. 1,966 1,966 1,966 1,971 1,971 1,971
R2 0.314 0.314 0.314 0.287 0.287 0.287
Covariates NO NO YES NO NO NO
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
Clusters Polling Center Neighborhood Polling Center Polling Center Neighborhood Polling Center
Table 3.6: First-Difference regressions of change in AKP vote share on change in walking time, by high school
completion rates within mahalle in 2009. All regressions include year dummies interacted with the treatment.
Standard errors are clustered at the indicated levels. 2015 is the base year.
For further explorations, we repeat the analysis separately for swing and core voters in local
elections of 2009, and find no significant differences in the effects. AKP victory margin is not
an important factor which determines the impact of proximity to health care on AKP votes.
Similarly, we find no differential effects in neighborhoods with and without public hospitals.
These results are provided in the Appendix.
3.4.3 Visibility vs. Quality
So far, we have established that the spatial distribution of primary healthcare centers has an
effect on political support for the AKP. However, as explained in the institutional section, the
reform has also improved quality of healthcare, by assigning family physicians with respect to
population thresholds. What, then, explains the observed effects: visibility or quality? In this
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section we shed light into the mechanism driving the results.
Fortunately, we have collected data on the staffing information of FHC’s, from the webpage
of Istanbul Provincial Directorate of Health Services. These statistics indicate how many of the
available family physician posts are filled. Data is available for the years 2010 and 2015, and
are reported in different months. We use the data reported in October 2010 for the year 2011,
and the data for 2015 is reported in January 2015. Data for the pre-reform year 2009 on the
number of family physicians has been made available to us by the Public Health Directorate of
Istanbul. Combining these data with our main dataset, we compute the change in the number of
doctors and the change in staffing levels in the nearest healthcare center to each polling center.15
We run a horse-race between visibility and quality of primary healthcare by investigating the
effect of intensive improvement in the quality of primary healthcare on votes for the AKP.
Our findings are documented in Table 3.7.The treatment is the change in the number of
physicians, which has a positively significant effect on the vote share of AKP in 2015.16 We
have a lower number of observations as we have no physician data available for the year 2014.
Our results imply that voters respond to the quality of healthcare at the ballot box, as well as
visibility.
15To compute the staffing levels for 2009, we imputed the number of available posts for 2009 using data for the
same healthcare centers in 2010.
16The same result holds when the treatment is the change in staffing levels.
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Effect of Quality of Healthcare on AKP Votes. Main outcome: Change in AKP Vote Share.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
FD FD FD FD FD
∆ No. Doctors 0.123*** 0.128*** 0.128** 0.128** -0.045
(0.041) (0.046) (0.050) (0.060) (0.054)
2015*∆ No. Doctors 0.447** 0.447** 0.447* 0.009
(0.225) (0.227) (0.228) (0.161)
Obs. 1,384 1,384 1,384 1,384 1,126
R2 0.006 0.036 0.036 0.036 0.574
Covariates NO NO NO NO NO
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES
Clusters Polling Center Polling Center Neighborhood Clinic Polling Center
Table 3.7: OLS and First-Difference regressions of change in AKP vote share on change in the number of doctors.
All regressions include year dummies interacted with the treatment. Standard errors are clustered at the indicated
levels. 2011 is the base year.
To disentangle the effect of visibility from quality, we investigate heterogeneity of the ef-
fects with respect to pre-reform education levels of neighborhoods as in the previous section.
We find remarkable results, which are displayed in Table 3.8. The number of doctors is only rel-
evant for the voters in higher educated neighborhoods. One additional doctor increases support
for the AKP by between 0.6 percentage points, even after controlling for the presence of public
hospitals within the neighborhood. This finding, combined with the result in Table 3.6, reveals
that the visibility channel is more important than the direct benefit channel for low educated
voters, whereas educated voters do not respond to visibility but to quality of healthcare.
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Effect of Quality of Healthcare on AKP Votes. Main outcome: Change in AKP Vote Share.
High School Completion
Below Median Above Median
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
∆ No. Doctors 0.007 0.007 -0.019 0.073 0.073 0.064
(0.067) (0.075) (0.063) (0.058) (0.058) (0.060)
2015*∆ No. Doctors -0.005 -0.005 -0.017 0.568** 0.568** 0.541**
(0.434) (0.434) (0.446) (0.255) (0.259) (0.248)
Obs. 681 681 681 694 694 694
R2 0.023 0.023 0.103 0.038 0.038 0.075
Covariates NO NO NO NO NO NO
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
Clusters Polling Center Neighborhood Polling Center Polling Center Neighborhood Polling Center
Table 3.8: OLS and First-Difference regressions of change in AKP vote share on change in the number of doctors.
All regressions include year dummies interacted with the treatment. Standard errors are clustered at the indicated
levels. 2011 is the base year.
Overall, our findings demonstrate that public health provision was most effective in swaying
voters who previously opposed the AKP in local elections. It was effective in winning the hearts
and minds of both low and high educated voters, but for different reasons. In the next section,
we present results from some validity checks and robustness exercises.
3.4.4 Is Public Service Provision Geographically Targeted?
In this section, we try to disentangle pork-barrel from the effects of public service provision
on electoral outcomes. A major concern in our setting for endogeneity is a potential reverse
causality between the location of clinics and previous votes for the AKP. In order to measure
the voters’ responses to geographic proximity, we have to make sure that the location of the
clinics were not targeted. For this purpose, we use data on votes and population to investigate
whether vote margin plays a determinant role in the provision of healthcare.
As mentioned in the institutional section, primary healthcare centers existed before the re-
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form, and most of the existing buildings were also used post-reform. It is important to note that
the existing healthcare centers were built before the AKP by different preceding governments,
hence their locations cannot be strategic for AKP votes. What remains to show, is that the lo-
cations of newly built healthcare centers were not strategically chosen by the AKP with respect
to votes.
First, we present the results from OLS estimations in Table 3.9. For these regressions, we
only use the polling units that had a change in proximity to FHC’s (instead of using the previ-
ously built ones). Note that OLS estimates will be biased as unobserved characteristics of the
constituencies may be correlated with the need for FHC’s. Regardless of this issue, we do not
detect any statistically significant correlation between pre-reform AKP votes and post-reform
provision of healthcare, with or without controls.
Past AKP Votes and Proximity to Healthcare.
Outcome: Change in Proximity
(1) (2) (3)
AKP Vote Share, 2009 0.025 0.045 0.050
(0.043) (0.043) (0.053)
Population Controls NO YES YES
Covariates NO NO YES
Obs. 1,509 1,509 1,500
R2 0.000 0.005 0.101
Table 3.9: Effect of AKP vote share in 2009 on change in proximity to FHC’s. OLS estimates, standard errors in
parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
For a causal investigation, we restrict our attention to polling centers which had swing voters
in the 2009 elections, just before the healthcare reform. We test whether the AKP has invested
in healthcare depending on its vote margin, exploiting a Regression Discontinuity (RD) with
close elections. The running variable we use is the AKP’s vote margin in 2009 local elections.
We compare proximity to healthcare in polling units where the AKP barely marginally received
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or not the highest share of votes. For each polling unit, we keep the first observation after 2009,
and consider changes with respect to 2009. In this case our estimating equation is of the form:
Yi = α+βDi+ f (xi)+ εi (3.2)
∀xi ∈ (c−h,c+h) (3.3)
where Di = 1 if AKP has received the highest number of votes in that polling unit, xi is the
vote margin for the AKP, measured as the vote share difference between AKP and the largest or
second largest party, c = 0 is the winning threshold, and h represents the bandwidth.
First we present the results of standard validity tests for the RDD. Figure 3.5 depicts the
density of the running variable, showing that there is no differential manipulation of electoral
votes near the AKP win threshold. Figure 3.6 shows that characteristics of the polling centers
are similar for AKP marginal wins and losses, including the pre-reform treatment levels. For
both figures, we rely on the algorithm by Calonico et al. [2015].
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Figure 3.5: Density of the running variable, AKP vote margin in 2009. Analysis is based on the McCrary Density
Test.
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Figure 3.6: Balancing of pre-determined covariates at the polling station level. Each point depicts sample averages
within optimally determined bins of the running variable: AKP vote margin in 2009. Optimal number of bins
determined with respect to the Calonico et al. [2015] algorithm. A flexible polynomial of 4th degree is fitted. The
ticks represent 95% confidence intervals.
The regression discontinuity results are provided in Table 3.10. We report only the bias-
corrected RD estimates and the robust standard errors, computed using the method by Calonico
et al. [2014]. The bandwidths are computed optimally using the same algorithm. To address
the concerns arising from large bandwidth selections, we experiment with half of these optimal
bandwidths in columns (2) and (4), and show that there is no detectable effect. The outcome
is the change in walking time (to the nearest FHC) for columns (1)-(2) , which also controls
for the pre-reform walking time. Alternatively, the outcome used is walking time in columns
(3)-(4). In all specifications, we include a local linear polynomial of the running variable to
estimate the coefficients.17
17Results do not change when different polynomial specifications are used.
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RD regressions for First Stage. Outcome: Change in Walking Time.
Change Change Level Level
(1) (2) (3) (4)
AKP Vote Margin, 2009 -5.899 -13.029 6.535 13.456
(6.012) (10.920) (9.458) (18.455)
Bandwidth 19.29 9.645 21.71 10.86
Obs. 598 307 680 339
Table 3.10: RD Regressions estimating the causal effect of AKP marginal win in 2009 on change in proximity to
healthcare. AKP vote margin pre-reform is used as the running variable. The outcome is change in walking time
for columns 1-2, and walking time in columns 3-4. Calonico et al. [2014] optimal bandwidth (columns 1 and 3)
and half the bandwidth (columns 2 and 4) are used. Conventional and robust standard errors are reported.
Overall, we do not find a causal relationship between pre-reform electoral competition and
treatment status. In other words, change in proximity to healthcare is not different in locations
where the AKP marginally won or lost the local elections in 2009. This result ensures that our
results are not confounded by pork-barrel mechanisms, and thereby rules out the possibility of
a reverse causality problem.
3.4.5 Validity Checks and Robustness Exercises
Instrumental Variables Approach
As an alternative estimation approach, we test the robustness of our results to an IV strategy.
The natural candidate for an instrument is the population in the catchment area of each polling
center, as the reform was implemented based on population thresholds. To proxy for pre-reform
population, we use the number of voters registered within the polling centers in the 2009 reform
as our instrument. We restrict our analysis only to places where the distance changed. For each
polling unit, we keep only the first observation after 2009.
Table 3.11 shows the results. The signs of the coefficients are in the expected direction,
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however we do not prefer this as our main estimation approach due to a weak instrument prob-
lem, as defined by Staiger and Stock [1994]. This is perhaps due to imprecise measurement of
the population. We also alternatively use number of doctors in the nearest FHC in 2009 divided
by the voters registered within the polling center, in order to measure the need for FHC. How-
ever we do not find any statistically significant effects for this measure, and instruments have
even less predictive power.
Effect of Proximity to Healthcare on AKP Votes. IV Regressions
∆ AKP Vote Share
(1) (2) (3) (4)
∆ Walking Time -0.219* -0.219* -0.061** -0.219
(0.113) (0.128) (0.030) (0.133) )
First-stage F-stat 6.86 4.58 4.03 4.18
First-stage p-value 0.0089 0.0324 0.0001 0.0412
Obs. 1,509 1,509 1,500 1,509
Adjusted R2 0.0039 0.0039 0.0960 0.0039
Instrument No. Voters 2009 No. Voters 2009 No. Voters 2009 No. Voters 2009
Covariates NO NO YES NO
Clusters NO Polling Center Polling Center Neighborhood
Table 3.11
Distance Dummies
In order to explore whether the results differ by pre-reform distance to healthcare, we define
categories defined with respect to walking time to the nearest FHC, prior to the reform. We
divide the sample with respect to pre-reform proximity, and analyze separately the polling units
where the nearest clinic was less than 10 minutes away, between 10-60 minutes away, and more
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than an hour’s walking distance. The results are presented in Table 3.12. The specifications are
the same as before and the base year is 2011.
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Effect of Proximity to Healthcare on AKP Votes. Outcome: Change in AKP Vote Share.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
OLS FD FD FD
Walking Time <10 min.
∆ Walking Time 0.051 -0.088*** -0.088** -0.061*
(0.039) (0.034) (0.040) (0.037)
2014*∆ Walking Time -0.101 -0.101 -0.051
(0.181) (0.251) (0.241)
2015*∆ Walking Time 0.327** 0.327*** 0.299***
(0.151) (0.099) (0.085)
Obs. 2,448 2,448 2,448 2,435
R2 0.001 0.326 0.326 0.392
Walking Time 10-60 min.
∆ Walking Time -0.289*** -0.060** -0.060 -0.062
(0.032) (0.031) (0.043) (0.042)
2014*∆ Walking Time -0.672*** -0.672* -0.743**
(0.138) (0.343) (0.319)
2015*∆ Walking Time -0.362 -0.362*** -0.349***
(0.261) (0.048) (0.046)
Obs. 1,262 1,262 1,262 1,254
R2 0.062 0.292 0.292 0.356
Walking Time > 60 min.
∆ Walking Time -0.052 -0.001 -0.001 0.018
(0.140) (0.135) (0.121) (0.122)
2014*∆ Walking Time -2.568 -2.568*** -2.388***
(2.029) (0.263) (0.295)
Obs. 248 248 248 248
R2 0.001 0.084 0.084 0.109
Covariates NO NO NO YES
Year FE NO YES YES YES
Clusters NO NO Polling Center Polling Center
Table 3.12
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The upper panel presents the treatment effect for polling units with a FHC less than 10
minutes away, for whom the reform does not have an effect in 2014, and has an effect of the
opposite sign in 2015. The middle panel estimates the effect of proximity to healthcare for
voters that had to walk between 10-60 minutes to get the nearest FHC. Improving proximity
matters for this subgroup. The coefficient of interest is significant both in 2014 and in 2015,
and shows a negative relationship. The lower panel displays estimates from the polling units
where people previously had to walk more than an hour to get to the nearest FHC. The sample
size for this group is lower, so the effects are only estimated for 2 elections. As one would
expect, bringing healthcare closer returns the most AKP votes for this subsample. A ten-minute
decrease in walking time is associated with an increase of 26 percentage points in AKP’s vote
share in the 2014 local elections. This is further evidence supporting the visibility effect. We
show that the reform did not have a significant impact in places with already FHC’s nearby, and
bites the most for people who were more distant to healthcare.
3.5 Conclusion
In this paper, we consider the extent to which proximity to healthcare is effective in buying
electoral votes. The contribution of the paper is two-fold: methodological and empirical. We
make a methodological contribution to the political economy literature on public investment by
proposing a new measure of visibility. We proxy visibility by geographic proximity, using the
spatial distribution of the primary healthcare centers in Istanbul, Turkey. To our knowledge, this
is the most disaggregated measure of local public investment available.
Our empirical contribution is to quantify the effect of visible public investment on electoral
outcomes. First, we find that even a slight decrease in walking time to the nearest clinic has a
non-negligible effect on AKP’s vote share: a ten-minute decrease in walking time has increased
the AKP’s by 6 percentage points in the 2014 local elections. Our findings indicate that the es-
timated effects come from voters residing in non-AKP municipalities, and neighborhoods with
lower average education level.
Second, we establish a remarkable result when we estimate the effect of quality of primary
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healthcare, as measured by the number of doctors within these clinics, on AKP’s vote share.
While the proximity of healthcare has a ‘bite’ only for the lower educated voters; quality of the
service only bites for the educated voters.
The mechanism that we propose to explain our results is visibility. By improving the in-
formation available to the voters, visibility can alter the behavior of uninformed voters. Our
results emphasize the role of visibility and information in how public goods provision affects
electoral outcomes. Our findings are highly relevant for the burgeoning line of research on how
incumbents maintain political support through popular policies.
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Appendix A
Appendix
A.1 Appendix to Chapter 1
A.1.1 Zero-inflated Outcome
About 40% of the observations have zero female civil servants. To address the zero-inflated
nature of the outcome variable, I transform the outcome into a dummy variable, equal to one for
positive female employment and zero otherwise. The main results from using a binary outcome
are presented in Table A.1. The main results hold generally, although sensitive to bandwidth
choice.
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Table A.1: Zero-inflated Outcome
Outcome: Female share of employees (0,1)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
OLS MSE CER MSE/2 CER/2
AKP14- AKP09 0.108 0.227 0.386** 0.333 0.461**
(0.084) (0.149) (0.177) (0.206) (0.232ss)
Bandwidth 1.000 0.096 0.071 0.048 0.035
Observations 3,858 1,804 1,408 1,093 809
Clusters 687 352 287 231 171
AKP09 -0.102
-
0.413***
-
0.406***
-0.178 -0.196
(0.063) (0.134) (0.141) (0.187) (0.197)
Bandwidth 1.000 0.062 0.046 0.031 0.023
Observations 1,950 665 525 345 265
AKP14 -0.001 0.073 0.067 0.059 0.079
(0.059) (0.035) (0.123) (0.186) (0.209)
Bandwidth 1.000 0.130 0.095 0.065 0.048
Observations 1,908 1,116 864 628 524
Outcome Mean 0.596 0.600 0.593 0.572 0.601
Estimation method is local linear regression with two optimal bandwidths estimated fol-
lowing MSE-optimal and CER-optimal procedures described in Calonico et al. [2014].
Robust standard errors are clustered at the municipality level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *
p<0.1.
A.1.2 First-stage
This subsection presents evidence suggesting that the repeal of the headscarf ban in the public
sector has increased the supply of religious females in the public workforce. I use data from a
nationally representative survey conducted by KONDA, which includes information on 97,790
women for the years 2010-2017. A useful feature of the data is that headscarfuse is measured
both pre and post-reform.
On average, 63% of the women in the sample claim to wear a headscarf. I compute the share
of women working for the public sector among those who are employed, and conduct a sim-
ple diff-in-diff analysis, comparing public sector employment among women with and without
headscarves, before and after the repeal of the ban late 2013. Figure A.1 validates the parallel
trends assumption: public employment trends were moving similarly for women with and with-
out headscarves before 2014, and there is an increasing trend in the share of civil servants only
among women wearing headscarves.
(Using data from another dataset), This figure suggests that the aggregate share of female
civil servants does not change, it just shifts towards headscarf wearing women. This is in
contrast to table 3, that the aggregate share of female civil servants did not increase with the
repeal of the ban. But the big picture figure confirms that aggregate share of female civil servants
increased.
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Note that this data includes civil servants in all public institutions, not just municipalities!
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Figure A.1: Proportion of females employed in the public sector, with and without a headscarf over the year
This figure reports a difference-in-difference analysis of the share of female civil servants
over time with and without headscarves. Post-repeal, there was a large decrease in women
with no headscarf, and a much smaller increase in women with headscarf. Discuss this result.
This could suggest women with no headscarfs in civil servant positions being replaced with
women with headscarves, who can now enter these jobs. Note that the increase is much smaller
compared to the decrease. This somewhat puzzling result could be due to the lag in women
with scarves being entitled to civil servant positions, qualification exam. The supply of women
with headscarves eligible for civil servant positions increases gradually.
Table A.2 demonstrates that the probability of being employed in the public sector has in-
creased for women with headscarves, following the repeal of the ban. This analysis eliminates
the possibility that the main results are driven simply by a displacement of females employed
in other public sector institutions.
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Table A.2: Diff-in-diff Results: Headscarves and Public Employment
Outcome: % Public Employment
(1) (2)
Post*Headscarf 0.023* 0.020*
(0.012) (0.011)
Post 2014 (0,1) -0.016** -0.030***
(0.007) (0.007)
Headscarf (0,1) -0.170*** -0.024***
(0.009) (0.009)
Observations 16,758 16,652
R2 0.066 0.223
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
All specifications include region fixed effects
Column 2 includes dummies for education categories
A.1.3 Municipal Mergers
In 2008 and 2012, Turkish municipalities were subject to mergers. The new legislations in-
creased the number of metropolitan provinces, and town municipalities were merged to provin-
cial or district municipalities in order to establish a sound population base. Some small town
municipalities were abolished altogether, and lost their legal entities. A significant portion of
municipalities were affected by the enacted law. The number of municipalities decreased from
3,215 to 2,950 in 2008, and to 1,396 in 2014.1
The mergers were legislated prior to the local elections in 2008 and 2012, but the new ad-
ministration became effective with the local elections in 2009 and 2014.2 Since the mergers
were determined prior to the elections, they do not invalidate the randomization assumption in
contested elections, even if they were endogenously determined .
Although a large number of municipalities were affected by the mergers, both pre- and post-
treatment data exists for a majority of the municipalities.3 I drop the new municipalities from
my sample, and validate that the merge dummy is continuous around the treatment cutoff. The
results are further robust to an alternative empirical strategy with continuous treatment, where
treatment at the level of pre-merger municipalities is weighted by the relative employment in
the merged municipality.4
Table A.3 demonstrates that the merger dummy does not exhibit discontinuity at the treat-
ment cutoff. The estimates come from baseline RD specifications with local linear function of
1Data on the historical evolution of the number of municipalities can be found at:
http://www.tbb.gov.tr/en/local-authorities/types-of-local-governments/
2See Aygu¨l [2016] and Oguz and Sonmez [2014] for a detailed overview and discussion of the mergers.
3There are 138 new municipalities in 2009 elections, and 41 new municipalities in 2014 elections that cannot
be matched to pre-treatment data. Post-treatment data for municipalities that merged into others, is the outcome in
the merged municipality. I do not consider these municipalities separately, as individual post-treatment outcome
data is not available.
4Results are available upon request.
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the control variable and optimal bandwidths computed following Calonico et al. [2014].
Table A.3: Falsification test for mergers
Outcome: Probability of merge
Treatment AKP09 AKP14
RD Treatment Effect 0.081 -0.151
(0.080) (0.108)
Bandwidth 0.18 0.14
Observations 715 355
Local linear regressions with MSE-optimal
bandwidths a` la Calonico et al. [2014]. Robust
standard errors are clustered at the municipality
level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
A.1.4 Is the RD sample representative?
External validity is a general concern in RD studies. For instance, in swing municipalities, Is-
lamist mayors may implement more moderate policies. To assess whether the RD sample of
competitive municipalities is representative, I conduct extrapolation exercises. First, I add less
competitive municipalities to the sample by using twice the optimal RD bandwidths. The results
are reported in Table A.4. While the negative AKP mayor effect in the first period is robust to
extrapolation, the effect of the repeal of the headscarf ban disappears. This is discussed further
in the next subsection presenting results from diff-in-diff analysis.
The main results seem to hold only for municipalities close to the RD cutoff. Once we
move further away, the effects attenuate. As shown below, the results may be driven the most
competitive elections, as represented by the resutls from a donut RD that excludes these.
More broadly, however, it seems that the results are driven by a softening of the negative
effects of the AKP mayors in 2014 for municipalities which are more competitive. The effect
is gradually increasing as we near the cutoff. This supports a story where AKP mayors in mu-
nicipalities where secular parties are viable competitors need to adopt more moderate policies,
including hiring more women, and the repeal of the headscarf ban allows them to do this.
In the data, it seems that municipalities where Islamic mayors win by a larger margin, there
is no comparable reduction in male-hiring preferences post-2014. Column 1 of Table 4 shows
this: as expanding the bandwidth drowns out the effect of the more electorally competitive
municipalities and bring teh AKP09 and AKP14 coefficients to equality.
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Table A.4: Robustness to larger bandwidths
Outcome: Female share of employees
MSE 2*CER 2*MSE OLS
AKP14-AKP09 0.099** 0.022 0.012 0.003
(0.045) (0.040) (0.037) (0.024)
Bandwidth 0.088 0.129 0.175 1.000
Observations 1,697 2,343 2,755 3,858
AKP09 -0.099** -0.099** -0.094** -0.035*
(0.044) (0.046) (0.041) (0.018)
Bandwidth 0.073 0.108 0.146 1.000
Observations 765 1,005 1,215 1,950
AKP14 0.050 0.053 0.046 -0.032**
(0.022) (0.039) (0.033) (0.016)
Bandwidth 0.102 0.150 0.205 1.000
Observations 916 1,236 1,436 1,908
There’s the concern that the RD estimates may be driven by super-competitive municipali-
ties, which are outliers having unusually high female employment. The observations closest to
the cutoff are also likely to be the most influential when fitting local polynomials. I test sensitiv-
ity of the estimates, considering a “donut RD”, whereby I systematically remove observations
in the immediate vicinity of the 0 win margin and re-estimate the discontinuity.5 I consider a ra-
dius of 0.01 around the cutoff, for all treatments, and test sensitivity to exclusion of bandwidths
in increments of 0.0025. Figure A.2 demonstrates that the results are robust to the exclusion of
the closest units around the cutoff for both periods.
5Cattaneo et al. [2017] and Barreca et al. [2016] suggest donut hole approach as a useful robustness check.
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Figure A.2: The figures display the RD coefficients and corresponding robust confidence intervals (a` la Calonico
et al. [2014], separately for the two periods. The horizontal axis shows the vicinity around the cutoff that the
observations are excluded.
A.1.5 Difference-in-Differences Results
As a benchmark, Table A.5 reports results from diff-in-diff estimations, comparing the female
share of employees in municipalities with mayors from AKP and secular parties, before and
after the introduction of headscarves. Here, the sample of analysis also includes infra-marginal
municipalities, and not only the competitive municipalities.6 In that respect, the following anal-
ysis also tests whether the diff-in-disc results hold also for the infra-marginal municipalities, and
shows that they do not hold in a diff-in-diff framework. The effect of revoking the headscarf
ban on female share of municipal employees is not significant statistically nor economically.
This is because the impact of lifting the headscarf ban is confounded by sorting of municipali-
ties to AKP and secular mayors, when mayor type is not exogenous as in the case of close races.
6These are municipalities with the secular incumbent, where the pro-Islamist party was ranked first or second
in the local elections. There is no restriction with regards to the victory margin.
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Table A.5: Diff-in-diff results
Outcome: % Females employed
(1) (2) (3)
Headscarf 0.003 0.003 0.009
(0.024) (0.024) (0.022)
Observations 3,381 3,381 3,381
Mean 0.101 0.101 0.101
Year FE 0 1 1
Covariates 0 0 1
Column 2 adds covariates, column 3 accounts for
year fixed effects. Covariates include dummies for
the seven geographical regions of Turkey. Robust
standard errors are clustered at the municipality
level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Figure A.3 plots the coefficients in a diff-in-diff specification,
The pre and post trends are parallel. There is only a departure from paralel trends in 2014,
the year of repeal.
Given the difference in pre-trends, the diff-in-diff coefficients suffer from endogeneity be-
tween assignment to mayor type, the headscarf treatment, and female employment outcomes.
In other words, when the full sample of municipalities are considered, on average, AKP mayors
employ lower share of females both pre and post-reform. Note that the main result of the paper
is valid for municipalities where elections are contested. Can only be interrpeted as causal with
the LATE.
Figure A.3 also demonstrates that AKP mayors employ a lower share of females compared
to secular mayors, even after the introduction of headscarves.
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Figure A.3: Female share of civil servants in municipalities with Islamist and secular mayors, before and after the
repeal of the headscarf ban. Yearly averages are plotted, the vertical line indicates policy change.
A.1.6 Other Institutional Reforms
In 2010, the headscarf ban was annulled in university campuses, and in 2014 for high school
students. This section conducts robustness analyses to show whether the change in outcome of
interest is driven by the increase in female university and high school graduates. To do that,
I use as my outcome the ratio of females to males (residing in the boundaries of a given mu-
nicipality) who have completed high school, and university. Dividing by the number of males
corrects for any trends in males, and is the correct measure since outcome is the share of female
employees. I take 2014 as the year of reform, as students entering university in 2010 should
have graduated in 2014.7
The results presented in Table A.6 strongly eliminate the possibility that the main results
are confounded by headscarf reforms affecting educational institutions. Columns 1 and 2 use
high school graduation ratio as outcome, and columns 3 and 4 use university graduation ratio.
The results are robust to using MSE and CER optimally computed bandwidths. The ratio of
female to male high school and university graduates are not different in municipalities barely
conquered by the Islamist mayor, and the effect does not differ before and after the repeal of
the headscarf ban. The effect of the reform in high schools can be measured more accurately
using data on high school graduation in 2018 or 2019; and is more relevant for the employment
7The results are identical when 2015 is taken as the reform year, allowing for preparation time for university
exam or students to take longer to graduate.
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outcomes after 2018 since the newly enrolled students would still be in high school in the time
frame of my analysis.
High school refers to people only completed high school (and no further), uni to people with
high school+uni edc.
Table A.6: Main results
Outcome: Completion ratio female/male
High school High school University University
(1) (2) (3) (4)
MSE CER MSE CER
AKP14-AKP09 -0.103 -0.105 0.027 0.053
(0.233) (0.283) (0.084) (0.099)
Bandwidth 0.163 0.121 0.117 0.086)
Obs. 1,818 1,476 1,396 1,092
Clusters 511 423 414 337
AKP09 0.261 0.273 0.003 0.016
(0.437) (0.453) (0.150) (0.159)
Bandwidth 0.217 0.161 0.100 0.074
Obs. 624 527 368 288
AKP14 0.062 0.059 0.053 0.067
(0.042) (0.044) (0.045) (0.047)
Bandwidth 0.110 0.081 0.134 0.098
Obs. 768 594 917 689
Outcome Mean 0.684 0.680 0.674 0.684
Estimation method is local linear regression with two optimal bandwidths estimated following MSE-
optimal and CER-optimal procedures described in Calonico et al. [2014]. Robust standard errors are
clustered at the municipality level. All specifications include dummies for geographical regions. ***
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
A.1.7 Big Picture
Since there is only time variation in the repeal of the ban, there is no obvious control group with
which to check this assumption (that the difference between the two effects should be attributed
to the repeal of the ban).
Two ways to test: 1. broad aggregate changes. public vs private sector
Public and Private sector female employment before and after the repeal of the headscarf
ban. Broad aggergate changes happening over this time period. Includes all civil servants, not
just average percent across municipalities. Average share of female employees within the pub-
lic and private sector.
Furthermore, this figure also contributes to showing that for the private sector (that did not
see the headscarf ban lifted, or lifted earlier), there is no comparable increase in the share of
female employees around this time. Though there is an increasing trend, which could point out
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to some equilibrium spillovers.
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Figure A.4: Source: Data from the Social Security Register (SGK)
2. safely secular municpialities. Look at municipalities that were safely secular in 2009,
where Islamic parties weak enough that they would have been unlikely to win in 2014. Acording
to my story, the repeal of the headscarf ban in these municipalities would not have a large effect
on the female share of civil servants.
Define safely secular as municipalities where CHP won in 2009, and secular party votes
exceeded AKP votes by more than 25 of the vote share. Among these, AKP won in 23% of the
municipalities in 2014, and lost in 77 % of the municipalities.
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A.2 Appendix to Chapter 2
A.2.1 Additional Tables and Figures
This Appendix includes some supplementary tables and figures for our analyses.
The yearly treatment effects are estimated with the following regression equation:
yit = αi+βt ∗AtRisk fi +δt + εit (A.1)
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Figure A.5: Binary treatment with respect to above/below median of pre-reform intensity of potential mothers.
The figure displays parallel trends. Panel: 1983-2003.
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Outcome: Hirings
Proportions Dummy (0,1)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Potential Mothers Potential Fathers Not At Risk Potential Mothers Potential Fathers Not At Risk
1984 0.006 0.010 -0.015 -0.035*** 0.001 -0.043***
(0.012) (0.012) (0.013) (0.013) (0.014) (0.014)
1985 0.009 0.006 -0.014 0.001 -0.046*** -0.026*
(0.011) (0.011) (0.012) (0.013) (0.014) (0.015)
1986 0.013 0.005 -0.018 0.026** -0.077*** -0.050***
(0.011) (0.011) (0.012) (0.013) (0.014) (0.014)
1987 0.020* -0.001 -0.019 0.000 -0.087*** -0.049***
(0.011) (0.011) (0.012) (0.013) (0.014) (0.014)
1988 0.032*** 0.009 -0.041*** -0.035*** -0.025* -0.057***
(0.011) (0.011) (0.012) (0.013) (0.014) (0.014)
1989 0.016 0.042*** -0.058*** -0.183*** 0.049*** -0.089***
(0.012) (0.011) (0.012) (0.013) (0.014) (0.014)
1990 -0.020* 0.080*** -0.060*** -0.280*** 0.057*** -0.147***
(0.011) (0.011) (0.012) (0.013) (0.014) (0.014)
1991 -0.058*** 0.109*** -0.052*** -0.377*** 0.083*** -0.168***
(0.012) (0.011) (0.012) (0.013) (0.014) (0.014)
1992 -0.113*** 0.132*** -0.018 -0.487*** 0.092*** -0.187***
(0.012) (0.011) (0.012) (0.013) (0.014) (0.014)
1993 -0.238*** 0.204*** 0.034*** -0.683*** 0.148*** -0.203***
(0.012) (0.012) (0.013) (0.013) (0.014) (0.014)
1994 -0.239*** 0.193*** 0.046*** -0.875*** 0.035** -0.312***
(0.013) (0.012) (0.013) (0.014) (0.015) (0.014)
1995 -0.258*** 0.220*** 0.038*** -0.979*** -0.120*** -0.421***
(0.013) (0.013) (0.014) (0.015) (0.016) (0.016)
1996 -0.245*** 0.210*** 0.035** -0.946*** -0.131*** -0.426***
(0.014) (0.013) (0.015) (0.016) (0.017) (0.016)
1997 -0.255*** 0.201*** 0.054*** -0.893*** -0.152*** -0.402***
(0.014) (0.013) (0.014) (0.016) (0.017) (0.017)
1998 -0.240*** 0.202*** 0.038*** -0.836*** -0.151*** -0.386***
(0.014) (0.013) (0.015) (0.017) (0.018) (0.018)
1999 -0.275*** 0.232*** 0.043*** -0.828*** -0.073*** -0.335***
(0.014) (0.014) (0.015) (0.017) (0.018) (0.018)
2000 -0.235*** 0.233*** 0.003 -0.797*** -0.069*** -0.389***
(0.014) (0.014) (0.015) (0.017) (0.018) (0.018)
2001 -0.257*** 0.237*** 0.020 -0.770*** -0.082*** -0.353***
(0.014) (0.014) (0.015) (0.017) (0.018) (0.018)
2002 -0.282*** 0.256*** 0.026* -0.776*** -0.038** -0.328***
(0.014) (0.014) (0.015) (0.017) (0.018) (0.018)
2003 -0.283*** 0.278*** 0.005 -0.793*** 0.009 -0.317***
(0.015) (0.014) (0.016) (0.017) (0.018) (0.018)
Observations 587,470 587,470 587,470 969,129 969,129 969,129
R-squared 0.008 0.005 0.006 0.056 0.030 0.031
No. Firms 81,107 81,107 81,107 81,316 81,316 81,316
Year Dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES
Firm FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
Table A.7: Estimates from Equation A.1. Treatment: pre-reform intensity of potential mothers. Panel: 1983-2003.
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Outcome: Growth in Full-time Wages
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Median Wage Female Wage Male Wage Gender Wage Gap
1985 -0.018** -0.005 -0.024** -0.008
(0.008) (0.010) (0.010) (0.016)
1986 -0.013* 0.000 -0.028*** -0.004
(0.007) (0.009) (0.010) (0.015)
1987 0.015** 0.039*** -0.026*** -0.026*
(0.007) (0.009) (0.009) (0.015)
1988 0.006 0.023*** -0.016* -0.041***
(0.007) (0.009) (0.009) (0.015)
1989 0.053*** 0.068*** 0.000 -0.070***
(0.007) (0.008) (0.009) (0.014)
1990 0.027*** 0.052*** -0.014 -0.055***
(0.006) (0.008) (0.009) (0.014)
1991 0.041*** 0.061*** -0.002 -0.062***
(0.006) (0.008) (0.009) (0.014)
1992 0.003 0.039*** -0.010 -0.040***
(0.006) (0.008) (0.009) (0.014)
1993 0.020*** 0.040*** -0.005 -0.050***
(0.006) (0.008) (0.009) (0.014)
1994 -0.011* 0.042*** -0.060*** -0.082***
(0.006) (0.008) (0.009) (0.014)
1995 -0.063*** -0.035*** -0.100*** -0.056***
(0.007) (0.009) (0.010) (0.015)
1996 -0.016** 0.038*** -0.049*** -0.090***
(0.007) (0.009) (0.010) (0.015)
1997 -0.025*** 0.017* -0.044*** -0.064***
(0.007) (0.009) (0.010) (0.016)
1998 -0.004 0.052*** -0.034*** -0.084***
(0.007) (0.009) (0.010) (0.015)
1999 -0.002 0.040*** -0.030*** -0.072***
(0.007) (0.009) (0.010) (0.015)
2000 -0.010 0.038*** -0.039*** -0.080***
(0.007) (0.009) (0.011) (0.016)
2001 -0.024*** 0.034*** -0.067*** -0.113***
(0.007) (0.009) (0.010) (0.016)
2002 -0.019*** 0.038*** -0.051*** -0.097***
(0.007) (0.009) (0.011) (0.016)
2003 0.006 0.057*** -0.031*** -0.106***
(0.007) (0.009) (0.011) (0.015)
Observations 886,262 723,611 777,218 614,718
R-squared 0.008 0.007 0.006 0.001
No. Firms 80,662 71,592 72,891 63,771
Year Dummies YES YES YES YES
Firm FE YES YES YES YES
Table A.8: Estimates from Equation A.1. Treatment: pre-reform intensity of potential mothers. Panel: 1983-2003.
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Figure A.6: Yearly treatment effects on wage growth. Confidence intervals correspond to 95 % level. Panel:
1983-2003.
155
Outcome: Growth in Employment
(1) (2) (3)
Part-time Workers Low-educated Workers High-educated Workers
1985 0.008* -0.003 -0.003
(0.004) (0.004) (0.003)
1986 0.001 0.002 -0.002
(0.004) (0.003) (0.003)
1987 0.009** 0.001 -0.001
(0.004) (0.003) (0.003)
1988 -0.001 0.002 -0.002
(0.004) (0.003) (0.003)
1989 0.005 0.005 -0.008***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
1990 -0.009*** 0.008*** -0.006**
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
1991 -0.001 0.006* -0.010***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
1992 -0.016*** 0.009*** -0.008***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
1993 -0.012*** 0.007** -0.008***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
1994 -0.049*** 0.008*** -0.010***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
1995 -0.038*** 0.007** -0.010***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
1996 -0.025*** 0.011*** -0.008***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
1997 -0.024*** 0.007** -0.010***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
1998 -0.011*** 0.008** -0.009***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
1999 -0.024*** 0.011*** -0.007**
(0.004) (0.003) (0.003)
2000 -0.008** 0.015*** -0.013***
(0.004) (0.003) (0.003)
2001 -0.020*** 0.010*** -0.012***
(0.004) (0.003) (0.003)
2002 -0.025*** 0.011*** -0.017***
(0.004) (0.003) (0.003)
2003 -0.027*** 0.011*** -0.014***
(0.004) (0.003) (0.003)
Observations 887,813 887,813 887,813
R-squared 0.004 0.001 0.000
No. Firms 80,749 80,749 80,749
Year Dummies YES YES YES
Firm FE YES YES YES
Table A.9: Estimates from Equation A.1. Treatment: pre-reform intensity of potential mothers. Panel: 1983-2003.
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Figure A.7: Yearly treatment effects on hiring. Treatment: pre-reform intensity of potential mothers. Confidence
intervals correspond to 95 % level. Panel: 1983-2003.
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Outcome: Hirings
Proportions
(1) (2) (3)
Potential Mothers Potential Fathers Not At Risk
1984 0.036 -0.032 -0.004
(0.030) (0.034) (0.029)
1985 0.078*** -0.023 -0.054**
(0.029) (0.032) (0.027)
1986 0.098*** -0.102*** 0.004
(0.029) (0.031) (0.026)
1987 0.105*** -0.089*** -0.016
(0.029) (0.030) (0.026)
1988 0.083*** -0.035 -0.048*
(0.029) (0.031) (0.026)
1989 0.119*** -0.071** -0.048*
(0.030) (0.032) (0.027)
1990 0.176*** -0.094*** -0.082***
(0.031) (0.032) (0.027)
1991 0.166*** -0.077** -0.090***
(0.031) (0.032) (0.026)
1992 0.051* -0.046 -0.005
(0.030) (0.033) (0.028)
1993 -0.080*** -0.030 0.110***
(0.031) (0.033) (0.029)
1994 -0.054 -0.082** 0.136***
(0.035) (0.037) (0.031)
1995 -0.085** -0.032 0.117***
(0.035) (0.038) (0.033)
1996 -0.088** -0.059 0.147***
(0.035) (0.039) (0.035)
1997 -0.086** -0.051 0.137***
(0.034) (0.037) (0.033)
1998 -0.090*** -0.040 0.130***
(0.035) (0.038) (0.034)
1999 -0.185*** -0.027 0.213***
(0.037) (0.040) (0.038)
2000 -0.130*** -0.043 0.173***
(0.036) (0.041) (0.038)
2001 -0.145*** -0.034 0.179***
(0.038) (0.040) (0.037)
2002 -0.160*** -0.018 0.179***
(0.036) (0.041) (0.037)
2003 -0.116*** -0.085* 0.201***
(0.040) (0.044) (0.039)
Observations 587,470 587,470 587,470
R-squared 0.003 0.002 0.006
No. Firms 81,107 81,107 81,107
Year Dummies YES YES YES
Firm FE YES YES YES
Table A.10: Estimates from Equation A.1. Treatment: parental take-up rates of females in 1992. Panel: 1983-2003.
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Outcome: Hirings
Proportions Dummy (0,1)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Potential Mothers Potential Fathers Not At Risk Potential Mothers Potential Fathers Not At Risk
βShortRun -0.258*** 0.229*** 0.029* -0.369*** -0.194*** -0.254***
(0.014) (0.014) (0.015) (0.022) (0.023) (0.022)
βLongRun -0.280*** 0.245*** 0.035** -0.474*** -0.322*** -0.363***
(0.013) (0.013) (0.015) (0.026) (0.027) (0.025)
Observations 119,741 119,741 119,741 182,420 182,420 182,420
R-squared 0.008 0.006 0.004 0.026 0.021 0.022
No. Firms 9,116 9,116 9,116 9,121 9,121 9,121
Year Dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES
Firm FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
Table A.11: Estimates from Equation 3.1. Treatment: pre-reform intensity of potential mothers. Panel: 1983-2003,
conditional on firms that survive until the last year of data, 2003.
Outcome: Growth in Full-time Wages
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Median Wage Female Wage Male Wage Gender Wage Gap
βShortRun -0.001 0.013*** -0.020*** -0.024***
(0.003) (0.005) (0.005) (0.007)
βLongRun 0.000 0.023*** -0.006 -0.021***
(0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.007)
Observations 173,251 150,743 164,548 142,043
R-squared 0.013 0.006 0.011 0.001
No. Firms 9,121 8,750 8,973 8,602
Year Dummies YES YES YES YES
Firm FE YES YES YES YES
Table A.12: Estimates from Equation 3.1. Treatment: pre-reform intensity of potential mothers. Panel: 1983-2003,
conditional on firms that survive until the last year of data, 2003.
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A.3 Appendix to Chapter 3
A.3.1 Different Means of Transport: Driving
Effect of Proximity to Healthcare on AKP Votes. Main outcome: Change in AKP Vote Share.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
OLS FD FD FD FD FD
∆ Driving Time -0.418*** 0.350 0.350 0.350 0.350 0.243
(0.075) (0.543) (0.642) (0.642) (0.642) (0.609)
2011*∆ Driving Time -0.531 -0.531 -0.531 -0.531 -0.411
(0.547) (0.647) (0.648) (0.652) (0.614)
2014*∆ Driving Time -1.146* -1.146 -1.146 -1.146 -1.112
(0.614) (0.826) (0.797) (0.801) (0.791)
Observations 3,958 3,958 3,958 3,958 3,958 3,937
R-squared 0.008 0.271 0.271 0.271 0.271 0.342
Covariates NO NO NO NO NO YES
Year Dummies NO YES YES YES YES YES
Clusters NO NO Polling Center Neighborhood Clinic Polling Center
Table A.13: OLS and First-Difference regressions of change in AKP vote share on change in driving time to the
nearest FHC. Columns 2-6 include year dummies interacted with the treatment, and standard errors clustered at
the indicated levels. 2015 is the base year. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
A.3.2 Heterogeneity: Swing and Core Voters
Effect of Proximity to Healthcare on AKP Votes. Main outcome: Change in AKP Vote Share.
Core Voters Swing Voters
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
∆ Walking Time 0.023 0.023 0.055 -0.371 -0.371 -0.021
(0.177) (0.177) (0.180) (1.194) (1.195) (1.295)
2011*∆ Driving Time -0.069 -0.069 -0.088 0.216 0.216 -0.142
(0.180) (0.180) (0.182) (1.196) (1.197) (1.297)
2014*∆ Driving Time -0.628* -0.628* -0.670* -0.169 -0.169 -0.515
(0.380) (0.380) (0.375) (1.254) (1.246) (1.353)
Observations 2,910 2,910 2,910 1,048 1,048 1,048
R-squared 0.271 0.271 0.305 0.297 0.297 0.331
Covariates NO NO YES NO NO NO
Year Dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES
Clusters Polling Center Neighborhood Polling Center Polling Center Neighborhood Polling Center
Table A.14: First-Difference regressions of change in AKP vote share on change in walking time, by swing and
core AKP municipalities in 2009. All regressions include year dummies interacted with the treatment. Standard
errors are clustered at the indicated levels. 2015 is the base year.
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A.3.3 Heterogeneity: Presence of Public Hospitals
Effect of Proximity to Healthcare on AKP Votes. Main outcome: Change in AKP Vote Share.
Hospital=0 Hospital=1
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
∆ Walking Time 0.028 0.028 0.062 -1.913 -1.913 -1.775
(0.169) (0.169) (0.172) (2.191) (2.188) (2.395)
2011*∆ Walking Time -0.089 -0.089 -0.114 1.793 1.793 1.661
(0.172) (0.172) (0.174) (2.192) (2.182) (2.398)
2014*∆ Walking Time -0.601 -0.601 -0.624* 1.201 1.201 1.093
(0.370) (0.388) (0.363) (2.202) (2.221) (2.405)
Observations 3,439 3,439 3,439 519 519 519
R-squared 0.276 0.276 0.308 0.292 0.292 0.317
Covariates NO NO YES NO NO NO
Year Dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES
Clusters Polling Center Neighborhood Polling Center Polling Center Neighborhood Polling Center
Table A.15: First-Difference regressions of change in AKP vote share on change in walking time, by presence
of public hospital within the neighborhood. All regressions include year dummies interacted with the treatment.
Standard errors are clustered at the indicated levels. 2015 is the base year.
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